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Foreword

Thomas J. Ward



This issue of the *Journal of Global Development and Peace* appears in the midst of seismic shifts in the political landscape of the Middle East. Longstanding authoritarian governments in Egypt and Tunisia have been replaced by transitional governments and democracy is being proffered as a viable path for the future. Key proponents of change in these countries as well as the international community aspire for transformations that would result in an institutionalization of democratic processes and rule of law. However, this cannot be measured through a single election. The sustainability of democratic reforms will be assessed over the next decade.

In the decades following World War II, monarchies were toppled in Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran and Iraq. This led not to democracy but rather to different expressions of authoritarian rule. Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser emerged as the foremost figure of the Pan-Arabist movement. However, when his successor President Anwar Sadat established formal diplomatic relations with Israel, Syrian leader Hafiz al-Assad and Saddam Hussein assumed more central roles. Since the toppling of the government of Saddam Hussein, it is increasingly difficult to uphold the legitimacy of this movement as a defender of Arab interests. Unlike its two Arab neighbors, Iran has emerged as a revolutionary state that is reliant on religion to validate its political decisions.

It was the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who established the first secular government in the Islamic world when he assumed power in 1923. During his fifteen year rule, Ataturk crafted a separation of religion and government in Turkey. Although Ataturk would be seen more as a political figure of the right, Gamal Nasser, Hafiz al-Assad, and Saddam Hussein did not inherit his rightist leanings though they did adopt his separation of government and religion. They also reflected his authoritarian tendencies.

The identity of the emerging new governments of Egypt and Tunisia can be expected to be more democratic following planned elections. However, these governments will then need to debate the role that religion should play in their future political trajectories. Most likely the first elections in these countries will produce elected governments that incline toward a separation between government and religion. However, if those elected governments fail to sustain popular support, they may well be succeeded by governments that

will emphasize the role of Islam in governance. The impact that the death of Osama bin Laden will have on this process cannot be immediately assessed. Will it lead to a rise or to a decrease in the role of Al Qaeda and related organizations? Or will diplomacy and rule of law become the norm for addressing inequities in the Middle East? Those questions we can only answer with time.

***

We all mourn the tragic loss of life, resulting from the earthquake and the tsunami that took place in Japan in March. We must pay respect, as many have already done, to the ways in which the Japanese, with support from nations around the world, maintained their composure in the midst of this tragedy. The Japanese have endured, have patiently stood in lines, have not ransacked abandoned stores and have managed to put the most seriously afflicted before themselves. On the world stage, they have demonstrated the noble dimensions of the Japanese spirit that can benefit us all.

While violence continues to erupt in the Middle East, Japan's peace has internalized and matured, even beyond the peace of its Western mentors. The Meiji reforms of the 1860s not only transformed Japan's economic structure but they ended the era of the Samurai. In the period following World War II, Japan has emerged as a model of cooperation, social harmony and self-sacrifice.

It is more than appropriate in opening this Spring 2011 issue that we begin by rendering homage to those who aspire for freedom and rule of law in the Middle East and have sacrificed their personal aspirations for this dream. But we also do well to recognize, appreciate, and learn from the citizens of Japan whose nobility has been played out before us on the evening news this Spring.

A sincere expression of thanks to our contributors in this Spring 2011 issue. Many thanks to Kemal Argon, Darryl Brock, Hongbing Deng, Solomon Hailu, William Lay, Phillip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika and Mark A. Wilterding. I hope that our readers may all benefit from these writers' excellent analyses and insights into global challenges and opportunities.

Thomas J. Ward
Executive Editor

American International Relations: Lessons from Dollar Diplomacy and Caribbean Development

Darryl E. Brock

Abstract

The United States sprung onto the world stage at the turn of the twentieth century, joining the ranks of the European imperial powers. Two events catalyzed this evolution, both occurring in the Caribbean. The outcome of the Spanish-American War proved the first, with direct possession of Puerto Rico and other territories, as well as virtual control over Cuba as a protectorate. Soon thereafter, primarily associated with President William Howard Taft, Dollar Diplomacy provided a vehicle for U.S. sovereignty over the Dominican Republic and other areas of the Caribbean, substituting "dollars for bullets." The U.S. projected its power into these arenas, seeking to reshape and develop regional Latin American polities into capitalistic, democratic nations in the American image. This laboratory, experimenting with power and economic development, would forge new American foreign policy directions, its echoes today shaping contemporary nation-building projects in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Biography

Darryl E. Brock is a Ph.D. candidate in Modern History at Fordham University in New York City, with an M.A. in history from Claremont Graduate University in Southern California and an M.S. in marine science from the University of South Florida. He has recently published an article in the Southeast Review of Asian Studies*, as well as a book chapter "José Agustín Quintero—Cuban Patriot in Confederate Diplomatic Service" in the book* Cubans in the Confederacy. *He is also author of the book* China and Darwinian Evolution: Influence on Intellectual and Social Development *and is currently co-editing the book* Mr. Science and Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution. *Mr. Brock is a board member of the Irvine (CA) Sister Cities Foundation, previously served on the NSF panel for President Bush's Excellence in Science Teaching Awards, and recently received a British Council fellowship to present, in Egypt, on the influence of Darwin in China.*

"Peace follows . . . the power of the mighty civilized races which have not lost the fighting instinct, and which by their expansion are gradually bringing peace into red wastes where the barbarian peoples of the world hold sway."

Theodore Roosevelt (1899)[1]

The lure of new global export markets, among other factors, drove the United States to seize the opportunity of the *Maine's* sinking in Havana harbor, thrusting America into the ranks of imperial nations. Republican Senator Albert J. Beveridge defended American imperialism as right and just in his Senate speech of January 9, 1900. According to Beveridge, God made Americans politically adept so "that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples."[2] To prevent relapse into barbarism, then, Americans had been given a divine mission to "lead in the regeneration of the world."[3]

Col. Theodore Roosevelt, commander of the 1898 "Rough Riders" cavalry at the time of the Spanish-American War.

Photo | *Library of Congress*

Theodore Roosevelt concurred. The president-scholar perceived a "certain parallelism" regarding the fate of species and the affairs of men, i.e., development, change and dominance among those various human groups "which form races or nations." A barbaric race might gradually develop into a more complex civilization, just as in evolutionary biology generalized forms give rise to specialized forms. Roosevelt perceived the question of how to deal with utterly alien peoples as the daunting challenge then facing empires in the new century. International duty, according to the great powers, demanded control of other races—while, of course, safeguarding against the threat of barbarism—but only if managed "for the benefit of the other race."[4]

Roosevelt and Beveridge, in a nutshell, expressed the turn-of-the-century civilizing mission embraced by the United States as the ebb and flow of international fortune presented the United States with a global empire, one anchored in the Caribbean. Indeed, the pervasive appeal of such notions transcended political and popular ideas of international development and peace, with *Scientific American* even noting Puerto Rico as unique, possessing "a large white population capable

of taking part in advancing civilization."[5]

New Economic Frontiers

Economic considerations conjoined with the civilizing impetus to evolve new directions in American international relations. During the nineteenth century the United States had witnessed Europeans carving up the world, the British, the French and the Germans in Africa, the French also in Indochina, and later the Japanese even expanding their power in Asia, with virtually all nations scrambling for a piece of China. The United States had catalyzed the emergence of the ultimately imperialist Meiji regime with Commodore Matthew C. Perry's mid-century, trade-oriented gunboat diplomacy; however, to project sustained power, Americans sought to expand their navy. After the Confederate War, Secretary of State William Seward had pursued expansion of an American Pacific presence with the purchase of Alaska, and also argued unsuccessfully for U.S. naval bases in the Caribbean. In the 1890s, U.S. Naval College president Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan succeeded where Seward had failed. Mahan argued that British global dominance emerged from its sea power and that the United States should construct a strong navy to support the expansion of American markets. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner indirectly reinforced Mahan. His noted 1893 essay—The Frontier Thesis—declared the final closing of the American frontier. Turner's work implied that American economic expansion would now need to seek foreign outlets. No market lured more than the vast China market. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt supported Mahan's ideas and, in turn, President William McKinley's reluctant war against Spain. By the time the dust had settled on the Spanish-American War, the U.S. sphere not only included its Caribbean possessions, but also a series of Pacific coaling stations from Hawaii to Guam and the Philippines with which to reach the fabled China market.[6]

United States security interests shifted as prospects brightened for an inter-ocean canal, eventually located in Panama, driving American hegemonic interests in the region.

Secretary of State John Hay recognized the weak position of the United States vis-à-vis the European powers which had already staked claims in China where the Americans had none. Ostensibly as a measure to safeguard Chinese rights and sovereignty, Hay proposed an "Open Door" policy to guarantee equal trade and commerce opportunities in China. He secured agreement from Japan, Russia and the European powers to this free, open market, the great powers resolving not to seize Chinese territories for the establishment of new colonies. Hay had adroitly maneuvered a relatively weaker United

States into a commercial presence in China. He did this without war and without the inconvenience of direct colonization, an important factor while the U.S. wrestled with how best to manage its new colonies, especially in the Caribbean.[7] Successive administrations would follow Hay's free, open market approach as a matter of foreign policy.

Holding Europe at Bay

United States security interests shifted as prospects brightened for an inter-ocean canal, eventually located in Panama, driving American hegemonic interests in the region. European presence in the Caribbean needed to be minimized, either directly by naval force, or by threat of that force. Thus arose in 1904 President Roosevelt's "Big Stick," an extension of the Monroe Doctrine that came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary. In essence, to discourage European nations from intervening in Latin America to collect debts—as had been threatened in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic—Roosevelt declared the U.S. as hemispheric policeman. These constabulary powers would not be directed so much at the Europeans, but at any irresponsible Latin American powers, in the U.S. view, that would invite European aggression for not meeting international financial obligations. As a matter of duty, the United States would take whatever measures it deemed necessary to assure internal stability in such impotent nations. In practice, Roosevelt had created justification for repeated military interventions into Latin American nations such as Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.[8]

The U.S. might desire stable Latin American nations capable of dutifully paying their debts to European investors, but civilizing mission or not, convincing American citizens to support new wars and bear the burden of more colonies would be untenable. President William Howard Taft (1909-1913) desired to replace "bullets with dollars," invoking a new foreign policy of Dollar Diplomacy. Employing private loans, typically from Wall Street, to advance U.S. overseas interests, these enhanced financial and business opportunities worked hand-in-hand with diplomatic initiatives to press for fiscal and structural reform in Latin America. Dollar Diplomacy could be employed locally in the Caribbean, or to American interests around the world. Liberia enjoyed such American attentions to promote rubber production for Harvey Firestone and his company; similarly, in China, J. P. Morgan's banking conglomerate joined forces with a European consortium to build a railroad from Huguang to Canton. Behind the scenes, the driving force behind Dollar Diplomacy proved to be none other than Philander C. Knox, founder of the giant firm U.S. Steel. This reflected the eliding of diplomacy and private commerce in a re-ordering of international relations. Despite their hopes for this new policy, it would fail to stem revolution in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, and even China.[9]

Dollar Diplomacy and Imperialism

The standard narrative does not recognize imperialism as an aspect of Dollar Diplo-

J.S. Pughe's 1900 political cartoon "Hurrah! The country is saved again!" finds Uncle Sam and Columbia dancing with new insular territories, including Cuba and "Porto Rico," as well as American Labor, Capital and the Farmer.

Photo | *Library of Congress*

macy. Samuel Flagg Bemis, in his classic 1940s scholarship, perceived American imperialism of the 1890's as an aberration. He explained U.S. Caribbean Basin interventions as resulting from U.S. security concerns, such as defending the Panama Canal and controlling shipping lanes. Modern scholars would challenge this, articulating that the U.S. pursued incursions in a broader historical context of establishing a Caribbean Basin empire, at least informally.[10]

Those differing perceptions of United States imperial designs can be somewhat resolved by considering different notions of imperialism. In the British Empire, imperialist projects invariably resulted in colonization; however, after 1898 the United States sought to extend its influence without further acquisition of territory. Historian Daniel Headrick perceives imperialism when a stronger state imposes its will on a weaker society by force, or the threat of force. That is, in a modern sense imperialism can be equated with spheres of influence, or dominance, without the requirement for direct colonial conquest.[11] Imperialism aside, scholars consider Dollar Diplomacy an element of the civilizing mission. Assistant Secretary of State Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson, of the Taft administration, revealed the Social Darwinist impetus behind the policy. Wilson explained that nature's "rough method of uplift, gives sick nations strong

neighbors."[12]

Agricultural Development in Colonial Puerto Rico

Excitement over the new Caribbean colony washed over the American scientific community even before Roosevelt's "Rough Riders" stormed San Juan Hill, the incorporation of Puerto Rico representing a rare American experiment in direct colonial acquisition. The technical journals communicated a variety of perspectives on Puerto Rico's potential and how its agricultural resources ought to be developed. As medicine sought to maintain the health of the people to support the colonial project, agricultural production would provide the foodstuffs for their maintenance, and perhaps more importantly, an opportunity to sustain economic development. The journal *Science* reminded of European colonizing success, that even Holland "depended on scientific development of agriculture, forestry" and other industries in its colonies.[13]

Annexation after the 1898 war created opportunities to export U.S. institutional research models to Puerto Rico. President McKinley's special commissioner, Henry K. Carroll, in his comprehensive 1899 *Report on the Island of Porto Rico*, made twenty-four specific recommendations, the final one addressing agriculture: "That an agricultural experiment station be established in Porto Rico, and that the publications of the Department of Agriculture be made available to the planters in their own language; also, that the Territory share in the Department's distribution of seeds."[14]

By 1902, the Office of Experiment Stations at the USDA established the Porto Rico Agricultural Experiment Station in Mayagüez, a city of the west coast coffee region. Historian Richard Overfield distills USDA funding arguments before Congress: "[W]herever the American flag was, residents should have the benefits of experimentation and agricultural developments."[15] The USDA secretary sought hegemony over the Puerto Rican research agenda.[16] As the stations commenced operations, the leadership targeted projects to provide immediate assistance to growers. They focused on insect pests, for example, but their work did not synch with the actual needs of the people and initially proved of little value; the researchers had not considered previous agricultural work in Puerto Rico. Agronomist Edmundo Colón would later criticize early efforts to acclimatize North American plants as mere entertainment: "It would not have been so bad if the species from temperate climates had been tried at higher altitudes." In addition to research, the station managed the extension service to local farmers until 1924. As with sometimes off-target research, they translated twenty-four USDA bulletins that were more suited to temperate climes than the tropics. Distributing thousands of bulletins and reports informally to leading "progressive planters," their programs often did not reach the intended great masses of poor, local farmers.[17]

Experiment Station Successes

The USDA Mayagüez station, however, could claim some areas of relative success. Researchers sought to stimulate the ailing

coffee industry, which had gone into decline due to the devastating effects of the recent hurricane Ciriaco, exacerbated by Spain inflicting a high tariff after 1898, thus closing the vital Spanish market to Puerto Rico. Acquiring a coffee plantation near Ponce and introducing new coffee varieties from Java, Ceylon and elsewhere, by 1911 research plots had quadrupled production over the island's average. The journal *Science* reported novel efforts by the USDA entomologist to combat the coffee leaf-miner by means of a promising parasite, and that a botanist from the Connecticut State experiment station had temporarily relocated to study coffee diseases. Scientific research, however, could not solve coffee's underlying economic problems. Americans preferred Brazilian coffee, and that South American supplier had been overproducing for some time. On the other hand, fruit farming enjoyed clear benefits from station research. As roads and port transportation improved under U.S. colonial authority, the fruit industry expanded and growers sought advice from the USDA. The station had a banana plantation and nurseries of mangoes and citrus by 1903. USDA scientists discovered that chlorosis, then affecting citrus and pineapple, was caused by excessive soil concentration of carbonate of lime; accordingly, experiments on fertilizers quickly proceeded. By 1911, fruit and pineapple exports surged to $2.1 million, a twenty-fold leap from a decade earlier.[18]

The USDA station sought diversification of Puerto Rican agriculture, moving away from sugar, but that industry expanded rapidly given their exemptions from U.S. tariffs, financed largely by North American corporations. By 1917 sugar exports had grown five-fold, eclipsing coffee as the major export.[19] The island had achieved an underdeveloped "colonial economy," one "heavily dependent upon the single market of the continental United States," according to historian Richard Overfield.[20] The sugar *centrales* had quickly planted all available land and

Loading sugar cane from ox cart to railroad car in Guánica, Puerto Rico, to be taken to the sugar mill.

Photo | *Library of Congress*

by that time had thus explored new cane varieties and fertilizers to increase yields. While the USDA station urged rational agriculture techniques, such as rotations with vegetable crops, the Puerto Rico Sugar Growers' Association instead formed their own private experiment station at Río Piedras in 1910, located near

the capital, San Juan. This station hoped to duplicate the private Hawaiian Sugar Producers' experiment station success in eradicating the sugarcane leafhopper, as Puerto Ricans now faced the locally damaging white grub. By 1914, the sugar producers abandoned the project in failure, donating the station to the insular government's quasi-governmental Board of Commissioners of Agriculture. The newly christened Insular Experiment Station nevertheless continued close relations with the *centrales*.[21]

Sugarcane and Disease

The Insular Experiment Station faced a major challenge to Puerto Rican agriculture in 1917, one that would secure to it respect and reshape agricultural power relationships on the island, and beyond. Station pathologist John A. Stevenson found leaves of sugar plants oddly mottled, leading to his naming this new condition the mottling disease or *matizado*. Over the coming years the disease spread across the island, and as mills increasingly refused to accept diseased cane, bankruptcy afflicted a number of locally-owned *colonos*.[22]

By 1918, then director Stevenson's reports seemed desperate, with progress proving elusive. All cane varieties seemed affected, and the hereditary disease was passed down to new generations of cane grown from the diseased stalk. The disease had spread faster than planting activities alone would suggest. One small step of progress was his classification of the condition as sugar cane mosaic disease, due to its similarity to that in tobacco. Subsequent research determined globalization of agriculture to be the culprit, that Javanese cane hybrids arrived in the Caribbean through Argentina, perhaps via Egypt as well.[23]

Global scientists shifted their gaze to Puerto Rico, the disease epidemic only in that Caribbean space. The mosaic further engendered their fascination, it being a virus, one of that relatively recently discovered type of microorganisms. Investigators considered various factors that could explain the epidemic, its emergence particularly severe on smaller Puerto Rican owned plantations, *colonos*, as compared to the U.S. owned operations on the island's east and south. World War I had essentially destroyed Europe's sugar beet industry, driving such demand for cane sugar that growers often ignored good agricultural practices. Those actions weakened plant strains, a trend exacerbated by keeping the poorer, diseased stock for seed, while sending the best for

Never before had a Latin American nation solved a crisis in agriculture through scientific research. Puerto Rican agricultural science secured unprecedented political power throughout the Spanish Caribbean.

milling. Finally, in 1920 at USDA's Maryland greenhouses, researcher E. W. Brandes discovered that the corn aphid had the ability to transmit the disease. Researchers in Puerto Rico discounted this discovery since that aphid did not feed on cane; they instead focused attention on the sugarcane leafhopper.[24]

Politics, Agriculture and Chardón

Insular station mycologist Carlos E. Chardón would finally solve the puzzle. Born in 1898 and among the first generation of Puerto Rican scientists to come to maturity as an American colonial, he had proven a promising student at the newly established Mayagüez College of Agriculture. Chardón transferred to Cornell University upon the devastating 1918 earthquake that suspended college operations. Upon completing his master's degree in 1921, he returned to Puerto Rico to assume a station pathologist position.[25] Chardón conceived an elegant experiment to eliminate the leafhopper as culprit. He grew two groups of healthy cane, but one enclosed in a wire-mesh cage with leafhoppers contained therein. Within four months, the exposed cane emerged largely infected, but the enclosed group remained healthy. Chardón had exonerated leafhoppers as the culprit. He then decided to follow up on Brandes' lead regarding aphids.[26] Almost immediately upon his successful experiment, Chardón wrote to Nathaniel L. Britton, director of the New York Botanical Garden: "You will be interested to know that I have been able to transmit the sugar-cane mosaic by means of the [genus] aphis . . . and have obtained abundant secondary infections in the cages where the insects were used, and no infections in the checks. I forced the aphis to live on the cane by means of thorough weeding."[27] That is, the twenty-four year old Chardón had discovered that after normal weeding operations, the aphids jumped to cane for several hours, sufficient time to infect the plants with the mosaic virus. The aphid exposed, experts sought new resistant cane varieties, since the aphid could not be controlled. Testing canes from Java and Barbados, the new varieties flourished, producing even more sugar than before. By 1924 Puerto Rico no longer suffered under mosaic disease threat.[28]

Chardón viewed the increase in production as a direct result of scientific intervention. The lesson of mosaic disease was clear, that "every *colono* on the Island has awakened to the fact that after all, *only science applied to crop production* can in the end solve his problems."[29] Puerto Rican planters as well as politicians embraced Chardón's "vision because it had produced concrete results."[30] The success of the Insular Experiment Station led to its emergence as the Latin American model for agricultural science. Never before had a Latin American nation solved a crisis in agriculture through scientific research. Puerto Rican agricultural science secured unprecedented political power throughout the Spanish Caribbean and Carlos Chardón would be the vehicle to wield that power. The American governor Horace Towner found in the young pathologist a Puerto Rican from an elite family who embraced both the American and Spanish traditions, but more importantly, one who exhibited an impressive

mastery of agriculture. Taken with the insular marvel, Towner appointed Chardón as Puerto Rico's Commissioner of Agriculture.[31]

Exporting Development

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. would extol the Puerto Rican agricultural commissioner Chardón in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* as having "done investigational and scientific work of the first value."[32] Former University of Puerto Rico chancellor Thomas E. Benner, also writing in early 1930s issues of *Foreign Affairs*, elaborated on the eminent scientist: "The services of Porto Rico's commissioner of agriculture, Carlos A. [*sic*] Chardón, have been loaned on request to the ministries of agriculture of several Latin-American countries; on the basis of his study and advice new programs of teaching and experimentation have been inaugurated in the republics visited."[33]

Cornell-educated biologist Carlos E. Chardón, former insular agricultural commissioner, in 1931 serving as chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico.

Late in the previous decade of the 1920s, the new agricultural commissioner had hoped to promote the best aspects of North American and Puerto Rican traditions, perceiving his mission to export U.S. scientific knowledge to meet the agricultural, economic, social and political needs of Latin America. He argued that export agricultural problems were biological: soil depletion, crop diseases and declining yields. Scientists had the requisite expertise to solve these challenges. In short, the masters of biological practice should drive agricultural policy, not only in Puerto Rico, but throughout larger Latin America.[34]

Latin America marveled at and sought to emulate Puerto Rico's agricultural success. As a result, Chardón consulted extensively with governments and agricultural groups in Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Ecuador and the Pan American Union. He focused on two projects: constructing a national agricultural research program in Colombia, and establishing Puerto Rico's graduate school of tropical agriculture.[35] These efforts fit squarely within Roosevelt's vision. The governor proclaimed the work of Chardón and others: "In agriculture Puerto Rico's achievements have been the equal of those in medicine." Roosevelt sought to build on those achievements, arguing that for North and South America, Puerto Rico "can serve as the connecting link between the two great cultural divisions." That is, "We might well make Puerto Rico a base for cultural and scientific work the influence of which would be felt through both continents."[36]

The Graduate School of Tropical Agriculture

Chardón's work in Puerto Rico and Colombia convinced him of the need for a graduate school of tropical agriculture to train the future specialists that would surely be in great demand. He accelerated efforts in this area and, by 1926, developed a detailed proposal. The United States, he felt, had a moral obligation to train these future agricultural leaders; moreover, such a biologically-oriented Latin outreach could be more constructive than, as he sardonically noted, the military's clear failure "in the development of friendly relations with Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua."[37] Chardón referred to a series of military interventions after the failure of Dollar Diplomacy in those nations.

The model for this new agricultural graduate school would be the University of Puerto Rico's highly successful School of Tropical Medicine.[38] Just as Columbia University filled a critical cooperative role for that medical institution, he imagined Cornell University likewise providing similar support for agriculture. By the following year, Chardón led a high-level Puerto Rican delegation to Washington to place the proposal before the National Research Council's chair for the Committee on Biology and Agriculture. The NRC visited Puerto Rico and embraced the project, declaring that the proposed university would promote Western hemispheric relations. The Puerto Rican legislature authorized the school and Cornell's president committed to raising funds for the institution.[39] The journal *Science,* nearly two decades earlier, had called for a "Pan-American institution for the scientific study of the conditions of tropical America."[40] This seemed to be coming to fruition with Chardón's initiative, *Science* now declaring that assistance along "scientific lines" could promote international relations. "For that reason, Governor Roosevelt hopes that the graduate tropic agricultural school on the island sponsored by Cornell University may soon become a reality."[41]

The economic effects of the Great Depression impacted agricultural science in Puerto Rico. While the USDA station stood immune to local conditions, and the Insular Experiment Station managed to attract legislative funding, progress on the School of Tropical Agriculture ground to a halt. The president of Cornell University proved unable to secure sufficient donors for the needed $1 million endowment.[42] As a result, Chardón adjusted his trajectory, accepting the chancellorship (rector) of the University of Puerto Rico.[43]

Chardón's experiences with the economic depression and in managing a university broadened his views on the primacy of scientific research as the vehicle for modernization; he now came to appreciate more fully the study of economics as a complementary consideration. Appointed to the Puerto Rico Policy Commission, he prepared a report regarding the island's economic situation. As foreign sugar markets contracted and poverty increased, the chancellor and his colleagues developed a reform plan—the *Plan Chardón*—to diversify agriculture as well as industry. Tech-

nological recommendations, such as developing alcohol fuels from sugar, joined with economic proposals. The plan having been endorsed by Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, Chardón resigned as chancellor to assume leadership of the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Agency (PRRA), a New Deal organization. The PRRA worked to rebuild the fruit and coffee sectors, while also addressing soil erosion and deforestation, against a backdrop of political resistance from the powerful sugar corporations.[44] Though PRRA success proved elusive, USDA undersecretary (and future Puerto Rican governor) Rexford Tugwell endorsed the *Plan Chardón* and urged the Mayagüez experiment station to expand its mission beyond Puerto Rico in order to serve the broader continental United States as well.[45]

SDIC and the Dominican Republic

Nearly a decade prior to the annexation of Puerto Rico, Gilded Age speculators Smith M. Weed and Frederick Williams Holls—friends of President Glover Cleveland—formed the San Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC) in order to seek their Caribbean fortunes. SDIC's first action: Purchase of the Dominican Republic's five-million-dollar debt in 1893 from the Dutch. Allying with Dominican dictator Ulises Heureaux, the SDIC sought to improve the nation's finances in order to pay off the debt. Through the dictator, the SDIC pressed country peasants, the *campesinos*, to abandon food crops in favor of export agriculture, as would later occur under American tutelage in Puerto Rico and Cuba. Such a shift would not only provide greater agricultural exports but would also increase food and manufactured imports from the U.S., with duties levied by Heureaux both ways to enhance his nation's financial solvency. This nascent Dollar Diplomacy would eventually prove unworkable against fierce peasant resistance. Heureaux's assassination would force the U.S. to take direct control in 1905, permanently sidelining the pariah SDIC. In the end, the SDIC catalyzed President Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and led the way for the mature Dollar Diplomacy to take root, being financed from major bankers, as opposed to management by a Gilded Age relic, an SDIC run more on cronyism than capital.[46]

Washington, in the early 1890s, had originally embraced the SDIC in order to expunge European influence from the Dominican Republic. As long as European bankers owned the loans there, they exercised a level of control that flew in the face of the Monroe Doctrine's spirit. Much better, Washington reasoned, for a private American firm to own the debt. Americans running the SDIC could also help maintain close ties to the Dominican Republic as the U.S. negotiated for rights to Samana Bay. The U.S. needed this as a coaling station for Mahan's new navy, especially with the Central American isthmus canal to the Pacific already under construction, though at the time in Nicaragua rather than Panama. The U.S. wanted to control the anticipated lucrative traffic that would flow near the island of Hispaniola, and have a military presence to help protect the canal. Outposts in

Puerto Rico and Cuba's Guantanamo Bay yet lie some years into the future.[47]

The roots of the SDIC's demise lie within its structure. With its financial capital sources in Europe and its political power in Washington, the SDIC embodied a contradiction. Once the Dominican Republic defaulted on its loans in 1897 an international scramble occurred during the 1901-1904 period, leading to the U.S. invasion. That is, one might ignore the suffering caused to the Dominican people that the SDIC-induced restructuring had engendered, but Washington could not countenance European interventions to secure their principle and interest. In fact, Washington realized, a bit tardily, that it had allowed a private firm to preempt and usurp diplomatic channels for some years. Roosevelt would remove that middle-man with his beginnings of Dollar Diplomacy. The U.S. thus established the 1905 receivership of Dominican customs, directly managing the flow of money on behalf of the inept and most likely corrupt Dominicans. The *modus vivendi* applied 55% of customs receipts against debt payments. Seizing these income streams would prevent revolutionaries from doing so to support insurrection. The president arranged for New York banks to refinance SDIC debts as well as those owed to European creditors. The United States had now established a "fiscal protectorate" over a small Caribbean nation in addition to its own colony of Puerto Rico.[48]

Receivership to Dominican Intervention

The *modus vivendi* operated for over two years before the Senate ratified its provisions as a treaty in 1907. The Dominican Republic, during that time, successfully restructured its debt down to a $20 million bond issued in the United States, which also supported needed public works. American direct investment soared as business interests noted the new Dominican Republic, one now paying its bills. This investment included American sugar firms, now benefiting under tariff and tax incentives codified in the 1911 Agricultural Concessions Law. The island enjoyed financial and political stability for a handful of years afterwards until a new series of revolutionary disruptions threatened.[49]

Newly elected President Woodrow Wilson, successor to Roosevelt's hand-picked Taft, inherited the Dominican challenge and vigorously faced new political instabilities there. The U.S. refused to accept a new revolutionary regime in 1913, and forced new elections that December. American pressure for increased financial control provoked resistance so that by 1916 former Minister of War Desiderio Arias took over the city of Santo Domingo in an attempted coup. To prevent Arias from assuming control of the government, President Wilson established a full U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic on November 26. Abrogation of the 1907 treaty and refusal of Dominicans to reform in order to meet international financial obligations stood as the primary reasons for the U.S. action,

but as the Great War approached, fear of German infiltration into the Dominican Republic also fueled American concerns.[50]

The U.S. military governed the Dominican Republic for an eight year period (1916-1924). Modest achievements could be claimed related to island reforms, but they hardly matched the extraordinary efforts made by U.S. military authorities in such areas as sanitation, education, property rights, taxation and agriculture. Agricultural reforms, in particular, followed a "technocratic progressive" orientation, including establishing extensive experimentation stations with which to integrate colonial knowledge from American experts who had served in the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico.[51] Environmental historian Stuart McCook observes that "The fusion of Cuban, Puerto Rican, U.S., and foreign influences made the research stations distinctively creole institutions."[52] More specifically, the American dean of the College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts (Mayagüez, Puerto Rico), which had been in operation since 1911, quickly engaged in correspondence with Holger Johansen, an American agronomist and the Dominican Republic's new agricultural director. Johansen, who would later lead research in the Panama Canal Zone (as well as 1930s sugarcane investigations in Puerto Rico) sent some of his students to Puerto Rico to become agricultural experts, while the Puerto Rican college provided graduates to work on Dominican projects.[53] Linkages continued after the occupation, with Puerto Rican agricultural commissioner Carlos Chardón working with the Dominican president in 1937 on an economic development plan, which included forestry management. In fact, during the 1940s Chardón would head the National Agricultural Institute of the Dominican Republic.[54]

Peasants and Guerrillas

Agricultural reforms, however, proved impossible in the eastern sugar provinces, where a violent guerrilla movement emerged in response to the occupation. The shift from subsistence agriculture to export monoculture, as demanded by the dollar diplomats, resulted in peasants losing land to the American-owned sugar operatives. Unemployed and landless, these peasants joined the guerrilla resistance. The little-reported war against the U.S. Marines found exasperated American occupation forces resorting to cruelty and even torture against the peasant fighters. This only strengthened local resistance. Ironically, the Americans could offer emerging tropical agricultural expertise, but unfortunately the Dominicans would not benefit greatly from it. American occupying forces would experience similar frustration with insurgents nearly a century later during nation-building enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan.[55]

Unintended consequences resulted from the Dominican adventure. Armed guerrilla resistance in the east reinforced mounting political pressure against the U.S. occupation. The negotiations over the eventual withdrawal in 1924 catalyzed a rising nationalism in the nation. At the same time, in attempting to prevent a return to disorder, Americans had created a

strong local police force, the *Guardia Nacional*. Its commander, Rafael Trujillo, unexpectedly manipulated the forces at his command to steal the election of 1930, establishing himself as dictator. President Trujillo sought legitimacy, but his pariah regime curried only disfavor and resistance from the U.S. State Department. The advent of World War II reversed the legitimacy equation. Trujillo effectively postured as an anti-Hitler protector of America's Caribbean backdoor. The U.S. military swung to his side, strongly supporting the regime. So successful Trujillo's exploitation, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt would look beyond a large-scale genocide of Haitians, instead touting the dictator's munificence in welcoming Hitler's displaced Jewish refugees. Dollar Diplomacy had enabled conditions for America's creation of a ruthless Caribbean strongman, a pattern that would occur again and again; moreover, Americans would then be manipulated by their monsters from the Caribbean laboratory, in this case against Hitler, later by other despots against American fears of Communism or Middle Eastern extremism.[56]

Dominican Republic strongman General Rafael Trujillo, standing at attention, upon arrival in Washington, while the national anthem is played (1939).

Photo | *Library of Congress*

Taft and Dollar Diplomacy

William Howard Taft assumed the presidency from his political ally Theodore Roosevelt in 1909, differing from his predecessor in placing greater importance on foreign trade than expansionism. Taft realized the United States economy produced more goods than it could consume and that foreign markets in Latin America and China needed to be vigorously pursued for export. He believed that strengthening the economies of those recipient nations would not only make them good consumers of American products, but would improve political stability overseas. Taft and his Secretary of State Knox found Roosevelt's Dominican precedent of establishing customs receiverships appealing, and as part of their Taft-Knox doctrine, they resolved to apply this solution to other nations. Taft thus formalized Roosevelt's original *modus vivendi* into the doctrine of Dollar Diplomacy, which came to be associated with Taft more than any other president. In fact, during his last address to Congress on 3 December 1912, President Taft summarized his foreign policy as one concerned with commercial intercourse: "This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one

President William H. Taft, promoter of U.S. Dollar Diplomacy policy, in 1912 portrait.

Photo | *Library of Congress*

that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims."[57]

Taft attempted Dollar Diplomacy not only in the Caribbean, but also around the world in places like China, Turkey and Liberia. The Chinese experience proved controversial and unsatisfactory. Whereas Roosevelt had supported Japan as the emerging power of Asia, and a potential bulwark against Russian expansion, which in turn could also help to protect Hay's Open Door, Taft and Knox reversed that policy in favor of China. America must increase its financial interests in China, for surely that nation would take the lead in Asia. Taft's administration irritated Europeans as the president insisted American investors participate in Yangtze Valley railroad initiatives. One such project in Manchuria—to repurchase the Chinese Eastern Railroad from Russia—only resulted in binding the formerly antagonistic Japanese, Russians and Europeans into an alliance to shut out the Americans. That is, U.S. efforts to strengthen China's hand actually put the Qing Dynasty in a weaker position against the now strongly united foreign powers. Other potential Dollar Diplomacy schemes in the Middle Kingdom came to a grinding halt with the Chinese revolution of 1911, establishing the Republic of China. President Woodrow Wilson would reluctantly support further loans to China in 1918, but Dollar Diplomacy failed to elevate that nation. Japan remained dominant in Asia until World War II, much as Roosevelt had predicted.[58]

It can be argued that Taft's Dollar Diplomacy did anticipate future American foreign policy. President Taft used private capital to foster development overseas, but after World War II President Harry S. Truman chose public capital to the same end. Both presidents sought to advance American interests by establishing stable governments in underdeveloped nations.[59]

Nicaragua and U.S. Imperial Rule

Dollar Diplomacy had been an utter failure in Asia, but at least Taft could claim mixed results in Latin America. Factors associated with the Panama Canal emerged as the overriding factor in Caribbean affairs, and no other nation found itself more impacted by this than Nicara-

gua. Once the U.S. decided in favor of Panama for the canal, thus abandoning the project in Nicaragua, the issue of European intervention took on a new complexion. The Americans could not accept a rival canal in Nicaragua, and President José Santos Zelaya's efforts to do just that with the Germans (and Japanese) required reigning in the recalcitrant leader. The outbreak of civil war at the east coast town of Bluefields in October, 1909 pushed the United States into action. American money had financed the revolutionaries, in part, and when Zelaya executed two American mercenaries that had been captured with the rebels, the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations. Marines quickly landed at Bluefields to protect American property. Zelaya resigned to Mexican exile by December.[60]

The revolutionaries assumed power within a year, but the U.S. would not recognize Adolfo Díaz's conservative government until he had accepted an American receivership of customhouses and a new American loan to pay off British bankers. Unlike the Dominican Republic, the U.S. did not directly take over the government, but sent in an army of dollar diplomats to reform the Nicaraguan economy.[61] The American hegemony of this policy could not be more evident, with the Banco Nacional de Nicaragua organized as a Connecticut institution, and that nation's railroad (Ferrocarril del Pacifico) established as a Maine Corporation.[62]

Revolution erupted once again in 1912, resulting in another American intervention with 2,700 Marines to protect U.S. property and citizens. Soon the U.S. withdrew the majority of its Marines, but maintained a contingent almost continuously over the next two decades, until 1933, as a demonstrative force to help sustain conservative rule. While the Senate would not approve the Castrillo-Knox Treaty to affirm U.S. rights to military intervention, by 1916 it did ratify the modified Chamorro-Bryan Treaty granting the U.S. exclusive rights for construction of an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua. This served American interests in preventing a rival canal to challenge the then-completed Panama Canal.[63]

The American hegemony of this policy could not be more evident, with the Banco National de Nicaragua organized as a Connecticut institution.

Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua took on a different stance than in other parts of Latin America. Wall Street policymakers sought to prevent corrupt elites from politicizing public finances, at least in the U.S. view. American bankers assumed control of the treasury, their restrictive policies depriving Nicaragua of the "dance of the millions" that characterized Dollar Diplomacy elsewhere in Latin America. The paradoxical U.S. position against modernization, at least according

to the elite plantation owners from Granada, the region of the powerful, conservative oligarchical coffee and sugar growers, even came to be reflected in popular Nicaraguan novels. The plot lines revealed the villains as Wall Street bankers, the victims as local agro-export producers. The crime: Ruination and bankruptcy of the nation's agricultural enterprises by withholding credit and refusing to support development of transportation infrastructure, such as railroads. The United States had managed to convert its conservative, elite supporters into anti-Americans, virtually ready to support a new revolution. Further demonstrating Nicaraguan chafing under American strictures, President Bartolomé Martinez nationalized the U.S.-controlled Banco Nacional, a move to which the State Department acquiesced, over bitter Wall Street denunciations.[64]

The Nicaraguan Legacy of Unintended Consequences

The scholar Michel Gobat explicates the unintended democratizing consequences of Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua. While true that capital-intensive oligarchical agricultural interests suffered, in fact Nicaraguan agricultural-based economic growth accelerated under U.S. control through its withdrawal in 1933. Coffee, sugar and banana exports actually grew, but the greatest strength proved traditional agriculture, particularly cattle and cereal production that brought in several-fold more revenue than the plantation sectors. Lack of rail and other transportation development, so negatively impacted by Wall Street's restrictive policies to encourage paying off debt instead of financing political patronage projects, little affected the non-elite agricultural producers. Utilizing existing waterways and land

Graffiti pronouncement of "No more dictatorship" in Granada, Nicaragua.

routes, they exported corn and cattle to other Central American nations, ironically countries benefiting from Wall Street investment. The elites suffered disproportionately from the lack of credit to support modernization, with non-elite small and medium growers enjoying the democratizing effect, that is, finding local credit sources more than satisfactory for their more modest needs.[65]

The American withdrawal in 1933 had a similar unintended consequence as in the Dominican Republic. Various governmental factions threatened almost continuously, but the nationalist leader Augusto César Sandino actually raised a peasant army to resist the Americans. The United States had created a *Guardia Nacional* to maintain order after departure, but Sandino insisted it represented American imperialism and must be dissolved. The Nicaraguan president had placed the *Guardia Nacional* under a fellow conservative, Anastasio Somoza García,

who refused the request to dissolve the military, his power base. Somoza instead secretly had Sandino arrested and executed in 1934, and within a month had hunted down and exterminated the liberal army. Somoza resigned from the *Guardia Nacional* long enough to be constitutionally elected president in 1936, only to resume his position as military chief the following year. The laboratory of American Dollar Diplomacy had created yet another Latin American tyrant. The autocratic dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza lasted over four decades until challenged by the Sandinista rebels, liberals who claimed Sandino's heritage, but who were perceived and resisted as Communists by American presidents Carter and Reagan. Remnants of Somoza's army would be reconstituted as the Contras, and despite (illegal) arms deals with the Iranians to fund these "freedom fighters," the Sandinistas would remain in power.[66]

Lessons of Dollar Diplomacy

New York University historian Greg Grandin, a Guggenheim fellow and member of the United Nations Truth Commission investigating the Guatemalan Civil War, argues that Latin America has been the proving ground for exporting American diplomacy around the world. Grandin acknowledges that recent American efforts to assist developing nations are perceived to be a continuation of similar post-World War II assistance to Germany and Japan; however, according to Grandin, this is all wrong. America's first attempts to restructure nations occurred much earlier in places like Cuba. The modern U.S. military formed in response to Latin America, the command structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established just after the Spanish-American War; furthermore, in Nicaragua the military first perfected the coordination of aviation assaults with ground troops, and Latin American guerrilla wars served to hone soldiers' capabilities in preparation for European and Asian conflicts. Grandin reminds that by 1933 Americans invaded Caribbean nations at least thirty-four times, but also stresses that Latin America proved to be the indispensible school of foreign policy officials. This is where they learned "soft power," to use nonmilitary means in spreading American influence via cultural exchange, multilateral cooperation and commerce. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt launched European and Asian diplomatic initiatives based upon the success of his Good Neighbor policy in Latin America.[67]

The long reach of Dollar Diplomacy in the locations discussed—Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua—tends to support Grandin's conclusions. That is, American efforts to promote peace, development and stability faced tensions originating from local agency, global realpolitik, and unintended consequences. Some lessons that might be gleaned from these examples:

1) While Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson sought to shut out European influences in the Caribbean via Dollar Diplomacy, in the end the exhaustion of World War I shifted European attention away from the Western hemisphere, not American policy. Similarly, in the Cold War the United States strenuously sup-

ported anti-Communist positions and even wars in Central America, at severe human cost, only to learn the Soviets had not orchestrated liberal and socialist-leaning movements to the extent imagined.[68] What factors are overlooked or overestimated in the United States today in relation to Asia, the Middle East and in modern Latin America?

2) The creation of local police and military forces as a surrogate for American power, with the hope of maintaining order and stability, will likely be counterproductive. The National Guards in both the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua proved alluring tools for would-be despots, enabling ruthless autocratic regimes to emerge and terrorize local populations. The result in such cases is often much worse than the original problem of instability, presenting even greater threats to peace and development. This pattern may be emerging in Iraq with local police forces, based on numerous reports of local abuse.

3) The chicanery of the SDIC in the Dominican Republic drew the United States into significant new roles in Latin America, that is, establishing a customs receivership and attempting to grow a foreign economy. Similarly, after World War II, the United States assumed a greater responsibility on a global scale, and more recently 9/11 changed the U.S. role yet again. History suggests that today's reality may only be a chimera requiring rapid adjustment to a new paradigm at any time.

4) Globalization, knowledge production and development are intrinsically related, as demonstrated in colonial Puerto Rico. Globalized sugar cane mosaic disease traveled from Java through Argentina and possibly Egypt before creating an international sensation in Puerto Rico. More recently, AIDS and other modern human diseases also erupted rapidly on a global basis due to modern transportation networks. In terms of knowledge, as imperial powers interact with client nations they often disparage local knowledge. This sometimes has negative effects, as with the initially ill-conceived export of American agricultural practice to Puerto Rico. At the same time, local knowledge may be embraced, Carlos Chardón's research success against sugar cane mosaic disease serving as an example; however, efforts to globalize Chardón's agricultural expertise to broader Latin America failed due to differing cultural practices and local conditions.

5) Democratizing forces, the benevolent goal of American imperialism, can have unintended, negative consequences. In Nicaragua, such democratizing influences weakened the elite, eliciting a counter-reaction that ultimately helped destabilize the nation into revolution and then a despotic regime. As the United States interacts in complex world areas such as the Middle East and Asia that possess a diverse number of stakeholders, it is critical to have an advance understanding of the interests, power relationships and vulnerabilities of those groups.

6) The eight year Dominican military intervention of 1916-1924 found Americans industriously working to improve education, infrastructure and institutions,

only to encounter fierce resistance and to discover upon withdrawal that their strongest legacy had been to breed anti-American nationalism. Occupation, however it might be justified and whether or not in the interest of the "host" nation, can be expected to unite indigenous peoples, coalescing their unity into resistance. While one may differentiate between religious and colonial experiences in Latin America and the Middle East—and debate notions of nationalism in those regions—the Dominican experience could nevertheless have helped to predict the insurgency the Americans experienced in Iraq.

7) Alliances with regional leaders expose the United States to potential manipulation. Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo exploited American fears of Adolf Hitler, while Anastasio Somoza exaggerated the Communist menace to advance his own agenda.[69] In the twenty-first century, the United States needs to understand the intentions of allies such as Pakistan and Israel as it continues the fight against Middle Eastern extremism.

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Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies: Prospects for Nonviolent, Proactive Countermeasures to Terror

Kemal Argon

Abstract

This article outlines some prospects for nonviolent, proactive countermeasures to terrorism, essentially interreligious dialogue, with the aim and intention of incorporating multidisciplinary approaches to understanding associated phenomena and innovating appropriate dialogue projects. These projects would be intended to facilitate better understanding and improved relations between communities. This improved understanding and better relations would be the end goal of attempting to address some of the root causes of terrorism and to attempt to ameliorate some of the damaging effects of terrorism.

Biography

Kemal Argon was Visiting Assistant Professor of World Religions at the International College at the University of Bridgeport in the Autumn of 2010. He was awarded the PhD. in Arab and Islamic Studies from the University of Exeter, Great Britain in the spring of 2010. His main area of research has been on contemporary Islamisms in Pakistan. He previously received his masters degree in Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in 2004 from Hartford Seminary with a thesis focusing on Sufism. His interests include Islam in the modern world and Islam in the 20th century, prophetic biography, Sufism, and interreligious dialogue.

Since September 11, 2001, terrorism has been a heightened concern to many residents of Western liberal democracies, especially to the residents of the United States.[1] The purpose of writing this article is to assess some important salient aspects of the phenomenon of terrorism as it affects Westerners generally and to suggest some implications and prospects for addressing a selection of certain root causes of terrorism, utilizing nonviolent, proactive methods as countermeasures.[2] This proposal of proactive responses includes utilizing interfaith or interreligious dialogue as part of an integral strategy for addressing some of the root causes of terrorism and ameliorating some of the effects of terrorism in multiple communities.[3] It should be noted at this point that more areas of inquiry will be exposed where further research will be needed to assess feasibility and effectiveness: it is within the intended purpose of this article to direct more attention to areas of potential inquiry and research.

It becomes rapidly apparent in talking with North Americans with only a cursory knowledge of terrorism and Islamism that Islamism and terrorism are often popularly but mistakenly perceived to be necessarily coterminous.[4] They are often seen as being a real threat to the Western way of life as lived in Western liberal democracies.[5] Before embarking on an examination of terrorism, some explanation of the term "Islamism" would be in order.

Martin Kramer traces the use of the term, "Islamism," to the point where the use of the inexact term of "fundamentalism" has given way to a new use of the term, "Islamism," originally by way of French literature.[6] This was, by the mid-1980s, no longer simply or even primarily a synonym for the religion of Islam in contemporary French usage.[7] Graham Fuller argued in 1991 for the use of the term "Islamism" as opposed to "fundamentalism" to be used in many contexts as the phenomenon as it is not so much a theology as an ideology whose implications are not at all old fashioned but thoroughly modern.[8] He gives a further explication of his definition of the term Islamism in his 2003 work, The Future of Political Islam.[9] This would appear to include any Muslims who have a political agenda.

Fuller's perspective would appear to be similar to those statements of the Ameri-

can Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Pelletreau, Jr. in 1994; essentially that the term "Islamists" should describe Muslims with political goals and that this is an analytical term and not necessarily sinister.[10] The term "Islamists" can then be used to describe many legitimate, socially responsible Muslim groups with political goals and these are different from those who operate outside the law, whom Pelletreau termed, "extremists."[11] If we accept that the term Islamist is widely in use and accepted as legitimate and not by itself pejorative, it can be used analytically to describe a wide grouping of people who can be engaged in dialogue with, these being Muslims who generally who have political goals.

The position taken in this article is that the vast majority of Muslims and Islamists are, in reality, people who do not support the killing of innocent civilians as the terrorists do: the group of radicals who support the killing of civilians is much smaller than the moderates.[12] However, attitudes exist amongst moderates in Muslim countries that have a negative or unfavorable view of the United States.[13] This means that only a small minority of Islamists, by the wider definition, are radicalized and are not approachable for dialogue. In theory, the majority of moderates are not radicalized yet and still have attitudes that are of the type that nonviolent approaches to inter-religious dialogue may seek to overcome for improved relations. A clearer understanding and perspective of this reality may help more residents of Western democracies to prepare better strategies for more effectively targeting certain of the root causes of terrorism and for ameliorating the damaging effects of terrorism.

Part of this strategy can include, for example, formulating different choices of encountering the non-violent majority of Islamists with a selection of options amongst various genres of inter-religious dialog and encounter. This encounter can yield certain outcomes and strategic options that are in the interest of residents of Western liberal democracies and others elsewhere, with the objective of overcoming prejudices and bigotries affecting multiple groups domestically and multi-domestically.

We can pursue certain areas of inquiry in understanding both terrorism and Islamism, following the observations and recommendations of experts in various disciplines, including psychiatry, psychology, social psychology, law enforcement, social work, journalism and religious studies. Taken as a whole, the sum of these different resultant observations can be considered along with some of the aspects of existing scholarship to form an understanding of these two phenomena. This understanding is relevant for the purpose of guiding inquiry into the prospects for nonviolent proactive countermeasures to terrorism. Amongst the possibilities of nonviolent proactive measures, there is the prospect of dialogue and peacebuilding across communities, these options approaching the healing of the emotional effects of grievances, including healing the aftereffects of previous terror attacks. Establishing mutual understanding, respect, and acceptance can begin to overcome some root causes of enmity.

Methodology

This paper interprets the implications of a selection of observations and conclusions of existing research and scholarship in multiple disciplines and different fields relevant to the subjects terrorism and Islamism. The observations and information gleaned from the research projects and opinions of selected experts are relevant to formulating strategies for nonviolent proactive countermeasures to terrorism. These are brought together to suggest a strategic scope for nonviolent proactive countermeasures, such as interreligious dialogue, as either part of an augmenting factor to a portfolio of countermeasures to terror. The final conclusions rely on extant research and propose certain avenues for further research and inquiry relevant to nonviolent proactive countermeasures.

In discussing the methodology of this paper and any other proposals for further research or strategy formulation derived from it, it may be wise to follow the advice of Moghaddam, who notes that psychological research on terrorism suffers from two main weaknesses, both of which arise from weaknesses in mainstream psychology.[14] The weakness, as identified by Moghaddam, is that of a lack of powerful conceptual frameworks, and a reductionist-positivist reliance on data gathering on the assumption that data will allow us to mimic the success of the "real sciences" by borrowing the framework of a game-theory approach.[15] In this paper, this assumption of utilizing the game-theory framework also assumes making use of statistical research analyzing attitudes in the Muslim world. Multidisciplinary qualitative research can also be used within game-theory analysis to overcome the lack of a powerful conceptual framework.

The other tendency, mentioned by Moghaddam and borrowing from mainstream psychology, is for researchers to split into dispositional and contextual camps: this presents a better alternative arriving upon a more accurate viewpoint of treating the role of dispositional and contextual factors as being variable rather than fixed.[16] In this paper, variability in aspects of both dispositional factors and contextual factors are described for use within the Enders and Sandler game-theory framework, thence utilizing a variable selection of dialogue genres.

The disposition of terrorists and others who are possibly sympathetic to terrorists can be described from expert perspectives including those of psychiatry. Both the context and disposition of terrorists can be considered when formulating strategy. The qualitative analyses of dispositions involved and context is undertaken in formulating a portfolio of choices within the game theory framework and associated quantitative analysis as described by Enders and Sandler.[17] This utilization of game theory as a methodology is the starting point for discerning and describing a proper timing and place for the choice of nonviolent, proactive countermeasures. This method of game theory and quantitative analysis requires that a proper strategic assessment be made of context and be included in strategic modeling and programming.

It must be noted that any choice of violent/military options as proactive measures are a matter for officially authorized policy-makers and planners in government and are beyond the scope of this article. The author of this article makes no statement whatsoever on their applicability in any context. The important assumption in this article is that there is a wider field of possibilities for nonviolent, proactive countermeasures to the root causes of terror if analysis for prospects of intervention are extended beyond the narrow field of violent extremists to the moderate majority of nonviolent Islamists.

More can be said about the importance of taking context into consideration. Palmer notes that terrorist threats should be contextualized, as the risks are small and to live in their thrall is to help them to achieve their aims.[18] According to Stevens, it can be noted that psychological approaches to understanding, studying, and preventing terrorism must also draw on paradigms that link the individual to economics, history, law, politics, religion, and culture: a multidisciplinary approach to preparing nonviolent, proactive countermeasures that will facilitate much-needed cooperation between experts in various disciplines.[19]

The analysis associated with the game-theory approach can integrate information from these. A multidisciplinary approach to formulating nonviolent, proactive options to respond to terrorism and/or to ameliorate its damage can be contextualized in preparations for strategy formulation, understanding the role and context of the selected nonviolent, proactive options (for example, interreligious dialogue) and the dispositions of involved parties (for example, persons emotionally affected but amenable to peace-building.) The lesson that can be learned from the observation of weaknesses in research hitherto performed is that anyone using any of the nonviolent proactive strategic options suggested in this article should be savvy about dispositions of the persons involved and about the context in which they are located. Any research and publication about these projects should not repeat the two weaknesses described above by Moghaddam. These weaknesses can be overcome to some extent by understanding the psychological dispositions of prospective participants and by planning and matching, more optimally, a choice of genres of dialogue to the needs of all participants and the surrounding contexts.

September 11th terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, NYC
Photo | Courtesy of the Prints and Photographs Division,
Library of Congress

Why is Terrorism a Concern for Residents of Liberal Democracies?

There are many reasons why Western liberal democracies are specifically vulner-

able to terrorism. Liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks.[20] Liberal democracies face a dilemma as many of the protections guaranteed to citizens of liberal democracies are exploited by terrorists, remaining an open society allows terrorists to work while too harsh a response can curb popular support and create support for these terrorists.[21] If we assume that terrorism is a phenomenon that is here to stay as noted by Enders and Sandler,[22] and Marvasti,[23] as long as there are persons with grievances who will choose to use this as a cost-effective tactic for fighting, residents of Western liberal democracies must be concerned about it. Understanding the phenomenon of terrorism, strategies may be devised for dealing with terrorism as a perennial recurring phenomenon and therefore as a concern to residents of Western Liberal democracies.

The Effects of Terrorism are a Human Concern

It is generally true that terrorism is a human concern. It may also be seen to be a concern of the many and diverse residents of western liberal democracies.[24] This can be observed widely and it is common knowledge for anyone privy to the discourse taking place in the public sphere of the United States after September 11, 2001.[25] Terrorism may be defined in different ways, and the label itself is often controversial.[26] One definition of terrorism is offered by Enders and Sandler: being "the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims."[27] This necessarily entails a political or social motive. Other definitions exist, for example a United Nations definition and a US Government definition.[28] With all definitions, what is important for our purposes is the recognition that terrorism has physical and psychological victims and that psychological damage is also associated with it. Associated with this injustice and damage in multiple communities are subsequent needs for healing and reconciliation.

> Parallel with suffering caused by terrorism within the general population of liberal Western democracies, the minority Muslim communities in these countries are also forced to carry a psychological burden.

The direct and indirect effects of terrorism on particular countries and on particular sectors can be sizeable, the indirect costs of foregone output, increased security costs and increased risk premiums can be cumulative, and it is difficult to measure these various costs precisely.[29] Enders and Sandler conclude that terror-

ism is here to stay…as long as there are grievances there will be conflict and that terrorism will be a cost-effective tactic of the weaker side associated with these conflicts.[30] Marvasti is similar in his opinion to Enders and Sandler in seeing that suicide bombing will continue as long as there are life situations in which people feel that this type of violence is the only way to change their world and to improve their nation or their tribe's status quo.[31] Indeed, the problem of terrorism will not go away on its own.

Parallel with the suffering caused by terrorism within the general population of liberal Western democracies, the minority Muslim communities in these countries are also often forced to carry a psychological burden. Popular thinking about terrorism has often been associated with the term "radicalization." As Githens-Mazer and Lambert note, the current "wisdom" on radicalization is a failed discourse.[32] Policy-makers and the media have come to rely increasingly on a 'conventional wisdom' of radicalization… radicalization is a research topic plagued by assumption and intuition, unhappily dominated by 'conventional wisdom' rather than systematic scientific and empirically based research.[33] This is where the potential of Enders and Sandler's approach offers a solution, pointing to these more scientific approaches to understanding and dealing with the whole problem of terrorism. Their game-theory approach can be made multidisciplinary, combining with other scientific methods to facilitate plans to ameliorate the damaging effects of terrorism. These could be better focused on where the real problems and damaging effects are taking place in the communities, as opposed to naively creating injustices for minority Muslims or others.

An example of this need for a better approach can be seen where Githens-Mazer and Lambert further opine that, "Conventional wisdom on radicalization has sapped this term of scientific value, so that the label of 'radicalization' has become instead a tool of power exercised by the state and non-Muslim communities against, and to control, Muslim communities.[34] If this is true, the approach by Enders and Sandler is a much better alternative to the amateurishness of accepting unsupported assumptions and partisan prescriptions which can end up oppressing the wrong choice of people in one or more communities. Nonetheless, because this injustice towards minority Muslims occurs, there is a need and an opportunity domestically to engage in a selection of nonviolent, proactive methods for engaging these communities that will be designed to ameliorate the damage and heal the communities involved.

Why Ordinary People Become Terrorists

The literature on the psychology of terrorists is too vast to systematically describe here and a selection must be made. For the purposes of this article, addressing some of the root causes of terrorism, individual dispositions, i.e. typical patterns of individual motivations of terrorists can often be understood as providing some insight into the root causes of terrorism that can be addressed and also



proposing where dialogue should be avoided. The motivational factors in terms of disposition and context are varied and complex but a psychological pattern or set of patterns can often be discerned in nonviolent moderates to which nonviolent proactive measures can be addressed. These negative attitudes cannot be addressed in extremists but rather can be addressed more broadly in the wider population of moderates.

Palmer notes that, terrorism becomes morally polarized and politically manipulated, causing debate and understanding to thus be required if terrorism is to be managed.[35] While Palmer is most likely advocating a debate about a narrow topic of terrorism, his mention of "understanding" may be followed and extended to a broader context of the phenomenon including its root causes. In terms of this wider focus of inquiry and discussion, a choice could be made to include nonviolent, proactive measures that include dialogue leading to understanding beyond such a narrow focus on terrorists that can potentially include all persons emotionally affected. For planning these nonviolent, proactive measures, an understanding of disposition is necessary to better differentiate where dialogue is and is not practicable.

Multiple perspectives on motives exist and there are perspectives that terrorists are psychologically sick and that their motivations are sick.[36] Palmer notes that, it is possible that terrorists, leaders perhaps more than their actors, may have issues in the realms of personality, describing them as sometimes hardened individuals.[37] Arena and Arrigo describe a contention that identity plays a role in the commission of terrorism, prior research relying on psychological assertions that individuals are searching for identity, this leading to conclusions that something is profoundly wrong or abnormal with terrorists.[38] In frightening contrast to the com-

mon notion that terrorists are necessarily sick and that this psychology explains their behavior, Arena and Arrigo identify



Great Mosque, Saint Petersburg, Russia

an alternative notion as a possibility that terrorists are essentially normal individuals: more explanation from a social-psychological context, especially in terms of the impact of identity on extremist violence, is needed.[39] Post et al. note convincingly that suicide terror groups screen out mentally ill individuals.[40]

Whether terrorists are sick or not, the effects of terrorism are manifest and remain. Palmer notes that terrorist acts create moral revulsion, indignation, and righteousness and stimulate the drive for moral justification by all parties involved.[41] The deep emotions engendered are generally not conducive to understanding and dialogue.[42] This presence of deep emotions is an obstacle to dialogue apparent and familiar to anyone experienced in the field. This obstacle is not absolutely insurmountable, however, as Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Western countries are variegated and not monolithic, multiple genres of dialogue have been identified.[43] Understanding this variegation of communities and also the options of different genres of dialogue expands the range of possibilities for matching a genre of dialogue well with the needs of the community in context. The generally negative attitudes seen in a wider population of Muslim moderates described previously by Esposito and Mogahed are relevant in this respect as they show a larger prospect pool for dialogue.[44]

Post et al. provide various psychological models, individual and group models that may contribute to the explanation of suicide bombing, and they also look at various areas where psychiatry may be able to contribute to the interdisciplinary understanding of this phenomenon.[45] Within the context of these descriptions, factors described by Marvasti begin to look consistent with these descriptions of group and individual models. In explaining part of the psychological makeup of suicide bombers, Marvasti describes PTSD, caused by years of trauma, homelessness, displacement, humiliation, and loss of family and friends in conflict with the occupying army as partly explaining the proliferation of suicide bombers.[46] Marvasti also identifies elements of rage and revenge, psychic trauma and dissociation, the element of religion, the element of

group process, support and bonding, poverty, the element of perceived injustice, humiliation, shame and despair, cultural support, and remuneration as factors in the motivation for suicide bombers.[47] Post et al.'s description of the need for a multi-disciplinary approach can be seen in addressing the individual factors that are embedded in the development of a suicide terrorist.[48] Post opines that, the immediate consequence of this framework is that efforts to prevent suicide terrorism must be directed at all the necessary but insufficient factors that result in suicide terrorism….cross-disciplinary collaboration appears warranted, and indeed is required.[49]

Strategic Alternatives/Proactive Measures For Addressing The Root Causes of Terrorism

To follow the rationale and logic of Enders and Sandler's game theory framework for understanding terrorism, the factors and individual reasons for why ordinary people become terrorists may be assessed as the root causes to be addressed within these certain nonviolent options.[50] The selection of these options should take into consideration the psychological dispositions of different persons inclined to be sympathetic to terrorists and their pursuits. Some persons can be engaged in dialogue and others cannot be engaged. Understanding these aspects of the psychological disposition of community members as prospective dialogue partners is useful for understanding the purpose, scope and choice of nonviolent, proactive countermeasures.

Marvasti provides some useful insight into the psychology of terrorists which yields information on the root causes of this terrorism and suggests some different possibilities for addressing these causes.[51] Marvasti outlines the alleviation of trauma and the support for moderate activists and policies as a crucial factor.[52] While the selection of options, defensive and proactive, is most often best done by authorized parties of the state, the option of nonviolent proactive measures can be of particular interest to concerned residents of Western liberal democracies. As Liakatali Takim describes, this is a new experience for Muslims in America, a paradigm shift away from their attempts at converting others, to conversation with others.[53] The openness of Western democracies provides venues and opportunities in contrast to an often very different reality elsewhere. This can be seen described according to Takim as, "Muslims did not, generally speaking, feel the need to dialogue or converse with the other….hence, engaging in dialogue with non-Muslims is a relatively new experience for most Muslims, since many of them are accustomed to preaching Islam and to refuting the beliefs of the other."[54] This openness of Western liberal democracies also has the potential to foster this paradigm shift over to an interesting encounter with plurality, fostering a pluralistic discourse which has often been neglected.

Rather than merely following the conventional wisdom and developing strategies with undesirable effects as criticized earlier by Githens-Mazer and Lambert, Enders' and Sandler's rationale of using

game theory and statistical analysis provides an approach to formulating strategies for dealing with terrorism, which can draw on multidisciplinary competencies. Within the portfolio of options that this utilization of game theory generates, there is an option of dialogue, which is both nonviolent and proactive.

The author of this article accepts that there are people for and with whom dialogue is quite obviously not an option: they are simply too psychologically and politically radicalized due to the severities of their own personal histories. This reality should be clear for anybody who understands the personalities involved with terror movements such as Al-Qaeda.[55] It would be naïve to assume that members of these movements can be approached for interreligious dialogue. However, the majority of persons in Western liberal democracies and in the Muslim world are not within that category of psychological and political radicalization and extreme thought. Therefore opportunities do exist. Enders and Sandler do address the possibility of getting at the roots of terrorism, one option being addressing the grievances of the terrorists and eliminating the rationale for violence.[56] However, problems can arise following this course of action. The problems and tradeoffs encountered by government in deciding whether or not to dialogue with terrorists are described by Enders and Sandler.[57] The prospects and decisions of these options to dialogue directly with terrorists are best left to authorized members of government and military, and not to ordinary citizens. Dialogue with non-extremist moderates may however be an option.

Within this game-theory framework and statistical analysis suggested by Enders and Sandler the choices generated can include defensive and nonviolent proactive options to deal with terrorism. To begin to address some of the root causes

> ...despite whatever apparent content is on the agenda of the interreligious dialogue, a psychological change could be happening in the participants and audience, a change for better relations.

of terrorism, the experimental work of Mark R. Dixon, Kimberly M. Zlomke, & Ruth Anne Rehfeldt (2006) may have certain implications for the possible benefits of the options of inter-religious dialog between Muslims and others.

These authors conducted two experiments relying on the application of relational frame theory. They concluded that Americans' nonequivalent frames of "terrorism" and "America" can be partially reconstructed via a matching to sample procedure; their two experiments provide data suggesting that prejudice is not human nature and that it need not be accepted as such.[58] The authors describe that the dismantling of pre-existing rela-

tional frames of sameness and opposition can occur in part through the introduction of additional stimuli from another stimulus network that may provide an overarching transfer of function through an existing stimulus network.[59] More analysis would be needed but the results of this work could tend to suggest that the frameworks and stimuli provided in venues where different genres of interreligious dialog are being carried out should be studied to assess their impact for dismantling prejudices and for improving relations across communities. Contrary to the notion that dialogue is a waste of time or that it accomplishes nothing, the research taking place might help to explain if dialogue provides a frame in which prejudices can be dismantled, negative attitudes can be changed, and understanding can be facilitated. In other words, despite whatever apparent content is on the agenda of the interreligious dialogue, a psychological change could be happening in the participants and audience, that makes way for better relations.

The harsh reality of the context surrounding dialogue in the West is worthy of note as Palmer opines that, whether or not terrorists have personality or mental disorders, if they have the capacity, they must face the due legal sanctions for their actions.[60] Palmer opines that we should be careful not to elevate terrorists or those who espouse terror to the level of freedom fighter, politician or hero.[61] This attitude towards terrorists being held responsible can be expected to be ubiquitous in Western liberal democracies. Therefore his advice of avoiding any romanticizing of terrorism, and certainly NOT facilitating terrorist agendas in any way, is sage advice for anyone planning on engaging in any real dialogue. It is also realistic advice for realizing that there are some individuals who are simply too hardened and radicalized to be approached for nonviolent proactive countermeasures such as dialogue, even if they are rational actors.[62] The scope of interreligious dialogue should be directed to take place with the community in general, not with radicalized and extreme individuals. Participants will also need to be savvy of any legal considerations relevant to dialogue.

Before embarking on a discussion of interreligious dialogue, it can be noted that alleviating the effects of terrorism and minimizing or controlling its damage has been one of the responses of govern-

ments to terrorism.[63] Some wisdom might be gleaned here from the British psychiatrist, Ian Palmer, who stresses the need for contextualization of acts of terror, their perpetrators, their effects on populations and individuals, and attention to the psychology of groups.[64] Palmer also suggest that mental health commentators should endeavor to learn more about group behavior and the predisposing, precipitating, perpetuating and protective factors that take place in the manifestation of fear and fear-related conditions in society.[65] Post et al. maintain that we cannot prevent suicide terrorism in the absolute sense but efforts towards reducing this phenomenon are obviously of the highest importance and these efforts must derive from understanding the phenomenon itself.[66] This expert psychiatric call for more research in this area may be extended to the effects of dialogue within and upon such conditions. Research could be made into the effects of interreligious dialogue on attitudes of participant groups and their individual members, especially to see if it changes the stereotypes and bigotries present in societies and improves relations.

Inter-Religious Dialogue as a Countermeasure to the Root Causes of Terrorism

There is another aspect of interreligious dialogue that can be interesting: dialogue as a coping mechanism, ameliorating the effects of terrorism. Evidence exists for the utility of some spiritual approaches to ameliorating the psychological effects of terrorism. In one study by Meisenhelder and Marcum, the success and spectrum of coping strategies of one group of Americans in managing posttraumatic stress following a major terrorist attack was demonstrated: in certain sampled groups, positive spiritual coping strategies were strongly related to positive spiritual outcomes.[67] Spiritual measures such as, seeking comfort from God, prayer, and attending faith services, are common behaviors in the broader Christian community and beyond.[68] Although the sample consists of certain church members, similar reactions among participants in other faith communities are a possibility that warrants further investigation.[69] The use of spiritual approaches would appear to be evidenced as helpful in some situations and cases. These findings may suggest that dialogue has benefits. Despite the possible limitations of the research, being that some people are predisposed to spiritual solutions, this research overall could point to the utility of interreligious dialogue as a spiritual approach to healing and reconciliation between non-radicalized but nonetheless affected persons.

It should be stated at this point that the evidence for the benefits of interreligious dialogue for addressing the above mentioned root causes of terrorism is mostly anecdotal and there is a need for further inquiry and research into the effects of interreligious dialogue on the attitudes and well-being of involved groups. It has been the observation of the author within a Nordic context that sessions of interreligious dialogue have had a positive impact on the attitudes of members of Muslim communities faced with feelings of humiliation and rage when shown genu-

ine respect by their Christian dialogue partners.[70] The implications generally would be to assess the utility of such dialogue for all groups affected by terror, Muslim, Christian, and others. More scientific research into the benefits of such interreligious dialogue would be necessary to be able to assess accurately what benefits may proceed from such activities.

An approach to planning the content of nonviolent, proactive countermeasures to terror in the form of interreligious dialogue could be researched in a multidisciplinary way taking into consideration the disposition and context of the events that have taken place and overcoming the weaknesses of research identified by Moghaddam. Perhaps the earlier suggestion of Palmer, that we must become more knowledgeable of groups and should engage in dialogue, could be extended with good effects to this kind of group also (not to terrorists but to peace-builders).[71]

In terms of process, dialogue in the interest of peace-building can be expected to happen upon hermeneutical obstacles. This dialogue would also be a good test of the claim by Pratt concerning non-apodicity in Christian-Muslim dialogue, that unless participants are willing to be flexible on truth claims in scripture, dialogue will lead to disappointing results.[72] Appearing to touch on the same issue as Pratt mentions, Liakat Ali Takim opines of a need for Muslims to more clearly differentiate between sacred scripture and later exegesis: differentiation can be made between the Qur'anic vision and the socio-political context in which that vision was interpreted and articulated by classical and medieval exegetes.[73] In a sense similar to the kind of openness in interpretation as described by Liakatali Takim, Pratt's observations may and perhaps also ought to be taken into consideration when planning dialogue. Pratt and Takim both mention the issue of hermeneutics, discussing their own perspectives on how obstacles might be overcome.

However, in another sense, this realm of obstacles associated with scriptural hermeneutics and apodicity or non-apodicity are arguably not the whole story of interreligious dialogue as, even if there is inflexibility concerning certain truth claims, the psychology and attitudes of persons and communities involved in dialogue may change in a positive way if respect and acceptance is sincerely demonstrated and this should be researched further, regardless of obstacles. It should also be noted especially in this respect that multiple genres of dialogue exist which are not necessarily impeded by inflexibility in truth claims regarding scripture. This plurality of dialogue genres can also offer a response to overcome certain issues or obstacles that may be associated with identity affecting people's participation in interreligious dialogue.[74] Multiple genres of interreligious dialogue exist and can be considered as alternatives, expanding in some cases the applicability of such approaches vis a vis heretofore resistant members of certain identity groups. Inflexibility in truth claims can also at times be side-stepped in dialogue and community building by choice of dialogue genre, if necessary.

To provide some of the framework for planning and carrying out dialogue in terms of the end results of dialogue, Ayoub's suggestion of theoretical goals and obstacles of Christian-Muslim dialog can be considered.[75] The potential of interreligious dialogue for addressing certain root causes of terrorism at the level of individual disposition and at the level of community can be expressed in these end results. This is important for the content of dialogue and the initial intentions of involved parties. Ayoub opines that Muslims and Christians must accept each other as friends and partners in the quest for social and political justice…this demanding genuine and sincere respect of the faith of the other, including their beliefs, ethical principles, social values and political aspirations.[76] Ayoub hopes for accepting each other as equal partners, not opponents in dialogue, meaning equality in humanity and dignity, and equality in the claim for religious authenticity.[77] This hoped-for outcome would be something very different from the damage and grievances seen by experts in the field of psychiatry in the disposition of terrorists and people who are sympathetic to them.

Within this context of goals for interreligious dialogue suggested by Ayoub, we can hearken back to and reference some of the factors and motivations of the root causes of suicide bombers as identified earlier by Marvasti as being the "elements of rage and revenge, psychic trauma and dissociation, the element of religion, the element of group process, support and bonding, poverty, the element of perceived injustice, humiliation, shame and despair, cultural support, and remuneration as parts of the motivation for suicide bombers."[78] What interreligious dialogue begins to address is many of these same root causes. This is done by demonstrating mutual acceptance and respect as described by Ayoub. There can be multiple genres of dialogue and multiple venues chosen for this purpose of demonstrating sincere mutual respect and acceptance. The question might also be asked if Pratt's observation could be helpful in this respect, that, "the recognition of non-apodicity applies across all revelatory scripture… ameliorating the effects of difference by discerning of a deeper truth or revelation transcending the differences…"[79] Inquiry might well be made into Pratt's observations about whether or not the mutual respect and partnership that Ayoub talks about might be better facilitated with Pratt's approach and suggestions. If Muslims and Christians would be more open to exploring truth together, would the demonstration of respect and acceptance not be even more effectively facilitated? We could hope for a venue of healing analogous to what was found to be taking place by Meisenhelder and Marcum. This being the case, the ultimate analysis has to be made, asking if any of this dialogue effort makes any positive and meaningful difference in the long run.

A more specific differentiating process between peaceful and militant strains of Islam can also be taken up directly in preparations for dialogue. Takim opines that, "the tension between the peaceful and militant strains of Islam can be resolved only through reexamining the specific contexts of the rulings and the ways

in which they were conditioned by the times…this re-interpretive task demands that Muslims re-evaluate the classical and medieval juridical corpus."[80] This activity may be useful for Muslims who are intellectually equipped to maintain the integrity and moral fiber of the tradition but who also would like to pursue a fruitful discourse with non-Muslims leading to respect, acceptance and cooperation. This effort can be with the intention to begin to ameliorate some of the negative after-effects of terrorism and address the root causes as described by Marvasti. This has little potential with extremists but, in theory, a larger population of moderates can be involved, being self-differentiated from the militants.



Busy street in Cairo

Although this may be beneficial at the individual level, what can be seen at the level of the group and community is that the practical programming and planning of dialogue is a matter requiring more complex expertise, vision and a set of necessary skills. For planning this dialogue, the portfolio of different genres of interreligious dialogue described by Jane I. Smith can be considered as possible options, these being described in more detail in the suggested materials on interreligious and inter-Muslim dialogue.[81] A methodology for strategy formulation in planning interreligious dialogue between Christians and Muslims using these genres of dialogue was also proposed by Argon.[82] Formulating strategies for utilizing different genres of dialogue requires having knowledge of different pre-existing religious institutions engaging in dialogue and their dialogue projects.

To take into consideration some of the observations of Moghaddam's critique of psychological research, interreligious dialogue is always within a communal context, in addition to individual dispositions. Possibilities for programming approaches to a dialogue across communities which may begin to address some of these root causes in communal context is described by different authors. Examples of Christian perspectives on interfaith dialogue can be found in the work edited by Rev. Bud Heckman and Rori Picker Neiss, In-

teractive Faith: The Essentials Interreligious Community Handbook.[83] An example of a contemporary theoretical framework from a Muslim perspective on community and multi-religious peace-building may be found in Abu-Nimer's Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam.[84] Christian or Muslim, the intention expressed in these works is for dialogue to benevolently affect a community, not to be reduced to individual dispositions. These proposed models of dialogue might be able to provide venues of effectuating change such as dismantling prejudices as suggested in the findings of research described earlier by Mark R. Dixon, Kimberly M. Zlomke, & Ruth Anne Rehfeldt (2006).

Dialogue between Christians and Muslims has had an extensive history in the twentieth century and is not a new project.[85] It should be noted that there is not only a demonstrated willingness to dialogue and a history of doing so, but also an extant infrastructure for dialogue. Some examples can be cited to demonstrate this reality, although this listing must not be seen as comprehensive or exclusive. A representative sampling of major and minor Islamic organizations in North America can be seen to engage in dialogue: the Islamic Society of North America has an active dialogue unit.[86] The Vatican has engaged in interreligious dialogue, expanding and developing its dialogue, especially since the Second Vatican Council from 1962-1965.[87] The World Council of Churches also has a history of fostering dialogue.[88] Institutions and infrastructure for dialogue have decades of presence internationally. All of these Islamic institutions in North America will be privy to or affected by the presence of the "A Common Word" initiative.[89] What can be seen of the signatories to the Common Word document is that a large number of intellectuals and institutions in the Muslim world are interested in pursuing better relations with Christians. This would suggest at least willingness towards dialogue by individuals and institutions across the Muslim world and in minority communities in Western liberal democracies.

At the broader level of dialogue across communities, Islamists in different institutions can be considered as part of the solution in dialogue in addressing the root causes of terrorism.[90] This is often the case as those revival movements and Islamic institutions that exist in North America and throughout the Muslim world as a whole are often willing and able to carry on interreligious dialogue. The main point is that multiple institutions in the Muslim world and within Western minority Muslim communities are concerned about the future of Islam and Muslims and are often interested to carry on with interreligious dialogue and have programs for doing so. Some of them have an ideology for creating an Islamic state with the end goal of establishing an Islamic society. Others have no ideology of creating an Islamic state yet are nonetheless sincerely concerned for the future of Muslims and society in general. Both categories can be engaged. This plurality of Islamists also suggests the diversity in dispositions and a field of opportunities for dialogue, outlining a scope for diversified content and different genres of interreligious dialogue.

Conclusion

It would appear that the group of persons affected by terror is indeed a large part of the population in Western liberal democracies and also a large part of populations in other countries. There may be certain desirable outcomes of dialogue to be reasonably expected, extending to Muslims, Christians and others in dialogue and to any others affected by terrorism. More research will be necessary to discern what, if any, benefits of dialogue exist in ameliorating the effects of terrorism. More research will be needed in exploring the effects of dialogue beyond the anecdotal evidence of participants. However, there are definitely promising avenues for further inquiry and research. A multidisciplinary approach can be seen to be called for by experts as referenced in this article.

Interested persons may know that, with nonviolent, proactive approaches to addressing root causes of terror, they have certain abilities to rely on the work of experts in multiple fields and disciplines to strive to achieve a common good. With this multidisciplinary approach and research, including that of other specialists in religion and interreligious dialogue, we might hope that the "fundamental requirement of honest and constructive dialogue" becomes more of a reality as opposed to remaining an "ideal hope."[91] This dialogue could be made more of a reality, bringing persons in multiple communities to a place of mutual respect, acceptance and hopefully even to a more globalized peace.

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Case Not Closed: A Connecticut Family in King Leopold's Court

William D. Lay

Abstract

A student's surprising personal connection with a well-known decision of the International Court of Justice leads to a further exploration of the human and legal dimensions behind the case. In the late 1990s, rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo sought to utilize the extraordinary jurisdictional reach of Belgian human rights law to put an end to genocidal government propaganda. The ICJ ultimately struck down the arrest warrant of a Belgian court, but the legal decision did not put and end to one family's efforts. After enduring prison, exile, and combat, they found a new beginning in Bridgeport, Connecticut. They now work to bring peace to central Africa using both legal and humanitarian means.

Biography

William D. Lay is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Human Security at the University of Bridgeport. He also serves as chairman of that department. He holds a J.D. from Columbia University School of Law. Before joining the University of Bridgeport faculty, Mr. Lay practiced law in New York City with the law firms of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, and Flom LLP. His research interests include constitutional law and human security as well as human security and international law.

Jennifer Kalangala's wedding, on August 8, 2009, resembled any other wedding taking place on that brilliant summer day in Connecticut. The entire Kalangala family was gathered together to watch as an obviously proud father escorted his beautiful daughter down the aisle. Not apparent was that just eight years earlier, the Kalangala family members were separated by prison bars, politics, and hundreds of miles of dense tropical forest.

Jennifer and her sister, Jocelyne, were camped in the jungles of the Congo with their father, Col. Francis Kalangala, who was fighting against the government of Joseph Kabila and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, AbdoulayeYerodia, who is claimed to be the "minister of hate" behind thousands of killings of Rwandan Tutsis.[1] The girls' mother, Evelyne, languished in a Congolese prison where, after narrowly escaping the Rwandan genocide, she was held because of her ethnic identity, caring for their young brother as best she could under harsh conditions.[2] Today, the Kalangalas' hopes for peace for their country, and justice for the victims of Yerodia's actions, are not yet fulfilled. And they continue to work both for justice, and for the forgiveness and reconciliation that they believe are the only way to resolve the conflict.

To be sure, the author of this article had no inkling of any of this when he sat down in a university classroom in April, 2009, to discuss some of the ways that a nation's criminal courts might impact international disputes.[3] I asked my class to read the *Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000* (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium).[4] I knew that as we discussed the case, my class would be exposed to some of the complexities of international law. I had no idea that we would soon be leaving the rarified realm of legal reasoning, and be hearing firsthand from one student who had experienced the life-and-death struggle that lay beneath the printed words. Francis Kalangala's testimony is a tale of love, of hate, of extreme and daring action, of human dignity in the midst of chaos, and, regrettably, of elusive justice still unfulfilled.

Helicopter view of Congo River in Bunia, in the occidental province of Democratic Republic of Congo

As we began to discuss the case, Mr. Kalangala, who I knew only as one of my most lively and inquisitive students, raised his hand and said, "Professor, I was personally involved in this." We all turned to him. "Well, let me explain," he began.

But before telling Mr. Kalangala's story, a bit of background is required. The case itself tells of the unsuccessful attempt by Belgium to enforce an arrest warrant against Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia, Foreign

Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, accused of fomenting massive ethnic violence and murder in the heart of Africa. Perhaps in part to restore the past, Belgium has of late sought to oppose human rights violations in its former colonies in Africa. In 1993, Belgium enacted a statute that criminalized, as a matter of Belgian law, crimes constituting "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and crimes against humanity, wherever they may occur.[5] Such "grave breaches" specifically include, *inter alia*, "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or causing serious injury to body or health."[6] The Belgian statute further sought to extend the jurisdiction of the Belgian criminal courts over anyone committing such crimes, regardless of their nationality or that of the victims, where the crimes were committed, or where the perpetrator may be found. This meant that human rights cases from any place involving any party could be brought to Belgian courts for action.[7]

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, known from 1971 to 1997 as Zaire, was once the "property" of Belgian King Leopold II, and was later made a colony of Belgium. Its initial post-independence history was extremely violent and chaotic. Indeed, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, died in a plane crash there in 1961, while attempting to intervene personally to promote peace and national unity. However, with United States support throughout the Cold War period, the rule of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, later called Mobutu Sese Seko, brought the appearance of stability to Zaire during the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, the façade would disintegrate.

While Belgian legislators debated whether their courts could exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, ethnic violence was growing in Rwanda, another former Belgian colony and neighbor of the much-larger Zaire. By 1990, civil wars had become "a regular part of Rwandan life,"[8] and Mobutu sent troops of his Zairian Armed Forces

Colonel Francis Kalangala, Congo, 1998
Photo| Courtesy of Francis Kalangala

(ZAF) to support the regime of Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana.[9] At that time, Mr. Kalangala, then a captain, commanded a company of ZAF paratroopers that were sent to Rwanda.

In 1993, the year the Belgian statute was enacted, the Arusha Peace Accords ap-

peared to offer some promise of calm. But tensions and violence continued. On April 6, 1994, Rwandan president Habyarimana died in a plane crash, and this event triggered a genocidal wave of killings that claimed the lives of more than 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and Tutsi-supporting Hutus.[10] Mr. Kalangala was again mobilized to the Congo-Rwanda border, this time to the border city of Goma.[11] He became actively involved in efforts to save the lives of Rwandan Tutsis.[12] It was this activity that led him to make the acquaintance of his future wife.

Mr. Kalangala explained:

> I met Evelyne for the first time in Gisenyi, Rwanda, where she was hidden in one of her late father's friend's house. I remember I re ceived a call from one of my best friends, who knew that I was se cretly helping Tutsi escape from Rwanda. He asked me if I can help his cousin's wife who has her niece in Gisenyi. He said that her life was threatened after the killing of her entire family. That niece was Evelyne. I went to Gis enyi and met with her Wednesday, May 11, 1994 at 10:45 a.m.; one month and a week after the begin ning of the genocide. Friday May 13, 1994 around 11:00 p.m. Evelyne fled to Congo.[13]

By 1996, Rwandan Hutu militia forces (Interahamwe) who had fled Rwanda after the ascension of a Tutsi led government, had been using Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire as bases for attacks against Rwanda. These conflicts escalated into the First Congo War of 1996-1997, which led to the overthrow of President Mobuto and the seizure of power in Zaire by Laurent Kabila. Francis Kalangala was then a Colonel.[14] He was assigned by General Mahale Bakongo Lieko, FAZ chief of staff, to take charge of the armies defending Kinshasa. But resistance crumbled as Kabila's forces, with significant foreign assistance, moved swiftly on the capital. Mobuto flew out of the country on May 16. A white flag of surrender was raised at the innermost base of the Presidential Special Division (DSP) on May 18, and Kabila took control.[15]

Mr. Kalangala was immediately placed under arrest. However, rather than kill him or keep him captive, Mr. Kalangala explained, Kabila sought to exploit his popularity with his soldiers, and offered him an advisory position in the new army.[16] James Kabarebe, a Rwandan, was Kabila's initial chief of staff, but was soon replaced by Celestin Kifwa. Mr. Kalangala was assigned to be Kifwa's military attache. But with the military and politics rife with intrigue and corruption, no one and no position was safe. As political fortunes ebbed and flowed, side-switching became very familiar.

In 1998, conflict between Kabila and Rwanda contributed to the outbreak of fighting now known as the Second Congo War. At that time, Mr. Kifwa informed Mr. Kalangala that his wife, Evelyn, was an enemy of the state because she was Rwandan Tutsi. As a high-ranking military official, he thus could not be married

to her. He was ordered to divorce her. "You cannot have an enemy in your house," he was told.[17]

Mr. Kalangala refused. As he tells, his superiors were perplexed and suggested that he must be having "trouble" controlling his wife. They assured him that he needn't worry, for they could "take care of it."[18] In August, 1998, he was told that if he wanted to maintain his position in the army, he must bring his wife to a detention center. He knew that killings were being carried out at that location. So he sent his wife and their young son to his brother's house in Moanda, and left for the countryside with their two daughters. He sought to feign his own death so that they would not go after her, but this effort was frustrated when his image appeared on television in September. Kalangala's brother sent Evelyne and their son to a church that was considered safe, but they were betrayed by the pastor and arrested in October 1998. Sent to Kinshasa, their fate uncertain, they remained in prison for 10 months. Meanwhile, Mr. Kalangala made his way out of Kinshasa, a process that took two days, and joined the *Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Democratie* (RCD) in Bas Congo.[19]

During this time, Mr. Kalangala explained, the government kept up a relentless propaganda stream of hate and fear against Rwandan Tutsis through radio and other media, encouraging the populace to "go outside and kill" Rwandan Tutsis.[20] At one point, a Kifwa assistant, one Maj. Myumba, told the Congolese to take revenge against Rwandans and "show the toads that never, and never ever again will they swallow the elephant."[21] "Be ferocious. If you happen to encounter a Rwandan enemy . . . beat him to bruises [and] massacre them without mercy . . . bring a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire, stones and the like, in order, dear listeners, to kill the Rwandan Tutsis . . . jump on the people with long noses . . . ."[22]

Evelyne Kalangala with son Francis (one year-old) in Congolese Army jail, City of Matadi, Otober 1998

Photo| Courtesy of Francis Kalangala

Mr. Kalangala stated that Yerodia himself broadcast a list of 10 enemies, and Kalangala was first on the list. "He's an enemy too," Yerodia stated. "If you find him,

kill him."[23] According to Mr. Kalangala, his propaganda efforts were highly effective and "made the people into killers."[24] Kalangala stated that a mob had entered his village of Nzalia and had attempted to find him. By the time they left, they had killed 58 villagers including some of his relatives.[25]

Mr. Kalangala sought for a way to stop the propaganda in the late 1990s and to free his wife and young son who were being held in prison. He continued to conduct military operations with the RCD, while Azarias Ruberwa, a Congolese lawyer, led the political wing. In 1999, as the rebels met around a makeshift conference table, a Belgian lawyer briefed them regarding the possible usefulness of the new Belgian criminal law. Their idea was to get a Belgian court to investigate Abdoulaye Yerodia and to issue a warrant for his arrest.[26]

The rebel team's efforts had fallen short, but according to Mr. Kalangala, they were not entirely unsuccessful: Yerodia stopped his incendiary broadcasts and withdrew into silence.

Was it possible? Could Belgium, the former colonial power, now be made to serve the cause of justice in the Congo? The Congolese rebel group decided that a delegation would travel to Belgium and work there to initiate a prosecution of Yerodia and the issuance of an arrest warrant. Ruberwa made the first trip and things went well. The court was listening. In January, 2000, Mr. Kalangala went to Belgium to give testimony of the Kabila government's demand that he divorce Evelyne, his refusal to do so and his consequent arrest and escape, and the imprisonment of his wife Evelyne and their son.[27]

On April 11, 2000, the group achieved a significant step. The investigating judge handling the matter, Judge Damien Vandermeersch, concluded that there were "strong and sufficient grounds for initiating proceedings before the Belgian courts in respect of the matters complained of."[28] Accordingly, the court issued an arrest warrant *in absentia* naming Yerodia in respect of certain acts alleged to have been committed in August 1998. The warrant was immediately transmitted to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and circulated internationally.[29] As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) later observed, the international circulation of the warrant could have resulted in Yerodia's arrest while abroad.[30]

In response, on October 17, 2000, the Kabila administration applied to the ICJ to annul the warrant. In January, 2001, Laurent Kabila was shot and killed by his bodyguard. His 29 year old son, Joseph Kabila, then a military commander, succeeded him as president and remains so today. Unexpectedly, the younger Kabila sent word to Mr. Kalangala that he would

be welcome in the new administration.[31] According to Mr. Kalangala, Kabila offered to restore his grade of Colonel, and Ruberwa, who would become a vice president of the transitional government in 2003, also encouraged him to come.[32] Mr. Kalangala weighed the offer. However, others warned him that Kabila's offer was only a pretense to lure him to his death and he elected not to go. Instead, he received asylum in the United States, arriving in Newark, New Jersey, on September 10, 2001, where he was reunited with his family.[33]

The legal fight in the ICJ continued on into 2002. Then, on February 14, 2002, the Court handed down its decision. Without addressing Belgium's attempt at universal jurisdiction, which the Court found had not been properly raised by the Congo, the Court nevertheless struck down the warrant on the ground that Abdoulaye Yerodia, as the sitting Minister of Foreign Affairs, was immune from any such warrant issued by a national criminal court. In its decision, the Court attempted to instruct those seeking a remedy against Yerodia's alleged criminal conduct as to possible alternative routes to justice, noting that "the *immunity* from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy *impunity*."[34] However, as Mr. Kalangala explains it, the suggestions given by the Court from its perch in the Hague were of little practical benefit to Mr. Kalangala and his compatriots.

First, the Court noted that "such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law."[35]

While unquestionably true, the regime that appointed Yerodia minister of foreign affairs had no intention of prosecuting him for his actions, and Yerodia continued to wield great influence with the junior Kabila.

Secondly, the Court noted, "[such persons] will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity."[36] Again, the Congolese regime had no intention of doing so.

Third, the Court observed, "after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States."[37] However, the Congolese regime continued to provide Yerodia with official offices that kept his immunity intact.

Finally, the Court wrote, "an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction."[38] Examples of such international criminal courts include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court itself. However, to date, no such special tribunal with jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity committed in the Congo exists, and the International

Criminal Court only has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed since the entry into force of the Rome Statute on July 1, 2002.[39]

The rebel team's efforts had fallen short, but according to Mr. Kalangala, they were not entirely unsuccessful: Yerodia stopped his incendiary broadcasts and withdrew into silence.[40]

Indirectly, the efforts bore fruit in another way. While in Europe pursuing the warrant, Francis Kalangala requested help from the International Red Cross, the United Nations, and the United States in securing his wife Evelyne's release. With help from the Red Cross and the U.S. Embassy in the Congo, she and their young son were freed and granted asylum in the U.S. in March, 2000, although Mr. Kalangala, already back in the field, had no way of knowing this. It was only when Evelyne had passed through Benin on her way to America that she managed to get in touch with her husband through the satellite phone he carried. She was granted refugee status in the United States and settled in Bridgeport, Connecticut.

Upon learning that his wife and son were safe, Mr. Kalangala squarely faced his own tenuous uncertainties in the Congo. In the silence of the jungle night, with his wife and son far away, and his daughters, ages 11 and 14, close at hand but still at risk, he made the decision to leave the Congo. Thus he took the steps that eventually brought his entire family to Connecticut and to that summer day of August, 2009.

As a man with a unique quest for justice, Francis Kalangala's life is far from ordinary. He even returned to the Congo from October to December, 2005, and met with President Joseph Kabila, the man whose troops he fought against and whom he believes tried to lure him to his death with the offer of a high government position.[41] Reflecting on the trip, in 2006, Kalangala told the Connecticut Post, "Joseph Kabila is young and he has a good heart, even if he has bad people around him. [But] they really are a gang. I worry that no matter who you elect, nothing really changes."[42]

However, in many respects, Francis Kalangala is now just another immigrant to the United States – working as a computer engineer and pursuing an advanced degree while working to improve his life, and that of his family.

Postscript

The author of this article attended a United Nations Day program in Norwalk, Connecticut on October 21, 2009. Mr. Kalangala and his wife were the featured speakers on the topic: "The Human Face of War and Peace in DR Congo." That evening Evelyne Kalangala explained that her mother, a Tutsi, had been killed for her ethnicity in the genocide in Rwanda. Her father, a Hutu, was killed for marrying a Tutsi. And she, even after escaping to the Congo, found herself imprisoned. "You can't imagine an African prison," she said. "You can't eat. You don't shower. You don't sleep well."

"I miss my family," she concluded. "But if I teach my son to hate, it will never stop." Like some other survivors of the wars of the region, Evelyne explained that she had decided to forgive the perpetrators of the crimes that had destroyed her family because "forgiveness has power." Turning to the United Nations' representative present that evening, she pointedly observed, "Please tell the U.N, if you don't introduce the power of forgiveness, you can't stop what is happening in the Congo."[43]

Francis and Evelyn Kalangala, Bridgeport, CT
Photo | Courtesy of Francis Kalangala

Endnotes

1. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2, 2011.

2. *Id.*

3. Our text was *International Business Law and Its Environment*, Seventh Edition, by Schaffer, Agusti, and Earle.

4. *Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000* (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), I.C.J. Rep. 3, International Court of Justice (Judgment of 14 Feb. 2002) (the "Congo Decision").

5. *See* Belgian Act of 16 June 1993 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of 18 June 1977, as modified by the Act of 10 February 1999 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian law (Unofficial consolidated English text, and commentary, published in 38 I.L.M. 918 (1999).

6. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 147.

7. The statute was repealed in 2003. Opponents of the statute argued that cases brought under the law could be handled better by the International Criminal Court under the nearly identical Rome Statute for the prosecution of international war crimes and crimes against humanity. Even after the law's repeal, however, Belgian courts are still able to prosecute crimes committed in foreign countries where Belgians are involved and crimes specifically related to the Rwandan genocide.

8. Christina Fisanick, ed., *The Rwanda Genocide* at 9, Greenhaven Press, 2004.

9. William G. Thom, *Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence*, Journal of Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Fall 1999.

10. *The Rwanda Genocide* at 8.

11. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2, 2011

12. *Id.*

13. Email communication to author, Oct. 13, 2009.

14. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2, 2011

15. *See* Thom.

16. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2, 2011.

17. *Id.*

18. *Id.*

19. *Id.*

20. *Id.*

21. Hate Messages on East Congolese Radio, BBD World Mediawatch, August 12, 1998.

22. *Id.*

23. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2, 2011.

24. *Id.*

25. *Id.*

26. *Id.*

27. *Id.*

28. Congo Decision, CounterMemorial of Kingdom of Belgium, 25 September 2011, at 10.

29. Congo Decision, Judgment at 9.

30. *Id.* at 30.

31. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2 and Feb. 6, 2011.

32. *Id.*

33. *Id.*

34. Congo Decision, Judgment at 25-26. (emphasis in original)

35. *Id.*

36. *Id.*

37. *Id.*

38. *Id.*

39. In fact, the first investigation opened by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court was an investigation of crimes in the DRC opened in June 2004. However, the investigation is expressly limited to crimes committed after July 1, 2002, and thus excludes the conduct by Yerodia that Francis Kalangala and his compatriots complained about.

40. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2, 2011.

41. Author's Interview Notes, Feb. 2 and Feb. 6, 2011.

42. Bill Cummings, Fugutives From Congo Strife Building New Lives In Area, Connecticut Post, August 15, 2006.

43. Author's Notes of Oct. 21, 2009 Program.

Scholarly Note: American Medical Development in Colonial Puerto Rico

Darryl E. Brock

Abstract

Consistent with its civilizing mission, the United States sought to enhance healthcare development in its new Puerto Rican colony, one of the spoils of the Spanish-American War. American military physicians rapidly cured the population of their devastating hookworm affliction and the Rockefeller Foundation soon began exporting this imperialist triumph to the far corners of the world. Leveraging that success, the Porto Rico Anemia Commission evolved into the Institute of Tropical Medicine, predecessor to the University of Puerto Rico's School of Tropical Medicine. Issues of agricultural development would also impact insular healthcare, uniquely driving aspects of medical development. Efforts to export American successes to broader Latin America provide useful perspectives as the United States seeks to influence other underdeveloped global areas in the twenty-first century.

Biography

Darryl E. Brock is a Ph.D. candidate in Modern History at Fordham University in New York City, with an M.A. in history from Claremont Graduate University in Southern California and an M.S. in marine science from the University of South Florida. He has recently published an article in the Southeast Review of Asian Studies*, as well as a book chapter "José Agustín Quintero—Cuban Patriot in Confederate Diplomatic Service" in the book* Cubans in the Confederacy. *He is also author of the book* China and Darwinian Evolution: Influence on Intellectual and Social Development *and is currently co-editing the book* Mr. Science and Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution. *Mr. Brock is a board member of the Irvine (CA) Sister Cities Foundation, previously served on the NSF panel for President Bush's Excellence in Science Teaching Awards, and recently received a British Council fellowship to present, in Egypt, on the influence of Darwin in China.*

"We might well make Puerto Rico a base for cultural and scientific work the influence of which would be felt through both continents."

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Puerto Rican governor (1932)[1]

The era of Dollar Diplomacy found the United States seeking to exert influence on different Caribbean nations such as the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua without their formal incorporation into the American empire, but Puerto Rico represented imperialism *with* colonization.[2] The flurry of U.S. official and quasi-official representatives, subsequent to the 1898 annexation from Spain, revealed the civilizing mission as a motivating force. New York Botanical Garden botanist Lucien Underwood, for example, conducted studies of Puerto Rico in 1901 and extolled the island. Trekking through the mountains on horseback, he marveled at the luxuriant landscape, with coffee, tobacco and sugar cane in cultivation. Underwood represented Puerto Rico as a "rare prize," ready for modernization and development. He concluded that America owed Puerto Rico "the benefits of Anglo-Saxon civilization," which he claimed the islanders sought with great interest.[3]

The United States did seek to deliver those benefits and it immediately set out to remake the island in the image of the United States, exporting American finance, education and scientific expertise in tropical medicine and agriculture. *The British Medical Journal* noted in 1898 that the recent American takeover of "Porto Rico" offered potential new opportunities for the physician's practice. At the same time, the *Journal's* stance reflected British colonial attitudes toward the "inferior" peoples of the tropics, the empire seemingly unaware of an existing medical tradition on the island.[4]

The Puerto Rican elite initially welcomed the United States takeover from Spain, looking forward to the prospect of egalitarian, progressive American traditions replacing centuries of Spanish exploitation and neglect. Physicians numbered among those elite, the vanguard of a now stillborn autonomous movement. They nevertheless hoped to advance their liberal agenda under new U.S. government oversight, imagining reforms against alcoholism, robbery and homicide, among the ills originating from Spanish colonialism. Arrival of Americans, however, with their own phalanx of physicians under Uncle Sam's new colonial mandate, presented competition for authority and legitimacy. Despite Puerto Rico's experience with smallpox vaccinations, for example, the new colonial authority virtually bypassed insular physicians in the American smallpox campaign of 1898.[5] U.S. administrators typically viewed Puerto Rican physicians as self-serving, corrupt and incompetent, hardly differentiating them from pharmacists, *parteras* (midwife medical practitioners), or *curanderos* (rural semi-trained technicians).[6] The Americans thus engaged in a contemptuous disregard for local knowledge, as colonial administrators in European empires had done before.

Ciriaco and Hookworms

The United States faced an unexpected

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., governor of Puerto Rico (1929-1932) and governor-general of the Philippines (1932-33).

Photo | *Library of Congress*

threat within a year of its invasion—the even greater power of the menacing hurricane San Ciriaco. *Scientific American* couched its appeal for disaster relief in paternalistic, imperialistic terms, describing the storm's "awful desolation" that resulted in a starving, homeless people, a challenge to the "warm-hearted [American] race" that undertook the war to advance humanity. That is, the nation must prove to a skeptical, civilized world that it would meet "the white man's burden" to clothe, house and feed these millions in their time of sorrow.[7]

That natural disaster resulted in the American military government appointing a young army physician, Bailey K. Ashford, to establish a tent hospital in the city of Ponce to coordinate medical relief for the refugees pouring in from the mountains and rural spaces. It would be in this provisional facility that Ashford would initiate his hookworm research, a campaign that would bring international attention to Puerto Rico.[8] Ashford offered hope to the 800,000 people—more than four-fifths of the population—estimated afflicted with hookworm disease. The Porto Rico Anemia Commission, founded by Ashford and employing his thymol treatment, lowered death rates seven-fold (decreasing to 1,758 by 1907, from 11,875 in 1900).[9] Puerto Rican physicians took over the hookworm program upon Ashford's return to the United States in 1906. Under their leadership, the campaign treated over 250,000 people by 1910. The Rockefeller Commission visited Puerto Rico and found the program impressive; they soon exported it to the United States to treat American Southerners. This initiative, in the Old South, took the designation Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease. Internationally, the success of the Southern hookworm project, with origins in Puerto Rico, later led to the Rockefeller Foundation exporting the campaign to Egypt and Australia under the auspices of the foundation's International Health Board.[10]

Tropical Medicine and Governor Roosevelt's Vision

Ashford leveraged strong support from the American-dominated "Porto Rican" legislature into continued funding under the post-1917 era legislature, a body finally comprised of local Puerto Rican of-

ficials. Physician members of the Porto Rico Anemia Commission re-established themselves in 1912 under auspices of Ashford's new Institute of Tropical Medicine, located near the island's capitol building, the predecessor to the University of Puerto Rico's School of Tropical Medicine, which would later open in 1925. Funded by the Puerto Rican government but largely operated by Columbia University, the school exported biological expertise internationally and its early graduates included a Spanish Jesuit and a Hindu from India.[11] The journal *Science* took note of this new institution, in 1927 reporting public lectures by visiting scholars such as a tropical disease specialist from Caracas, and the director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York City, Simon Flexner.[12] Former Puerto Rican governor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., son of the president, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that the school would discover cures for tropical diseases, drawing youth from the Central and South American nations, and that "many of the Puerto Rican graduates will go to those countries to practice."[13] By 1949 the institution would be absorbed into the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine.

Col. Bailey K. Ashford, founder of the Porto Rico Anemia Commission, received international acclaim for his successful insular hookworm program.

Photo | *Library of Congress*

Governor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., for example, imagined Puerto Rico as a bridge between the United States and Latin America, making up for past American errors in the region.

Just over one year after the school's founding, in 1927, the Rockefeller Foundation sent one of its tropical medicine specialists, Francis William O'Conner, to conduct research on filariasis diseases such as elephantiasis.[14] Born a colonial subject of the British Empire, the Irish physician readily perceived underlying economic determinants for Puerto Rican health. At the end of his trip, in his *Diary* he reflected that Puerto Ricans are "exploited by absentee landlords who leave no chance for the small producer."[15] O'Conner's Rockefeller Foundation colleagues, however, tended to ascribe these

factors to the more naïve notion that disease causes poverty and thus that health actions could promote economic development. In fact, in exploiting widespread unemployment and a tariff-free colonial zone, those "absentee" American corporate sugar producers had largely displaced coffee and other crops, creating massive economic and social dislocation in Puerto Rico.

Examination of child for hookworm in a Puerto Rican Resettlement Administration (PRRA) center, San Juan, Puerto Rico (1938).

Photo | *Library of Congress*

Expanding upon O'Conner's observations, the medical historian José G. Rigau-Pérez links those colonial medical institutions of 1927 to the broader economic history: "All the medical research and public health efforts were necessary to counteract the consequences of an economy based primarily on one product: cane sugar." In fact, malaria and schistosomiasis incidence coincided with proximity to sugar cane production, the associated irrigation projects providing the vehicle for broad dissemination of infectious agents.[16] In short, disease does not exclusively cause poverty, but economic development can be the source of disease as well.

Concluding Thoughts

Well-intentioned development and peace initiatives may encounter unexpected difficulty in achieving objectives, despite their allure as ideal solutions to intractable challenges. Governor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., for example, imagined Puerto Rico as a bridge between the United States and Latin America, making up for past American errors in the region. Yet, despite successes experienced with the School of Tropical Medicine and the University of Puerto Rico in service to greater Latin America, tensions between the U.S. and Latin America continue, with Puerto Rican agency proving marginal in effecting progress. These new Americans—citizens after the 1917 Jones Act—found their shared linguistic, cultural and historical heritage with Latin America inadequate to overcome larger differences originating from North American hegemony and the systemic peculiarities of Spanish-speaking America.

Economic practices in specific locales may have broad, unexpected social, environmental or medical impacts on development. The Puerto Rican example reveals that displacement of existing crops with sugar monoculture had created massive economic and social dislocation. Healthcare development, in turn, suffered as public health mobilized to counteract

the consequences of an economy based primarily on the single product of cane sugar. That is, disease coincided with proximity to sugar cane production, with irrigation providing the vehicle for broad dissemination of infectious agents.

Colonial Puerto Rico also demonstrates the global application of local knowledge. Ashford's success against hookworm assumed a broad international reach, not only within the American imperial sphere, but beyond. Eradicating hookworms in Puerto Rico took on a life in the American South before the Rockefeller Foundation exported the achievement to Egypt and elsewhere.

The history of the Puerto Rican encounter with the United States offers unique insights into issues of development, these challenges yet relevant in the twenty-first century. At the turn of the century, Americans sought to influence an underdeveloped, Spanish-speaking, Catholic nation that shared little in the way of U.S. traditional values and institutional heritage. More than a century later, the United States still finds itself seeking to influence underdeveloped nations with differing linguistic, religious and political traditions. The experiences of past imperial episodes may help guide new encounters in the postmodern period.

Endnotes:

1. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. "Puerto Rico: Our Link with Latin America." *Foreign Affairs* 12 (1934): 280.

2. This scholarly note augments the author's more detailed treatment of American imperialism, also in this issue of the *JGDP*, entitled "American International Relations: Lessons from Dollar Diplomacy and Caribbean Development."

3. Peter Mickulas, *Britton's Botanical Empire: The New York Botanical Garden and American Botany, 1888-1929* (New York: The New York Botanical Garden Press, 2007), 218.

4. "Medical Practice in Porto Rico," *The British Medical Journal* 2 (1898): 1836.

5. Nicole Trujillo-Pagán, "The Politics of Professionalization: Puerto Rican Physicians during the Transition from Spanish to US Colonialism," in *Health and Medicine in the circum-Caribbean, 1800-1968,* ed. Juanita de Barros, Steven Palmer and David Wright (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group: 2009).

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7. "A National Opportunity," *Scientific American* LXXXI (1899), 130.

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9. Benigno Trigo, "Anemia and Vampires: Figures to Govern the Colony, Puerto Rico 1880 to 1904," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (1999): 118-119; Muna Lee, "Conquistador for Science," *The North American Review* 226 (1928): 132-133; Rodrigo Fernos, *Medicine and International Relations in the Caribbean: Some Historical Variants* (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse, Inc., 2006): 172.

10. Warwick Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 7, 195-196.

11. Lee; Fernos, 164, 174; Norman I. Maldonado, *On Health in Puerto Rico* (San Juan: La Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2008), 134.

12. "The Porto Rican School of Tropical Medicine," *Science* 64 (1926): 322-323; R.A. Lambert, "Public lectures at the School of Tropical Medicine at the University of Porto Rico," *Science* 65 (1927): 440.

13. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. "Puerto Rico: Our Link with Latin America." *Foreign Affairs* 12 (1934): 279.

14. Raúl Mayo Santana, Annette Ramírez de Arellano and José G. Rigau-Pérez, eds., *A Sojourn in Tropical Medicine: Francis W. O'Conner's Diary of a Porto Rican Trip, 1927* (San Juan: Le Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2008), 1-11.

15. Santana et al., eds.

16. José G. Rigau-Pérez, "The Apogee of Tropical Medicine: An Epidemiologic Portrait of Puerto Rico in 1927," in Santana et al. eds., *A Sojourn in Tropical Medicine,* 147-211.

Multilateral Peacekeeping in Africa: The Role of the UN and African Union

Solomon Hailu

Abstract

The United Nations was created to achieve international peace and security through collective measures. The international body has scored some successes in dealing with interstate conflict, but the institution has suffered significant failures in addressing intrastate conflicts. This problem has become largely evident in the addressing of security problems in developing regions, particularly in Africa. Among other things, the Western Powers' lack of high level political will, their lack of resource commitment and their doctrine of non-violation of member states sovereignty stand in the way of the UN functioning effectively in addressing the matters of internal conflicts in Africa. Under such circumstances, there seems to be no alternative but for Africans themselves to rise up and meet the challenge of peacekeeping and conflict under the auspices of the newly established African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). Obviously, young and weakly developed, the AUPSC needs to seek more support from the UN, Western powers, African sub-regional organizations and individual states in order to effectively address widespread internal conflicts in Africa.

Biography

Dr. Solomon Hailu teaches International/Community Development at the Oral Roberts University, Tulsa , OK. His teaching and research interest include International Political Economy, human security, conflict analysis and resolution and peace studies in Africa. He has extensively published on African peace and development issues. He is currently working on his forthcoming book on Collective Security in Africa.

The UN Charter Article 1 (1) states that one of the *raisons d'etre* for the birth of the UN was to maintain international peace and security and to this end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.[1]

Within the UN structure, the Security Council has received the mandate of handling international security issues. Article 24 of the UN Charter grants the Security Council the responsibility of utilizing every possible means to restore or maintain international peace. Among these are (1) seeking peaceful resolution of disputes under chapter VI of the UN Charter, which includes activities such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation of the disputing parties.[2]

During the Cold War, the UN had largely acted as an instrument of persuasion rather than coercion. All but a handful of the nearly 700 UN Security Council resolutions adopted during the Cold War have been under Article 24 of the Charter, which supports the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes.[3] Examples are the several wars between Israel and the Arab states, the South African incursions into Angola, the Iran-Iraq war, the Falklands War, Libya-Chad, China-Vietnam, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the Suez Canal Crisis[4] and (2) the Security council also employed forceful means of restoring peace under the authorization of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows both military and nonmilitary actions, such as economic sanctions against a law breaker or aggressor to be used in order to restore international peace.

Article 41 of the UN Charter reads: *The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.*[5]

Article 42: *Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.*[6]

However, the kind of aggression that the collective security system of the UN was designed to deter or punish has rarely been a feature of the conflicts during and after the Cold War. Instead, conflicts within states have become increasingly prominent. The Security Council has authorized only two peace enforcement actions in the context of interstate conflicts since its existence - the Korean War (1950-53) and the Gulf War (1991) - based on Article 42 of the UN Charter. In both cases, the mandate of the intervention was to restore the sovereignty of the victims of aggression, South Korea and Kuwait respectively.

Despite many of the Cold War intrastate wars having needed UN peace enforce-

ment measures, the UN has failed to authorize military measures according to Article 42 of its Charter. The UN has suffered three fundamental problems in dealing with intrastate conflicts. The first is doctrinal limitation. The UN was formed to create peaceful international relations among states and to settle conflicts between them but it still refrains from dealing with conflict within states no matter how destructive the conflict might be. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter recognized that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,"[7] except when the Security Council is agreed to implement enforcement measures under Article 42. This means that the UN suffers from constraints of its own doctrine of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of member states. Under such circumstances, the UN lacks proper doctrinal arrangements to address armed conflicts within sovereign states. The existing doctrinal flaw has raised the critical issue of whether the actions of the UN in sovereign states are within legitimate doctrinal limits.

Therefore, it is highly imperative that the UN takes critical steps in undertaking doctrinal revisions on its longstanding principles of non-interference and respect for traditional sovereignty. Instead, the UN should look to establish a doctrinal framework of intervention that authorizes it with the responsibility to protect under circumstances in which civilians are purposely being targeted by internal armed conflicts as was the case in the crises in Kosovo, Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Haiti (1994), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998-present) and Darfur happened to show.

Eva Bertram points out that the traditional view of sovereignty has so decayed that all should recognize the appropriateness of the UN measures inside member states to save them from self-destruction."[8] In his General Assembly speech (1999), former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan strongly asserted that the UN should take responsibility to protect civilian victims of internal armed conflicts.[9] However, part of empowering the UN should involve doctrinal revision of the longstanding principle of non-intervention to allow the UN to intervene in order to rescue civilians amid internal armed conflicts. In response, the UN has adopted a new mandate of greater use of military intervention called "forceful humanitarian intervention," which is designed to limit the effects of a conflict and assist in creating the conditions for its termination and the delivery of humanitarian aid.[10]

Under this new practice, the UN Security Council has authorized enforcement actions in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994) and Haiti (1994) based on Article 42 of its Charter. This takes as its main purpose the protection of civilian victims from the ongoing armed conflict by creating a safety zone against human rights abuse. For example, during the Gulf War, the Kurds were protected by the allied forces from attacks by Iraqi forces. The mission also involved providing them with humanitarian assistance (e.g., food and

medicine). The mission used military means to sustain relief efforts, as did the one in Somalia. Arguably, this constitutes a sweeping revision of the original concept of "security," which is underpinned in UN Charter Article 2 (7) and which effectively outlaws intervention in the internal affairs of member states.

Secondly, the UN was bound by ideological competition, rivalries, and even proxy wars between the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and United States. Despite its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, the superpowers' competition for ideological influence denied the Security Council the power to operate at full capacity, irrespective of how seriously internal conflicts posed threats to peace. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was unwilling to contribute to the cost of the vast majority of UN peacekeeping operations that did not coincide with Soviet interests.[11] The United States had also substantially cut its dues to the United Nations.[12]

Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War brought an end to ideological tensions and confrontations, the dominance of the US and the less certain influence of regional powers is still very real. For example, the US unilateral decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was against the modus operandi of the Security Council.

The third issue is political limitation. The UN order-keeping mandates have been significantly impaired by traditional states' national interest-driven conduct of international relations. For example, the Western Powers have no political interest to commit the necessary military and financial resources to UN interventions in regions where they have no immediate geostrategic and economic interest, particularly in Africa. As a region, Africa ranks as the lowest place in the order of Western foreign policy priorities. Africa's obvious lack of geo-strategic significance in the aftermath of the Cold War and its less than 5% contribution to the global economy have relegated it to the backburner of Western Powers' foreign policy priorities. This means that the universal acceptance of the indivisibility of peace has not always been matched by the commitment of the necessary resolve and resources to make that belief in the indivisibility of peace a reality - particularly in African situations.

Arguably, the Western commitment to their strategic national interest outweighs their obligation to the UN collective security system. Without doubt, the West's erroneous security policy towards Africa has significantly hurt the UN-led multilateral security efforts in Africa. Under such conditions, the UN has no other option but to depend on African regional organizations to seek solutions to peace and security problems in their continent.

The UN Charter authorizes regional organizations to take collective security measures in their respective regions in a manner that is consistent with the UN mandate of maintaining international peace and security. Article 53 states that "*the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional*

arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."[13]

However, despite the fact that regional organizations are required to seek prior approval from the UN, they have not always been consistent with the UN standard procedure of regional intervention. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) conducted intervention in Lesotho in 1998 without the authorization of the UN.[14] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was accused of using excessive force during a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.[15] These problems arise because each regional organization has its own principle and agenda for intervention that may lead to possible tensions with the UN.

Nonetheless, for a number of reasons, the potential for regional organizations in peacekeeping and conflict resolutions can't be ignored. First, past experience has proved that the UN has limited resources with which to resolve widespread international conflicts by itself. Africa has particularly been a serious testing ground for UN international peacekeeping missions. Failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Angola (1999), Sierra Leone (2000) and most recently, its ongoing struggle in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur and Sudan, are clear indications of the UN's inadequacy in addressing peace and conflict issues in Africa.

The aforementioned failures of the UN in Africa seem to confirm that the UN has to seek more support from African regional organizations to help address the complex nature of conflict in the continent. However, under the present circumstances, African contributions to the UN's multilateral peacekeeping operations in Africa come mostly through the contribution of troops. Africa's poverty and underdevelopment is the obvious reason for its limited contributions.

Second, regional organizations are far more familiar with local and regional dynamics of conflict and have sound knowledge of indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution. Therefore, regional organizations should have to share the UN burden of maintaining peace and security in their respective regions. Third, regional organizations have growing aspirations to play an active role in conflict resolution in their respective regions in order to ward off the most immediate "collateral damage" from regional conflicts. Fourth, regional involvement is less costly and intervention more timely due to the easy access to the conflict zone as a result of geographical proximity and, in some cases, common knowledge of language and culture.

However, casting greater peacekeeping and conflict resolution responsibility on regional organizations may bear the following problems:

- Regional organizations are often accused of lacking impartiality for representing the national prejudices of their most powerful member(s). This lack of impartiality arises from covert and overt political objectives of regional powers. In this respect, forces from

distant countries are highly recommended.
- Regional organizations' roles can be weakened by the lack of a formal mandate and policy framework and by the lack of experience needed to handle security issues in their respective geographical areas.
- Regional states are technically unable to carry out extended peacekeeping missions because of a lack of finances, low levels of skills and professionalism and poorly equipped peacekeeping personnel.

The Role of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC)

One of the top priorities of the African Union (AU) is addressing the prevalent peace and security problems in Africa. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 with the primary purpose of maintaining African peace and security in the context of expanded approaches in conflict resolution, which involve early warning systems, mechanisms for conflict prevention, doctrines of peacekeeping operations and peace-building missions, and the establishment of an African standby force for quick deployment.

The PSC consists of fifteen member countries. Ten countries are elected to the position every two years while the other five PSC members are elected to the position every three years. PSC is further supported by the Panel of the Wise and the AU Peace Fund, which coordinates financial support from partners inside and outside of Africa to support PSC activities.

Article 5(2) of the new AU Charter (also known as the Constitutive Act of AU) provides the specific function of the Peace and Security Council of the Union as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts in Africa.[16] The AU Con-

African Union Flag

stitutive Act also established a legal, technical and doctrinal framework for PSC intervention within and between member states through military and non-military activities. The African Union is perhaps the only regional organization in the world to put into effect a doctrine of intervention in its member countries to avert crime and atrocities against their civilian population. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act asserts that the "*Peace and Security Council may authorize intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.*"[17]

Despite establishing a regional intervention policy framework, including the

mandate to protect civilians from internal conflict, the PSC is less prepared to conduct robust intervention that covers the continent as a whole. The PSC simply doesn't have the necessary financial and human resources to stage durable peacekeeping operations under current conditions.

In addition to diminished Western interest in supporting the PSC peacekeeping efforts in Africa, the PSC's activities have been further undermined by Africa's own lack of high-level political will to commit military and financial resources. For example, the embattled African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is close to total collapse because of a serious shortage of combat forces. African countries have been turning down the PSC's requests for peacekeepers. As the case of AMISOM appears to show, only Uganda and Burundi together contributed about 5,000 of the 8,000 African contingents needed to launch the mission.[18] The rest of African states are nowhere near committing themselves to help the PSC's peace enforcement efforts in Somalia. This can be due to weak national security capacity and pressing socio-economic internal priorities.

Nevertheless, the PSC may still utilize the potential of African states through partnership with African sub-regional organizations. Article 16 of the protocol relating to the establishment of the African Union's Peace and Security Council establishes appropriate procedures and principles which sub-regional mechanisms should follow in order to stage any intervention in their respective region of administration.[19]

Some of the prominent African sub-regional organizations include the Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) in the east; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the north; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the south; and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa.

None of these sub-regional organizations were originally mandated to handle security problems within their respective regions. Indeed, at their inception, they were established as African Economic Communities (AECs) to promote economic integration and regional trade among their member states. However, the pressing insecurity issues in their respective sub-regions have forced them to expand their mandate in order to deal with conflict resolution and peacekeeping before they were able to build competent mechanisms for regional security. For example, ECOWAS conducted peacekeeping operations in Liberia in 1995 and Sierra Leone in 1997 on an ad hoc basis—without a well-established regional intervention structure to coordinate and lead forces drawn from different countries. The ECOWAS forces had neither previous joint military training nor sound logistical readiness prior to the intervention.

Clearly, the ECOWAS experience suggests that African sub-regional organizations need more time to construct a broader and more sustainable regional

intervention capacity that involves building early warning systems, preventive actions, the establishment of a standby force and peacekeeping activities. To this end, African sub-regions have begun to develop capacities for regional intervention through joint trainings, seminars, and workshops. As part of developing their security capacities, the PSC mandated each sub-region to build a brigade size African Standby Force (ASF) to be deployed under the command of the PSC. Each sub-region is currently in the process of building civilian and military components of this ASF. Among other things, the ASF has the following tasks:[20]

- observing and monitoring missions;
- preventive deployment;
- peace-building missions; and
- humanitarian assistance

However, building such capacity takes a long time and extensive resources, while African security problems need urgent solutions. In the face of such urgent crises, the UN must assume immediate responsibility to address African security problems. As set out in Article 1 of its Charter, the UN has been mandated to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, as part of its international obligation, the UN Security Council must continue to search for multilateral solutions to African peace and security problems. African motivations to do more in peacekeeping however should not be used as an excuse to scale down the extent of UN involvement in peace and security on the continent.[21]

In the meantime, the United Nations should simultaneously build African security capacity while undertaking peacekeeping operations in Africa. Most importantly, the UN Security Council and African Union Peace and Security Council should establish a strong partnership to promote peace and security in Africa based on the prescriptions of Articles 53 of the UN Charter and Article 7 (K) of the Protocol on the African Peace and Security Council which reads, "*to promote and develop a strong 'partnership for peace and security' between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations.*[22] The ongoing UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur is an example of a joint peacekeeping model used by the UN and the AU that needs to be adopted in Somalia and other African trouble spots.

Furthermore, the UN must use its international leverage and legitimacy to mobilize support from the international community in order to enhance the conflict resolution and management capacity of the PSC. In this light, part of the UN strategy should include mobilizing member states (in particular the Western Powers) and persuading stronger African states such as South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Egypt to support the efforts of the PSC in order to establish collective security in Africa. This demands that irrespective of their economic and military strength, every member country should be willing to participate on a consensus basis that peace is indivisible. The duties of the world's bodies should include encouraging non-African regional economic and security alliances and international philanthropic organiza-

tions to help the PSC to effectively deliver on its obligation to maintain peace and security in Africa.

Endnotes:

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Environmental Conflict Management in Africa: The Natural Resource Conflict Debate and Restatement of Conflict Management Processes and Strategies in Africa

Philip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika

Abstract

Natural resources have perhaps played a major role in defining much of Africa's public square. These resources have defined power politics, resource distribution thereof; defined gerrymandering strategies in much of Africa's public administration domain; and have also proved to be a major precipitant of armed struggles. Natural resources have motivated and fuelled armed conflicts in Africa and this has proven to be a hurdle in effective statecraft, or in times of full scale conflict-it has been a hindrance to effective peace processes from the negotiation stage, mediation stage and finally in the post conflict reconstruction or peace-making stage.

On the other continuum, Climate change for example, which is a major independent variable in the whole debate of natural resource conflicts in Africa could be viewed as an 'un-necessary burden' for the continent. It expands the purviews of environmental security, threatens the very base of national security and escalates social conflicts. However, it is important to note that the phenomenon of natural resource conflict is quite intricate and just like any social conflict debate, a mono-causal link of natural resource conflicts to climate change would actually not provide a thorough investigation when it comes to conflict analysis and a way forward in essence of natural resource conflict management or peace management for that matter.

This paper treats natural resource conflicts as an intricate web of the larger social conflicts and seeks to provide a link between natural resources and social conflicts, to situate the debate within the nexus between natural resource management and conflict management, and to argue for a restatement of a multi-actor and multi-level approach in dealing with natural resource conflicts in the context of conflict management and peace building.

Biography

Philip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika works as a Researcher in Africa's leading think tank on human security-'The Institute for Security Studies (ISS)'. He has been working on Environmental Security and Arms Control and Management issues specializing on the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes conflict systems. He is currently also a Doctoral Fellow in the joint Conflict Transformation Programme and Department of Development Studies programme, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa where he is pursuing his PHD in Development and Peace Studies. He is also Adjunct Faculty in the International Relations Department of the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya.

Introduction

'Environmental degradation in forms such as desertification, resource depletion and demographic pressure exacerbates tensions and instability. Systemically, pollution, population growth and climate change are not in the distant future, they are occurring now and hitting the poorest and most vulnerable hardest'[1]

The above statement by the former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan saliently captures natural resource variables that define and cumulatively make up much of the natural resource conflict phenomenon taking place today. Natural resources have perhaps played a major role in defining much of Africa's public square. These resources have defined power politics, resource distribution thereof; defined Gerrymandering strategies[2] in much of Africa's public administration domain; and have also proved to be a major precipitant of armed struggles. Natural resources have motivated and fuelled armed conflicts in Africa and this has proven to be a hurdle in effective statecraft, or in times of full scale conflict-it has been a hindrance to peace processes from the negotiation stage, mediation stage and finally in the post conflict reconstruction or peacemaking stage.

Natural resources can also be connected to the access, use and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, a situation which has exploited many negative opportunities provided by globalization. In this case, natural resources have provided a parallel political economy for fuelling wars and conflicts.[3,4,5] This is true of the illegal exploitation of diamonds in Sierra Leone and the use of consequent black market trade finances to procure small arms and light weapons and thereby to sustain the conflict across borders to Liberia. Environmental crimes have therefore seen their playing field essentially in geopolitical spaces whereby the State's legitimacy as the authority is challenged. There are also consequently twin problems posed by environmental insecurity concerns and these have cut across the easy financial outlets for armament and accessing small arms and light weapons. These are contemporary society order problems that characterize the wars of a third kind as Mary Kaldor has christened them.

Against the grain of widespread assumptions that most of the wars/conflicts of the 1990s and onwards are merely 'civil wars' resulting from ethnic tensions. A new understanding of these new wars sheds light on natural resources as a dominant variable. The new conceptualization is of their ability to sustain political economies in which a range of new mili-

Gold Mine in Shinyanga, Tanzania. Tanzania is Third Largest Gold Producer in Africa after Ghana and South Africa.

taries-the decaying remnants of state armies, paramilitary groups (often financed by governments) all need parallel sources of revenue to execute wars. Illegal resource mining and trade to finance the buying or sustenance of arms caches therefore becomes a preferred option. Indeed, the abundance of a resource base, the existence of already active hostilities and these changes in the war economy denominators all explain, to some extent, the causes of resource conflicts.[6,7]

On the other continuum, Climate change which is a major independent variable in the whole debate of natural resource conflicts in Africa could be viewed as an 'unnecessary burden' in Africa. It expands the purviews of environmental security, threatens the very base of national security and escalates social conflicts. However, it is important to note that the phenomenon of natural resource conflict is quite intricate and just like any social conflict debate a mono-causal link of natural resource conflicts to climate change would actually not provide a thorough investigation when it comes to conflict analysis and finding a way forward in essence of natural resource conflict management or peace management for that matter.

This paper treats natural resource conflicts as an intricate web of the larger social conflicts and seeks to first provide a link between natural resources and social conflicts, to situate the debate within the nexus between natural resource management and conflict management and to argue for a restatement of a multi actor approach in dealing with natural resource conflicts in the context of conflict management and peace management in the conflict cycle. Towards this end, a practical reflection on the essence of incepting natural resource conflict management strategies in successful diplomatic initiatives will be simulated with a critical analysis of the missing link in one of the most intermittent conflict systems in Africa-'the great lakes region' and particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo's (which is the conflict epicentre of the system) diplomatic predicament in the peace process.

The second and third image of the restatement of natural resources and their role in conflict management processes will be an audit of the environmental conflict management roles of two sub-regional regimes[8] mandated to deal with conflicts in both the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes conflict systems, namely the Inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR). These three practical images will seek to restate the conflict management strategies and processes in the region towards adopting a natural resource conflict management orientation in the cause for peace and security in the region.

For the purposes of contextualizing the debate and the thesis of this paper, it is important to give a brief analogy of the complex maze of understanding conflicts in Africa, the ambivalence of natural resources, the management and distribution thereof and their effect on social relations.

The Link Between Natural Resources and Social Conflicts in Africa

Environmental/Population map of the Great Lakes Region of Africa, accessible at the United Nations Environmental Programme website: http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/map/index.php?region=africa

Natural resources are an important component in understanding the very nature of conflict because of their susceptibility to the latter. Arguably, natural resources are embedded in an environment, in geographic, geopolitical and interdependent space where actions by one individual or group may generate effects far beyond localities or even national jurisdictions. This is true of shared trans-boundary resources, as widely understood, as well as other elements that constitute the flora and fauna. A good example to simulate this is embedded in the intermittent 'Mau complex system'[9,10,] and debacle.

A lateral and soon to be overt social tussle could be observed from a risk analysis perspective between Kenya and Tanzania over the Mara river basin.[11] It should be noted that with the Mara river having its source in the Mau forests complex in Kenya, it is in essence also a trans-boundary basin shared between Kenya and Tanzania, and is also part of the larger Nile basin that is shared by nine countries, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Due to the Mau forest cover loss and unsustainable agricultural expansion and intensification (including irrigation), human population growth, socio-cultural actors and socio-economic actors in the Mara river basin increasingly face inadequate access to water. Apart from the water security vulnerabilities confronting these people, are threats related to the loss of virgin forest cover in the upper parts of the catchment and along rivers, environmental crimes related to water pollution and abstractions by industries and urban settlements. These problems have provided serious environmental security predicaments. To mention a few, there are decreasing water supplies, competition for and conflicts over available water, inappropriate and poorly planned land use, and ineffective water resource management systems in the two countries listed above.[12] It should be noted that natural resources and the utilization thereof have complex ecological realities and processes. This in turn has an effect on the direct consumers of the 'environment' and a small analogy on these scientific complexities and the need of contextualizing them in the natural resource debate is of essence.

Scientifically, as is the case with the example on the Mara River Basin, the linked

biophysical or ecological processes in a specific environment disperse cumulative, long term oriented ramifications like erosion, pollution, or loss of plant and animal habitats on the negative basis of it. The nature of the problem may not however be apparent because ecological relationships are often poorly understood. This negative ecological process therefore takes a considerable time to attribute in effect and this has consequently affected environmental management, policy making and legal and diplomatic/conflict management processes. This is often the latent and underlying link of natural resources ecological link and their changes to susceptibility towards conflict, albeit often being unforeseeable. The situation is further compounded by other intermediating factors like climate change variables and this has had an effect on; the affinity to and frequencies of environmental crimes; the very foundations of a stable environmental security base; and the variables have also expanded and complicated the scope of environmental diplomacy and politics agenda. These have all had an effect on the *modus operandi* of policy processes and policy making both in the natural resource management contexts and in environmental conflict management.

The question therefore beckons, how has the environmental security agenda been affected by these realities? And how has it defined or opened up a debate towards the 'Natural resource conflict management' restatement of the resource management policy space and therefore the incorporation of contemporary environmental security predicaments? Before this is discussed, it would be constructive to look further into systemic developments that have expanded the natural resource management space and to incorporate contemporary environmental security predicaments included in this discussion to those conflicts over resource bases.

Epics of the Securitization of Natural Resources and Natural Resource Management

A further elaboration of the policy implication of the above realities and the operationalization thereof is seen in contemporary environmental security discourses and developments as mentioned. Natural resource conflict management, environmental diplomacy and environmental crime policy issues were principally debated after the end of the Cold War, when statesmen, academics and policy makers alike talked about global change questions like the sustainable development of the global South, population challenges, democratization and the internationalization of human rights, combining these with the looming global environmental crisis.

When the Rio Summit of 1992 was convened, environmental, developmental and conflict management based policy considerations were put at the top of the international agenda. This meeting of plenipotentiaries and heads of states was a landmark in the history of environmental diplomacy. For the first time the environment was treated as a major policy issue in domestic and international affairs alike.

Unfortunately, following the precedent

set by this process, environmental diplomacy and international resource management policy deliberations have taken on a procedural form resulting in a proliferation of agreements that seek to remedy threats to the environment and threats connected to international peace and security as a result of resource conflicts. Few of those agreements have translated into meaningful change. National interest and strategic diplomatic maneuverings have characterized environmental diplomacy or natural resource conflict management processes. The environmental agenda has been decelerated by this politicking, and the threat to its sustainability has, if anything increased as a result.

There seems in all these things to be a lack of appreciation for the fact that natural resource conflicts and general environmental dangers are global in scale, transboundary in nature and affect all people everywhere. Part of the problem is the cumulative nature of environmental change which in turn affects the distribution of natural resources. For example, annual variations in global climatic change are relatively small, and are therefore easily overshadowed by more dramatic and seemingly more important challenges. This is where the unnecessary face of climate change shows its ugly face to an already struggling African polity and policy processes to curb the same.

A factor that arguably presents the greatest set of difficulties to environmental diplomats, policymakers and practitioners is that threats to the environment are characterized by a high degree of empirical uncertainty. Often the perceived threats and vulnerabilities are theoretical and remote and the evidence can appear incomplete or contradictory. It is extremely difficult to measure, much less predict, long term vulnerabilities. For example, assessing the extent of species extinction (which is singled out as a major issue in environmental crime and has been a major precipitant of social conflicts and tussles), is complicated by the fact that the majority of endangered/ extinct species have not been yet identified.

As a result of such dynamics, policymakers and political decision-makers have little choice but to place the environmental agenda on the cost benefit analysis scale, sieving out the genuinely critical 'environmental concerns' and 'qualified environmental crimes or contentions' from among the wide range of issues placed on the agenda. This shows the complex nature of natural resource conflicts and its management and provides that a mono-causal analysis could not serve the exercise rightfully. Therefore, variables like climate change are but a component that does not ameliorate an already fluid contestation of the thinning natural resource base attributed to many other factors.[13]

Lateral - Underlying Conflicts and Attribution of Resource Scarcity or Stress

The above argument hits at the heart of lateral conflicts as observed in conflict cycles.[14] Apart from the complex environmental conflict management and agenda situation as experienced by policy practi-

tioners are the proximate attributes of natural resources that are hidden and act as latent causes of conflicts. An important aspect worth untangling in the natural resource conflict management debate is the 'cognitive' aspect that strategically analyses resources' scarcity, abundance and management/mis-management as a cause of conflict. This should also be extended to latent conflicts or implicit conflicts like those which communities do not attribute or feel threatened by but actually manifest themselves over time and more drastically than immediate and overt conflict. In these conflicts, communities or social cultural resources[15] of a conflict are affected by a process of environmental degradation that they do not recognize (or) although they might be aware of degradation, they are unable to associate it with the activity of specific social agents.

The environmental conflict is thus made explicit when communities establish an immediate logical connection between environmental degradation and the activities of certain social agents.[16] This is a context within social conflict theory whereby the roles of certain agents are appreciated in providing visibility and publicity on lateral situations which, if left uncatered for, would actually lead to outbursts of overt contestation over meagre resources. This publicity role is effectively taken by sub-regional organizations or third party actors whose mandate is conflict management. This is the case with mandated tasks with regimes like the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR) and the IGAD whose role is partly to help member states and contesting protagonists to attribute or recognize potentially hidden conflicts that need to be nipped in the bud before maturing further in the conflict cycle.

As a result of such dynamics, policymakers and political decision-makers have little choice but to place the environmental agenda on the cost benefit analysis scale.

This role is discussed subsequently in this paper. These are also the strategic attributes that a rational natural resource management regime has to incorporate.

It is important to also note that the relevance of research or fact finding in the natural resource management and ecological analysis or research and communication thereof can help to establish this connection. It may also consequently shed a more realistic picture onto the causes of conflict, as well as act as catalysts for social learning about how to manage the resources and conflicts that might arise. A second view of why natural resources have a leading role in social conflicts has all to do with social contexts and power relations that it provides to a public sphere. Natural resources are also embedded in a shared social space where complex and unequal relations are established among a wide range of social actors. These are namely the marketers for exam-

ple of primary products (for example agro-export producers and farmers, small scale farmers, ethnic minorities, government agencies and others). Just like other fields with political dimensions those actors with the greatest access to power are also able to control and influence natural resource decisions in their favour.[17] A relevant view of the power of natural resources ordering society is captured by the words of Kenyan jurists on the novelty of resources in Africa as follows:

In grappling with our socio-economic cultural problems and the complex relationship between the environment and good governance, we must not ignore the linkages between landlessness, land tenure, cultural practices and habits, land titles, land use, and natural resources management, which must be at the heart of policy options[18]

It is also important to note that natural resources are subject to increasing demand, and also to unequal distribution. Such a situation is better explained normatively by the Peace Research/Neo-Malthusian debate on resource conflicts. This is the multi-disciplinary and multi-causal explanation of why resource conflicts occur. Named after the English demographer Thomas Robert Malthus, It uses the 'scarcity' variable to explain the role of natural resources in conflict. The Neo-Malthusian school of thought argues that rapid population growth, environmental degradation, resource depletion, and an un-equal access to resources combine to exacerbate poverty and income inequality in many of the world's least developed countries. These deprivations are easily translated into grievances, increasing the risks of rebellion and social conflict.[19]

Internal disputes can arise from local environmental degradation, for example the introduction of an affluent releasing factory in a human settlement area-affecting waterways and air pollution. Equally, ethnic clashes can occur when population migration increases demand for scarce resources like land to cultivate or settle on. This is the case in Agrarian economies for example in Eastern Africa, where land is exploited courtesy of tenure systems and where there is a large cultural identification with ancestral-tribal land. Environmental change may involve land and water degradation, environmental crimes over exploitation and illegal exploitation of wildlife and aquatic resources, extensive land clearing or drainage or even climate change itself.

Young Massai child herding cattle, Ngorongoro park, Tanzania.

These increasing demands in turn have multiple social and economic dimensions, including population growth, changing consumption patterns, trade liberalization, rural enterprise development and changes

in technology and land use. Natural resource scarcity may also result from the un-equal distribution of resources among individuals and social groups or ambiguities in the definition of rights to common property resources.

As noted by Homer Dixon and Blitt,[20] the effects of environmental scarcity such as constrained economic production, migration, social segmentation, and disrupted institutions can, either singly or in combination, produce or exacerbate conflict among groups.

As further asserted by Lederach, in a conflict setting and in society in general for that matter, there are constituents or individuals who directly experience and are affected by armed confrontations or contestation over natural resources. These are what he calls socio-cultural resources.[21] These are the people who use natural resources symbolically and this is a reality that peacemaking and natural resource management experts should come to realize. Land, forests and waterways are not just material resources that people compete over, but are also part of a particular way of life (farmer, rancher, fisher, and logger), an ethnic identity and a set of gender and age roles. These symbolic dimensions of natural resources as experienced from the eyes of socio-cultural resources lend themselves to ideological, social and political struggles that have enormous practical significance for the management of natural resources and the process of conflict-management.

Because of the dimensions of natural resource management, specific natural resource conflicts usually have multiple causes-some proximate, others underlying or contributing. A pluralistic approach that recognizes the multiple perspectives of stakeholders and the simultaneous effects of diverse causes in natural resource conflicts is needed to understand the initial situation and identify strategies for promoting change and effective conflict management.[22]

Control Politics and Natural Resource Conflicts; Bringing Back Politics to Natural Resource Management

The field of diplomacy and policy administration as widely understood has been evolving and is becoming more technical as the world economic, political and informational system becomes more complex. As such, the politics of diplomacy/ conflict resolution has called for a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder inception; and environmental conflict management, and environmental diplomacy for that matter, have become major variables for genuine negotiation, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction processes. The fact that natural resource distribution has been prey to control politics[23] of the same basically means that diplomatic processes must have in the scheme of things a large component of natural resource conflict management. The over-emphasis on power sharing formulas in peace-processes, security dividends and other aspects generally viewed as ones of 'high politics' throws these processes on the negative peace continuum and real-underlying concerns of conflicts are not adequately addressed. The practice of different actors in dealing with natural

resource conflicts will capture this in context. The multi actor lenses and roles to be captured represents two images that are a possible point of entry for reconceptualising conflict management processes to reflect more on 'natural resource conflict management'.

To simulate the above point on a restatement of environmental conflict management is the Great Lakes conflict epicentre in 'the Democratic Republic of Congo' and the politics of natural resources and security in the Great Lakes conflict system as a whole. This is the first multi-actor role or image that this paper explores, having in mind all the mentioned space of natural resource conflict management.

Multi-actor images, roles and lenses re-conceptualizing conflict management

Multi-actor Image 1:
Coltan Blood and Tears: the Missing Link in Congo's Peace

Picture the scene: a well coordinated diplomatic gathering of Heads of States of the Great Lakes region, together with a barrage of their respective delegations shuttling from all corners that define regional and international power politics, conducting their business in one of the region's most affluent leisure country homes, The Windsor, in Nairobi. At the same time and in the same geopolitical space - not very far from this diplomatic venue - on the 7th of November 2008, thousands of frightened civilians flee skirmishes near a refugee protection zone in Eastern Congo. This comes as renewed clashes between rebels and government troops add urgency to a positive outcome of peace talks about the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict. Meanwhile, on the other end of the continuum, the one key player absent from the diplomatic discussions -'General' Laurent Nkunda - scoffed at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)[24] - United Nations summit held in Nairobi. To cite his exact words, the Nairobi Process "Is only a regional summit, it doesn't have any impact on our demands."

In a conflict and region where peace agreements and ceasefires are notoriously short-lived, it is apparent that there is a missing link in the negotiation processes and the agreements that follow these negotiations. Congo's lack of peace has been defined by two dominant variables that unfortunately have not been properly weighed out and matched in conflict management exercises. The first variable is the most apparent bone of contention in the DRC, namely the equitable and political distribution of the vast natural resources in the country.

Secondly, there is the variable of regional politicization of civic activities. Unfortunately, all peace attempts have emphasized the latter: from the negotiation stages to the peacekeeping mandate architecture of MONUC (The United Nations Mission in Congo). The politics of natural resource management in the DRC has indeed been a missing link in the diplomacy of conflict management in the country. This may explain the often inter-

mittent reconstitution of the different ethnic control politics and militarization, essentially as pertains to the governance of North and South Kivu. The two provinces are a buffer zone between the DRC and Rwanda and elements of both governments have an interest in continued instability there. Partly as a result of this, and partly for local reasons, the two provinces are populated with opposing ethnic militias that fight intermittently, with or without the assistance of the Congolese and Rwandan armed forces. The observed skirmishes between the Mai-Mai and Nkunda's loyalists were perhaps the most visible of this resource-fuelled contestation in some of the resource-richest parts of the DRC.

It should be noted that the different inchoate peace processes that do little for environmental conflict management have actually had a negative centrifugal effect. It seems that these agreements - as is apparent with the current short-lived Goma peace agreement of January 2008 - legitimize positions taken by different recognized official players in the Congo conflict. As a result, a non-recognized player is put on the other end of the conflict continuum and his interests are not catered for.

The absence of Nkunda and his loyalists, who purported to be fighting for the freedom of his Tutsi clansmen, at the Nairobi Peace Process or in any pre-shuttle diplomacy exercises, is yet another diplomatic blunder that does not address the real issues. Nkunda's military excursions, it should be noted, were conducted and are still being conducted by different loyalists in the Coltan-rich North Kivu area. Given the large geographical terrain of the DRC and the fact that this area is far from the DRC capital Kinshasa, government presence here has always been weak. The question therefore is how does the international community deal with these areas that have alternative authorities of control and secondly how to clothe peace processes with effective natural resource management mechanisms that provide equitable resource-dividends to all internal players in the conflict?

The peace processes and exercises in the DRC should be well matched to inculcate equitable sharing of resources pegged additionally within a rights based diplomatic process. As such, resource dividends should be determined by a process where rightful actors in the conflict are provided legitimacy to the resources and governance thereof by their adherence to the cause of human security and human rights determination of their cause. This means that environmental conflict management in Congo's peace should work within a diplomacy of human rights whereby genuine underlying issues of the conflict in the Congo are critically addressed.

The second variable of the regional ethnicization of Congo politics can be effectively handled by existing processes namely the ICGLR process and the currently mandated diplomatic efforts of former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as African Union and UN plenipotentiaries for the Great Lakes conflict negotiations. Therefore the poli-

tics of Coltan and related minerals in the Congo should constitute the genuine ingredients of peace processes for the DRC and not the procedural conference diplomacy exercises that do not recognize the urgency of the situation and the finesse required for a consolidated negotiation and mediation process. A second image that this paper discusses opens up the debate regarding natural resource conflict management in multi-lateral contexts which serve as major dispute settling venues. Case studies of environmental conflict management and vacuums under the ICGLR and IGAD are therefore discussed.

Multi-actor Image 2:
The ICGLR and IGAD Multi-lateral conflict management roles

1. Bringing Back Politics to Natural Resource Management: A Focus on Regional Concert Diplomacy

The multi-lateral framework in the diplomacy of conflict management has also been a major front whereby natural resource conflict management has been restated. This paper posits that natural resources are a international public good and that the penchant of internationalization of environmental dividends determines much of what constitutes environmental security in essence of shared natural resources, contested zones across borders and the twin problem of other security predicaments that are closely connected to resource contestations or what is classically captured as commodities of a 'third kind' in 'wars of a third kind'[25] as captured by Mary Kaldor.

A classic case of multi-stakeholder diplomacy when it comes to tackling environmental conflict management can perhaps be captured by the Eastern Africa initiative under the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) process.

The ICGLR process and Regional Environmental Conflict Management

It is important to first and foremost understand what the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is. The ICGLR stemmed from the conflicts and tragedies in the region, especially from the genocide in Rwanda and the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which constituted a threat to international peace and security. In 2000 the United Nations Security Council through its resolutions 1291 and 1304, called for an International Conference on Peace, Security, democracy and development in the Great Lakes Region.

Later that year the International Conference was established with its joint United Nations/African Union Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. The countries of the ICGLR were consequently grouped into 11 core countries namely; Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. There are also co-opted countries. These are Botswana, Egypt, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.[26]

In addition to this, in November 2004, the 11 Heads of State and the Governments of the Member Countries of the ICGLR unanimously adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region in Dar-es Salaam Tanzania. In this declaration they declared their collective determination to transform the Great Lakes Region into a space for sustainable peace and security for states and peoples, political and social stability, shared growth and development.[27]

In December 2006, the Heads of State and Government convened again in Nairobi and signed a Pact on security, stability and development. This Pact incorporates the Dar es Salaam Declaration, Programmes of Action and Protocols.[28] Following this analogy of relevance will be one of the protocols which is currently being implemented in the name of the Protocol against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (Article 9 of the Pact).

Of relevance to this study is the Pact's initial recognition of the central role of governance of natural resources in Statecraft and consequent conflict management processes. The Pact does recognize in the Preamble the need for a multisectoral cooperation approach for the sole benefit of peoples. This multisectoral restatement has been a positive trend in the Conferences' summit diplomacy and other deliberative diplomatic and conflict management activities.

The Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources seeks to put in place regional rules and mechanisms for combating the illegal exploitation of natural resources which constitute a violation of the States' right of permanent sovereignty over the natural resources and which represent a serious source of insecurity, instability, tension and conflicts. This binding and legal gesture by the Protocol gives a restatement of the important role of good governance in relation to natural resource management. It also does resonate well with the resource question and the predicament in the member states of the ICGLR, all of which have had natural resources contestation and conflict situations in their past and contemporary political histories.

It should be noted that this 'enabling' environment of addressing natural resource contestation has not been fully utilized by the ICGLR Member States and has not been applied to their conflict management efforts. Bringing back and recognizing the politics of natural resources in peace talks and conflicts in the region brings into reality the underlying causes of conflict and 'the environmental conflict management' of the same should be

a dominant tool in all mediation and facilitative processes taken by the Member States and in the intermediary role of the ICGLR.

This paper also treats natural resource conflict management as an important stage in providing positive momentum of both mediation and post-conflict reconstruction stages. The Protocol takes cognizance of the role of national and international legal contexts that address impunity in due regard to the 'Environmental Crimes of illegal exploitation of natural resources by natural persons and other entities'. This alone gives the peace processes legitimacy to bring back to the table equitable mechanisms and options of sharing contested resources in a conflict. Implementation through diplomacy should simply 'paint pictures' to contravening states and entities in regard to illegal exploitation of natural resources as widely defined. This is the very context of 'environmental conflict management' and may aptly deal with the politics of natural resource conflict management.

However, a positive gesture of the processes' summitry and multi-sectoral diplomacy has seen the kick-starting of the designing of a certification manual for monitoring and verifying natural resource exploitation.[29] In context were the conference's initial pre-negotiation processes before the adoption of the protocols where different actors were provided legitimacy to feed into the ICGLR's process of expert facilitation of the substance of the nine protocols. Natural resource management experts through thematic working groups[30] provided to the diplomatic stewards of the process the much needed conceptual and substantive links towards establishing a set of 'natural resource conflict management' rules and thus the special nature of Article 9.

IGAD and Regional Environmental Conflict Management: Bringing Back Conflict Management to Natural Resource Management

The Eastern African region, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes conflict systems have not been spared in the refocusing and changing nature of natural resource management. It is imperative that the natural resource management regimes in the regions integrate a large component of conflict management and valid reasons to support this given the political-economic security predicament in the regions.

The geo-political space has seen the interplay of resource contestations with oil characterizing the protracted Sudan conflict, coltan and other precious metals being contested in the Democratic Republic of Congo and cattle rustling in the Horn namely in the Karpotur (Karamoja, Pokot

and Turkana Cluster) which affects pastoralist communities bordering Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan. This is also coupled with the circumstantial natural resource degradation, courtesy of climate change. Climate change becomes an unnecessary evil to the already protracted contestations and scarcity of resources in the region. The region experiences persistent economic crises, which to a large extent, have roots in severely degraded natural resources and the environment. This, exacerbated by recurrent droughts and other natural and man-made disasters, results in perpetual poverty and underdevelopment which in turn accelerates

A herder moves his donkeys through a small camp made by those displaced by fighting nearby in West Darfur, Sudan. August 23, 2004.

the degradation of natural resources and the environment, thereby closing the vicious cycle. From time immemorial, the IGAD region has been characterized by massive population movements pushed by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture and water resources, among others as stipulated above.

A significant proportion of the people in the region are pastoralists – the greatest number being in Sudan. In Ethiopia, about 10-12 percent of the total population is pastoralist. The pastoralist situation reads the same in other countries, in Djibouti it is about 20 percent; 33 percent in Eritrea; and 70 percent in Somalia.[31] Pastoralists, it should be noted, also practice transhumance.[32] The livelihood is practiced predominantly in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) where pastoralists are able to exploit land and conditions that normally cannot support rain-fed agriculture. ASALs have traditionally been considered almost 'waste lands'. Yet in a country such as Kenya, two thirds of the livestock population is found in the ASALs. Also, gum arabic, aloe vera and a host of minerals are known to exist in the ASALs. However, neither the resources of the ASALs of the IGAD region are adequately inventoried, nor is there a clear understanding of the environmental consequences and conflicts associated with pastoralism.

The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which is a regional conflict management regime has the unenvious task of realizing that much of its conflict management and natural resource management regimes have to compliment each other. This is also in due cognizance that the fields have also become quite interlinked with the above phenomena defining what is classically the sum total of human security.

Policy Shifts to Natural Resources Conflict Management

It is with the above realities in mind that the policy environment for natural resources management has evolved dra-

matically in recent decades. There are no more 'Resource frontiers'. Actually, virtually every change of land use and changing tenure and land adjudication systems, new developments, or expansion of any resource utilization/use now involves conflict.[33] This conflict can be both objective and subjective and may be characterized in the future with property based legal tussles as an example of conflict. Natural resources use also continues to be an aggravating factor in armed conflicts around the world and even in cases where the true sources of the conflict may extend beyond disputed resources, resource conflicts ultimately become the most visible and symbolic causes of the dispute.[34] This is true of the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes conflict systems as listed above and IGAD has had to contend with this.

The question therefore beckons, how does the IGAD utilize its diplomatic capacity and role as the regional conflict management regime to re-conceptualize its natural resource management mandate? The answer may ultimately lie in the utilization of other sub-regional arrangements that deal with thematic concerns of natural resource management coupled with the peace and security architecture connection of the same. Lying within the same geo-political zone is the East African Community arrangements and protocols that address these municipal and trans-boundary realities of resources, their use and their effect on environmental security of communities both within and outside of their boundaries.

A case in point is the East African Community protocol that seeks to manage trans-boundary shared resources. Tapping into such arrangements would, to a large extent, map out an effective natural resource conflict management mechanism for the IGAD and its member states. This is a case of concert development diplomacy whereby by principle of regional cooperation, the different regional regimes cooperate towards the common goal of enhancing human security through effective conflict management practices that focus on natural resource management. There is also need of a coordinated development mechanism with the mentioned ICGLR process and its protocol related to the illegal exploitation of natural resources. This role of being a collaborator for a common natural resource conflict management for the region is legitimate for the IGAD because it may be the only explicitly mandated intergovernmental organization managing the complex conflict systems of the region and their inter-related political, economic and ecological woes. This would also ensure the rationalization of multi-sectoral concerns that define conflicts of this very volatile region. In essence, this was what the IGAD[35] was originally conceptualized to deal with anyway.

In addition to the important intricate variables provided by these case study analyses, an important element that policy has to deal with in the natural resource conflict and management continuum is the fact that organized armed groups who are actors in the contestation have a rational orientation. They have multiple sources of financing and shift from one to another as a function of their need. Other

factors to be considered are conflict economies that are determined by resorting to environmental crimes like poaching and other drivers of conflict and the policy and diplomatic processes have to provide lee-way for these alternative conflict sustaining variables.[36]

Conclusion

It is with the above images of multi-sectoral and multi-actor approaches that conflict management and natural resource management regimes should take into context the dynamics, intricacies and predicaments of natural resource conflicts. Dealing with the equitable management of natural resources will definitely go a long way in both the conflict management stages of peace processes and statecraft and in the peace-management translation of the same. Sub-regional diplomatic regimes therefore have to restate their conflict management strategies towards a stronger recognition of natural resource management as a strong negotiation, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction variable.

This is the same of the diplomatic actor recognition of protagonists whose claims may be legitimate and who may assert an important consideration in the negotiation table as is the case with Nkunda's former control of variable natural resource carrots and sticks in the DRC in the name of coltan and other variables that escalate conflict and reduce mediation and peace momentum.

It is also important to note that in mapping out social conflicts in Africa in general, it is always essential to look at the multi-causal elements of the conflict. Variables of social contestations like climate change only escalate an already volatile situation and this should feed in as an important 'part' of the general architecture of the 'Natural Resource Conflict Management whole' together with all other considerations as brought out in this paper. It is also important to note overall that the natural resource debate and effects on policy as widely defined is a complex phenomenon as resource abundance and scarcity are neither a necessary nor sole criteria for conflict.[37] Thus what matters, as this paper posits, is not whether natural resources are simply present, but how they are actually managed, both in the conception of statecraft in peacetime periods and in the conflict management conception in the case of a state of conflict.

Endnotes:

1. Kofi Annan's sentiments can be observed in the Progress Report of the Secretary General on the Prevention of armed conflict, Agenda Item 12, 16th Session of the General Assembly, A/60/891 accessed in <http://www.ipu.org/SPLZ-e/unga06/conflict.pdf> as referred on 25th June 2009.

2. *Gerrymandering* is a term that describes the deliberate re-arrangement of the geographical boundaries of districts or local geo-political spaces to influence the outcomes of elections. Its purpose is to either concentrate opposition votes into a few districts to gain more seats for the majority in surrounding areas (called 'packing'), or to diffuse minority strength across many areas (districts)-called 'dilution'. The targeted geopolitical spaces have manipulative variables like valuable resources or even livelihood endowments like primary products that are essential to a populace and gerrymandering takes advantage of this. An analogy of this phenomenon is saliently captured by George Demko in, Demko J. George & Wood B. William (eds). *Reordering the world: geo-political perspectives in the 21st Century* (Michigan: Westview Press, 1999)

3. In much of conflict research, and especially so on the political economy of conflict, there is growing attention to natural resources. There has been a great deal of work on individual commodities such as oil, diamonds, drugs, coltan and timber also. In multi-lateral diplomacy the issue of conflict goods gained prominence through the various reports by the UN Security Council sanctions monitoring mechanism. See Le Billon, Philippe, "The Political Economy of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict," In Political Geography 20 (2001) pp 561-584.

4. The analysis on the growing political economy of natural resource conflicts is also observed as cited by Wennmann Achim, "The Political Economy of Conflict Financing: A Comprehensive Approach Beyond Natural Resources", In, *Global Governance; July-Sep2007, Vol. 13 Issue 3*, pp 427 – 444.

5. See Ross Michael, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" In, *Journal of Peace Research 41, no.3 (2004)* pp 337-356.

6. See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era,* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999)

7. It should be noted that in 2008 and in the current period 2009, 78 conflicts have been observed in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of them centered around resources oftentimes combined with national power or regional predominance. Whereas the year 2007 had seen a

certain de-escalation in Africa, the number of highly violent conflicts once more rose from nine to twelve in 2008. Three-instead of two-of these were wars these are; Chad which involved skirmishes between various rebel groups; Sudan and essentially so Darfur; and Somalia with the ever intermittent Union of Islamic Courts activities and related assertions by Al Shabaab. The latter two had already been classified as wars in 2007 and 2006. As the nine severe crises were situated in Mali, Nigeria, Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Kenya, and additional crises were situated in Niger, the Central African Republic, and Ethiopia (which was also involved with the war in Somalia), a zone of interrelated conflicts and conflict systems for that matter was distinguishable, constituting a 'constellation of crises' ranging from the Gulf of Guinea over central Africa and the Great Lakes conflict system to the Horn of Africa conflict system., - For more insights on each conflict system's conflict items or issues of contestation see Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, HIIK. *Conflict Barometer 2008. 17th Annual Conflict Analysis* (Heidelberg: Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, 2008) pp 25 – 44., Also accessible in, www.KONFLIKTBAROMETER.de as accessed on 8th September 2009.

8. For purposes of this paper regimes are treated as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international affairs or relations as widely defined. Sub-regional regimes are therefore more specialized arrangements that pertain to well defined organizational structures, activities, resources, geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of the international society. More insights on regimes can be accessed in Krasner, Stephen D., ed. *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1983) and also Ruggie, John Gerard, "International Responses to Technology-Concepts and Trends" In *International Organization* 29(3), pp 557 – 583 and 'Regimes' as cited by Eric Brahm, "International Regimes". *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2005 http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/ as accessed on 9th September 2009.

9. The Mau Forest Complex covers over 290,000 hectares and represents the largest remaining near continuous blocks of mountain indigenous forest in East Africa, it is Kenya's major Water Tower. It is situated approximately 250km from Nairobi and borders Kericho

to the West, Nakuru to the North, and Narok to the South. It comprises of South West Mau, East Mau, Transmara, Mau Narok, Maasai Mara, Western Mau and Southern Mau. These seven forest blocks merge to form the larger mau forest complex. It should also be noted that the water from the mau forests serves more than 4 million people inhabiting more than 578 locations in Kenya and several locations in Northern Tanzania., See Agutu Mark, "Revealed: Big names given Mau forest land", In *Daily Nation, April 2nd 2009* accessible through web-portal http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/556332/-/view/printversion/-uy3y4fz/-/index.html as accessed on 11th September 2009.

10. See, Ogiek Welfare Council, "*Mau forest complex on the spotlight: Ogiek opposition to the forest excision*", In <http//www.ogiek.org/…/MAUFOREST-COMPLEX-ON-THE-SPOTLIGHT.doc>as accessed on 12th September 2009.

11. The Mara River Basin can be divided into four distinct physical localities or positioning, mainly pegged on the location of the river. The upper catchment comprises two sections namely the forested mau escarpment and large scale agricultural farms. It should be noted that some of the large scale agricultural farms are irrigated using water from the Mara river. The mara river in turn runs through the open savannah grassland protected by the Maasai Mara National Reserve on the Kenyan side and the Serengeti National Park on the Tanzanian side. The forth section is the flood plains which are located in Tanzania where the Mara River discharges into Lake Victoria. High human and livestock population densities and subsistence agriculture characterize this section.

12. See paper by Waititu Annabell, "Global Warming & Conflicts over water in Eastern Africa", In Alliance Sud. *Conference on Water and Conflicts*, 6th March 2009, Berne. http://www.alliancesud.ch/it/politica/acqua/downloads/conflitti-aw.pdf as accessed on 9th September 2009.

13. See Philip Mwanika, 'EAPCCO, Environmental Crime and Challenges of Environmental Diplomacy', In *ISS Today* Publication, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 19th March 2009), can be accessed in website; www.issafrica.org

14. The conflict cycle phenomena in itself defines the attribution of conflict. Under this notion, conflicts tend to be described as cyclical in regard to their intensity levels that is escalating from (relative) stability and peace into crisis and war, thereafter de-escalating into relative peace. An additional phase

'durable peace' is often added- in which a conflict is considered resolved that is the reoccurring pattern of the conflict has been stopped. The latter is classically referred to as 'peace management'. The conflict cycle is further extrapolated by Christopher Mitchell, "Problem-solving exercises and theories of conflict resolution," in Sandole Dennis & Hugo Van der Merwe (eds), *Conflict Resolution, Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) pp 78 – 94., This is also discussed in Swanstrom L.P. Niklas & Weissmann S. Mikael, *Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Beyond: a conceptual exploration* (Washington: Central – Asia Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Summer 2005) pp 9 – 10 , also accessible on web domain www.silkroadstudies.org as accessed on 14th April 2009.

15. The concept of 'social cultural resources' is captured by John Paul Lederach. In his analogy, peace building resources include not only financial and material support, but also social-cultural resources. The latter resources provides that people in the conflict setting should be seen as resources rather than recipients. Connected to this is the notion that peace-building should also draw on existing cultural resources, see Lederach John Paul, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998) pp 87 – 99.

16. See Ascerlad, H, *Environment and Democracy*. (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileirode Analisis Sociais e Economicas, 1992) P 35

17. See Peet R.; Watts, M.. *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movements*. (London: Routledge ,1996).

18. These are the words of Justices Richard Kuloba and Samwel Oguk-once serving High Court Judges of the Republic of Kenya in; High Court and Court of Appeal cases ,*HCCA 238/99 of Francis Kimei and 9 others Vs. The Honourable Attorney General of 3 others.*

19. Colin H. Kahl, *States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)

20. See Homer-Dixon, T.; Blitt J. *Ecoviolence: Links among environment, population, and security*.(, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) p 8.

21. Op Cit., Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp 87-99

22. Chevalier, J.; Buckles, D., *A Land without gods: process theory, maldevelopment and the Mexican Nahuas*. (London: Zed Books,1995).

23. See Renner, Michael, *The Anatomy of Resource Wars, World Watch Paper*

162 (Washington DC: World-Watch Institute, 2002).

24. The ICGLR-The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region is a Regional Regime which was established by Member States of the Eastern Africa region to address peace and development woes of the Great Lakes conflict system and to some extent the repercussions of the Horn's security predicament. The ICGLR revolved into a Secretariat which facilitates mediation talks in the region and has currently been focusing on the DRC crises and security predicament.

25. The phenomenon of wars of a third kind is well captured by Mary Kaldor, Op Cit., Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*

26. A synthesis of the historical context of the IC/GLR can be viewed in http://www.icglr.org/F_END/about.asp as accessed on 20th April 2009.

27. Ibid

28. The Pact whose full citation is "The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, 15th December 2006" can be accessed in the Repository section of the IC/GLR official webpage in http://www.icglr.org/common/docs_repository/pactsecuritystabilitydevelopment.pdf as accessed on 20th April 2009

29. The IC/GLR Secretariat was tasked on 3rd April 2009 to set up a regional certification mechanism for natural resources. On the same line, it should be noted that from the 2nd to the 3rd of April 2009, the first meeting on the "Regional Initiative against the illegal exploitation of natural resources" was convened by the IC/GLR. This was also an expert meeting that brought in different sectors to bear on the question of equitable management of such resources and on alternative venues of settling resource contestation woes. This can be accessed in the Press statement section of the IC/GLR as accessed at http://www.icglr.org/common/docs/docs_repository/press%20Release%2006%2004%2009%20NR.pdf accessed on 20th April 2009.

30. On thematic working groups of the IC/GLR: The thematic working groups could be explained from the diplomatic processes and documents/protocols produced under the process. In December 2006, a Pact on security, stability and development was signed. The pact includes protocols and programmes of action and is divided into 4 thematic concerns that were and are still operationalised by thematic working groups. These are; Peace and Security group; the De-

mocracy and Good Governance protocol and group; the Economic Development and Regional integration group; and one dealing with Humanitarian and Social issues. It should be noted that one of the thematic groups and members-'the Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) which is a Non governmental organization dedicated to building sustainable human development in Africa was tasked to assist the ICGLR in advising on drafting the protocols and projects related to the certification and movement of natural resources in the region. This was as a result of PAC's experience within the Kimberley process. PAC participated in the Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi Summits and ICGLR working groups and is now working with the ICGLR Secretariat (based in Bujumbura, Burundi) to help move forward the implementation of the projects dealing with certification and movement of natural resources in the Great Lakes Region. See PAC website on its activities with the ICGLR in http://www.pacweb.org/programs-natural-resources-e.php as accessed on 29th April 2009.

31. See IGAD. *Environment and Natural Resources Strategy*, April 2007, in the IGAD Link, http://www.igad.org/ as accessed on 21st April 2009.

32. There are categories of pastoralist communities especially in the Horn of Africa region where they are transhumance. This means that in times of stress, livestock moves with herders in search of water and pasture but the communities or families remain settled in 'permanent' given locations. Transhumance pastoralists usually depend somewhat less on their animals for food than do nomadic ones. For further elaboration of the same see, Osamba O Josiah, 'The Sociology of Insecurity: Cattle rustling and bunditry in North-Western Kenya', in *African Journal of Conflict Resolution, No 2* (Johannesburg: ACCORD, South Africa, 2000) p. 13., also accessible on http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr/2000-1/accordr_v1_n2_a2.pdf ; See also Oxfam (n.d), Climate Change in Turkana: a way of life under threat (http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatwedo/issues/climate/storyturkana.htm) (Accessed in March 2007).

33. See Ayling, R and Kelly, K, 'Dealing with conflicts: natural resources and dispute resolution', In, *Commonwealth Forestry Review*, 76(3), pp 182 - 185

34. See Tungittiplakorn, W, 'Highland-lowland conflict over natural resources: a case of Mae Soi, Chiang Mai, Thailand,' In, *Journal of Society and Natural Resources*, 8(2), pp 279 – 288.

35. It should be noted that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD) was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986. The recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Eastern Africa region. This prompted for IGADD to be formed. The protracted conflicts in the region and history of conflict cumulatively led to the refocusing of IGAD to generally specialize in conflict management but also cover development concerns affecting the region. For more insights of the history and focus of IGAD see the organization's website, http://www.igad.org/ as accessed on 21st April 2009.

36. See Wennmann, Achim, "The Political Economy of Conflict Financing: A Comprehensive Approach Beyond Natural Resources," In *Global Governance; July – Sep2007, Vol. 13 Issue 3*, p 428.

37. To also provide a basis for this point, other geo-political realities have provided that resource abundant countries like Botswana, Norway and also Australia or resource scarce countries like Japan have developed without experiencing armed conflict. What is needed is a strategic natural resource management regime that allows for a social conflict space incase of hostilities whereby policy takes the form of 'natural resource conflict management'., for more insights see, Cramer Christopher, "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War," In. *World Development 11*, no. 11 (2002), pp. 1847 – 1854.

Appendices

China's Economy and Market

Hongbing Deng

The past 30 years have witnessed an unprecedented development – the explosive economic growth and industrial expansion of China. China has achieved an average of 10% growth rate since 1979, the year after Deng Xiaoping set China on the economic reform path. This has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and brought China from absolute poverty to the level of a moderately prosperous country, though still poor on per capita terms. Cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, having gradually dilapidated before the economic reform, have been transformed into megacities that number among the most modern in the world. Shenzhen, a small fishing village, has become an advanced metropolis with a population of 9 million.

Hopefully what follows here can help Connecticut based and American based companies in general to gain a better understanding of China's economy and market. Some statistics from 1979 in contrast to the present are used for comparison to illustrate how China has evolved over the past 30 years.

Those interested in penetrating or investing in the Chinese market first need to know how vast China's economy and market really are and must recognize how rapidly the economy is evolving. Some recent headline news provides us with a better appreciation of this:

- China has passed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world.
- China has surpassed Germany to become the No. 1 exporter in the world.
- China's foreign currency reserve

Biography
Hongbing Deng is the Founder and Vice President of AnMar, a trading company specializing in Chinese pharmaceuticals. Mr. Deng worked in the business sector in China prior to coming to the United States and starting his own business here. He is a graduate of the Yale School of Organizational Management. A frequent traveler between the United States and China, in 2009 AnMar was chosen by the Connecticut Department of Commerce as the most successful small business in the state.

reached 2.65 trillion as of the end of September, 2010 compared to only $850 million in 1979.

- China's energy consumption has surpassed America's to become No. 1 in the world, a position that the United States had held for more than a century.
- China will overtake America to become the largest manufacturer in the world in 2011, a title America has held for 110 years. Interestingly, China is winning back this posting, having had been the world's largest manufacturer for more than 1,500 years until it ceded its position to the United Kingdom in the mid 19th century. The United Kingdom's manufacturing in turn was eclipsed by America at the end of the 19th century.

A country's economy is usually measured in terms of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product), either by nominal US dollars or by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity). GDP has four components: private consumption, government spending, capital investment and foreign trade (export minus import).

The following are a few staggering numbers which demonstrate the changes of China's GDP over the past three decades:

- China's foreign trade has increased one hundredfold in the past 30 years, from $29.3 billion in 1979, or about 1% of world trade volume, to $2.97 trillion, or 10% of world trade share, in 2010.
- China is now the world's largest exporter and the second largest importer.
- Bilateral trade between the United States and China reached $366 billion in 2009 from almost zero in 1979.
- America and China are now each other's third largest trading partners.
- The China-based operations of American companies reached $100 billion in sales in 2009.

Night view of Shanghai

China's infrastructure, among the most backward in the world 30 years ago, is now ahead of many developed countries. The massive infrastructure building still shows no signs of abating. China's highway network, totaling 40,000 miles at the end of 2009, is now second only to the United States', with 50,000 miles, and is expected to exceed that figure within three years.

China's population, continental size landmass, and the increasing mobility of its citizens give China a huge advantage in the development of high speed trains. China now has the most sophisticated high speed railway network in the world, with most of it having been developed in the past decade. China also has plans to extend its high speed rail network to Southeast Asia in the coming years, eventually linking Singapore with London in a

rail travel time of 48 hours.

China also now has seven of the ten longest bridges in the world. The Hangzhou Bay Bridge, with a length of 22.2 miles, is currently the second longest sea bridge in the world. The Qingdao Bay Bridge, only recently completed, is now the longest, spanning 26.4 miles. Also, now six of China's seaports number among the ten busiest in the world with Shanghai Port first on the list in terms of both cargo tonnage and TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units), having just exceeded Singapore in 2010.

Shanghai's metro system, with the first line built in 1995, now has 260 miles in operation and has surpassed New York to become the most extensive system in the world. The Shanghai metro system is expected to reach 540 miles by 2020, more than doubling its current total length. Shanghai also operates nearly 1,000 bus lines, compared to only 100 lines in 1979. The Shanghai bus system likewise now ranks as the most extensive network of its kind in the world.

To feed its speedy industrialization, urbanization and infrastructure building, China now produces 47% of the world's steel, which is greater that the total output of the next 19 largest steel-producing countries combined. It also produces 50% of the world's cement, 60% of its aluminum and 45% of its coal. The rapid industrialization has exerted huge pressure on China's environment and resources. According to a World Bank study from a few years ago, China is home to 16 of the world's top 20 most polluted cities.

For those interested in marketing products or in investing in China, some other questions naturally come to mind such as: Is China a rich country, or is China a poor country? What products does China need? Can China afford the products that our firm would like to market? Which market segment should our firm target?

Most Chinese, whose annual per capita income only reached $283 per year in 1979, lived in absolute poverty. China did not provide a market for the products that most of the outside world would have liked to have made available in

Red lantern and skyscraper with blue sky in Beijing Central Business District

China at that time. What China had was only a potential market. Multi-national consumer companies repeatedly had lofty dreams of every Chinese buying one piece of their product. Today, such a dream is not only feasible-it is being realized.

China's per capita GDP reached $3,700 in nominal terms and $6,800 in PPP in 2009, a thirteen fold increase in 30 years. These numbers still appear low, ranking about 100 in the world in terms of PPP. To determine whether China is still too poor to buy your products, average numbers can be very misleading. China has a very uneven wealth distribution. Furthermore, government statistics often underestimate the real income. Many multi-national corporations drew the wrong conclusion and later regretted that they had lost a competitive edge against their more savvy competitors who did enter the Chinese market earlier in the process.

A good example was Yum! Brands, the parent company of the KFC, Pizza Hut and Taco Bell fast food restaurant chains. In spite of repeated courting from the city government of Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province and a second tier city in China, both Yum! Brands and McDonalds balked on investing in Nanchang. Government statistics showed that Nanchang's per capita income in 2000 was 2000 Yuan, which was deemed too low in affordability by both companies, given that a typical meal from those chains costs more than 20 Yuan per person. KFC finally decided to open its first restaurant in August 2000 and it prepared to lose money for at least 3 months. On opening day, KFC put up a huge poster with the words: "Our sincere apologies to Nanchang people; we are late." Nanchang people were very forgiving. The line was six-tenths of a mile long and KFC set a worldwide single day sales record that day and that record continued being broken for 23 consecutive days.

One of the biggest negative issues in China's economic development is the expansion of the Gini coefficient, the measure of income distribution in which zero indicates perfect equality. China's Gini coefficient reached 0.47 in 2009, placing China among the countries with the widest gap between their rich and poor.

It is estimated that out of 1.3 billion Chinese people, 150 million still live in poverty (i.e. under $1 a day), 250 million live between $1 and $2 a day and another 400 million are in a low income class with limited purchasing power. The middle class population reached 350 million in 2010 (50,000 Yuan annual income, or about $7500 dollars in nominal terms and $14000 based on PPP). The upper middle class reached about 100 million. The wealthy class is estimated at 40 million now and is likely to reach 160 million in 5 years. At the top of the pyramid are 10 million very wealthy people, 900,000 millionaires and about 200 billionaires (both in U.S. dollars), second only to America.

The past few years have witnessed a rapid accumulation of wealth in China, with the total net worth now exceeding $16.6 trillion, placing it No. 3 in the world, after America's 54.6 trillion and Japan's 21 trillion. Even excluding those living in poverty and low income families, China's market size and purchasing power stands among the highest in the world, with 500

million people in the middle and wealthy classes.

Another tremendous income source is the "grey income." Though every country has the phenomenon of "grey income," China could be the most dramatic case because of its rapid economic expansion and the serious corruption that exists in business activities. According to a Credit Suisse study, China's grey income amounted to a stunning $1.4 trillion in 2008, or about one third of China's GDP in that year. About 80% of the grey income is concentrated in a small group of wealthy people, which bodes well for the luxury goods market.

China's consumption-to-GDP ratio, currently at 36%, is only half that of the U.S. and about two-thirds those of Europe and Japan. But that is about to change. Recent statistics show that private consumption in China is expanding at about 15% a year, much faster than the rate of overall economic growth. The ratio can reach above 50% of GDP by 2025, adding $1.9 trillion to global consumption, according to a recent report by McKinsey, a management consulting concern. As a matter of fact, many products catering to the middle class and wealthy class have already seen their sales in China exploding in recent years.

Yum! Brands' KFC unit opened its first restaurant in China in October 1987 at Beijing Qianmen, its largest restaurant in the world with more than 500 seats. The cost of a typical meal per person was about one week's income for a Chinese worker at that time. Many Chinese tried it once but were not return customers. KFC had to rely on foreign tourists for its business. Less than 5 years later, the restaurant was enjoying such good business that it had to expand by adding 200 seats. Now KFC already has 3200 restaurants in China. On average it is opening 1.5 new restaurants every day in China. During the second half of 2010, China surpassed Yum! Brands' US market to become its largest market in total sales. Yum! Brands expects its revenue from China to be more than double that of the United States by 2015. Avon entered the Chinese market in the late 1980s. Sales reached $4 million in the first year, 3 times what had been projected. That figured doubled in 1992. It doubled again in 1993 and reached $40 million in 1995 and $200 million in 2000.

When Deng Xiaoping visited the United States in 1979, he toured a Ford plant in Atlanta. The output of that plant in a single month outnumbered the total automobile sales in China at that time. In 2009 China's automobile sales reached 13.5 million units, surpassing the U.S. to become the largest market in the world, or 25% of the world total unit sales. Sales jumped another 33% in 2010 to reach 18 million units. GM sold 2.35 million cars in China in 2010, a 28.8% increase over 2009. China is now GM's largest market, surpassing its US market, which had been GM's largest for 102 years.

The breakneck development of car ownership and the growing freight traffic over the past few years have resulted in constant traffic jams in major Chinese cities and highways, often among the worst in

the world. Last August, China set a record for traffic jams by having one that lasted for more than 20 days and extended for 60 miles on the Beijing Tibet Highway in a section close to Beijing.

Luxury products sales in China grew 20% in 2009, enabling China to overtake America to become the No. 2 luxury market in the world after Japan. With sales increasing another 30% in 2010, China is expected to be the largest luxury goods market by 2013. German luxury car makers have been extremely successful in China. Total sales of the three luxury brands of Mercedes, Audi and BMW in China exceeded those of the United States for the first time in 2010. China is likely to surpass the German home market in 3 to 5 years for these brands, if not sooner.

Both Coach and Tiffany, seeing their business exploding in China, are aggressively opening stores in China. 10% of Coach's revenue was from China in 2010. Coach predicts China's share to be 20% by 2013. Casino revenue in Macau, $23.5 billion in 2010, outshined that of Las Vegas by a significant margin. In 2010 nearly 1 million Chinese tourists visited America. With an annual family income of between $45,100 and $79,300, these visitors spent $7200 on average per person during these visits.

China's service industries, at 42.6% of GDP, are most likely underestimated, especially in PPP terms, as government statistics do not capture many cash transactions. The restaurant business has been booming for many years in major cities as restaurants are often favored places for business meetings and for nurturing relationships. Multi-story restaurants in big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou contain a hundred or more dedicated private rooms and huge halls on each floor. Some restaurants even have waiters and waitresses roller-skate to serve tables.

Service industry, Chengdu Sichuan Province, China

A fast aging population has created a huge household service market in major cities. There are more than 1 million live-in housemaids in Shanghai alone, in addition to part-time cleaners, cooks and hospital overnight maids. The well-know Big Mac index measures the purchasing power in different countries for a single product. The most recent study shows that a Big Mac costs $3.71 on average in America and about $2.20 in China. The conclusion would appear to be that Chinese currency is 40% undervalued, as claimed by many economists and politicians. One of the most underpriced services in China is actually the haircut. A basic haircut costs 10 Yuan or about $1.5 in Shanghai at a decent hair salon. The same haircut costs $6 in New York's Chinatown. If a haircut index rather than a

McDonalds index were in existence, politicians such as Senator Charles Schumer could claim that the Chinese currency was in fact 75% undervalued.

Every 30 years is considered a mini cycle in China. A witty folk saying has demonstrated how China has changed over the past 60 years, both economically and ideologically. It goes like this: In 1949 only socialism can save China, in 1979 only capitalism can save China and in 2009 only China can save capitalism.

We are never lacking in predictions regarding China's future development. The boldest prediction could be from Robert Fogel, a Nobel Prize laureate from the University of Chicago. He predicts that China's economy will reach $123 trillion by 2040, or $85,000 per capita. Many pessimists, on the other hand, predict China will eventually collapse or even disintegrate, as they claim China's economy and political system are not sustainable.

No matter which eventuality plays out in coming years, one thing is certain: China is not a country of status quo but of constant change, and that change cannot be taken lightly.

Is it Time for American Businesses to Re-Define their China Relationships?
Learning from Past Experiences and Positioning for Future Global Expansion

Mark A. Wilterding

Abstract

With the measured economic success of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) economy of the past 30 years, its continuing increase of foreign direct investments, and its sovereign account actively targeting global acquisitions and equity investments, it is now time to think about expanding existing, or starting new, mutually beneficial business relationships with China. In order to better formulate the options for existing or new business ventures, it is important to trace the foundations that were laid by the Chinese state-owned-enterprises, entrepreneurs, and international companies that worked with China over this period in order to form a sustainable framework for its future domestic and international industrial economic expansion.

Biography

Retired IBM VP and Partner of IBM Global Services (and founder of Innovation Management Advisors LLC), Mark A. Wilterding, Sr., recalls his experiences and observations of these pioneering efforts and provides his Point-of-View on China's future economic growth and challenges. During his 29 year career with IBM, he led IBM's Asia Pacific Industrial Sector Consulting and Solutions and the Global Product Lifecycle Management Practices from 1999 to 2009. He received his BA from Lawrence University, B.Arch from University of Minnesota, and M.Arch from Harvard University. He is a member of the Advisory board of the International College of the University of Bridgeport. He was the Contributing Editor "Reshaping Supply Chain Management – Vision and Reality" and author of the chapter "Perfect Product Launch", IBM Press, Pearson Publishing, 2007.

Historical Background

In response to China's economic reform policies, global international companies and pioneer entrepreneurs have established mutually beneficial Chinese business relationships. These early successes contributed to the positive growth and expansion of their own business performance and the growth of China's industrial sectors. In his book, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run*, Agnus Maddison writes, "In the past, analysis of the economic progress and its determinant has had a heavy Eurocentric emphasis. Assessment of the Chinese historical record has been highly Sino centric. A more integrated view can illuminate both exceptionalism and normality, and provide a better understanding of the reasons for the rise and decline of nations."[1]

IBM's China experience was established in 1934 in accordance with the company's founder T.J. Watson's vision to establish foreign sales and distribution affiliate companies in countries around the world. China's decision in 1978 to abandon its rigid foreign trade policy and decentralize its foreign trade decisions, [2] its reunification of Hong Kong in 1997, and its more recent easing of diplomatic tensions to begin to expand economic ties with Taiwan, influenced IBM and other multinational companies to transform its original China-specific product sales and support business into a broader sales, product development, manufacturing, and consulting services.

Creating and Expanding Initial Business Relationships in the 1990s

In the early 1990s, IBM's domestic China business and organization began the process of aligning with China's emerging reformed domestic and international economic growth policies promoting foreign direct investment. Some of the company's key decisions included the establishment in 1995 of its China Research Laboratory located in Beijing, [3] the formation of a new business relationship with China Great Wall Computer Group to manufacture PCs, and the announcement with Ji Tong Communication Company, Ltd. of a joint telecommunications industry research and development venture.[4] IBM also opened its newly formed management consulting practice offices in Hong Kong and Shanghai.

Likewise, many other leading international industrial companies, such as Volkswagen, Chrysler, GM, Volvo, Toyota, Philips, Siemens, Mitsubishi, etc., were embarking on launching similar new China business plans. Wealthy foreign sovereign funds, led by Hong Kong, Taiwan, the US, Japan, and Singapore, began targeted industrial growth investments which helped to create new China economic development zones to service their key domestic markets and vertical industrial sectors.[5] Responding to the dramatic 430% increase in Chinese postgraduates and students studying abroad, leading European and American Universities established and strengthened collaborative academic curriculum development and student exchange programs.[6] And, large Private and State-Owned-Enterprises

(SOE), such as First Auto Works, and Petro China, began to formalize preferred foreign supplier/ vendor or joint venture business relationships.

China's decision to form new SOE / Joint Ventures (JVs) became the single most important driver for increasing the demand for basic consulting and solution implementation engagements (Figure 1). The China SOE / JVs initially contracted for basic solution implementation, IT infrastructure, and process transformation services. Although IBM China's expanding number of anchor and field consulting offices could manage the client relationships, administer the contracts, and fulfill entry level consulting skills, they had not yet built a critical mass of qualified management consultants and solutions delivery personnel to staff the needs of the engagement deliverables. To fix the skill gap issue, this early period was characterized by flying in foreign teams of qualified industry consultants, global subject matter experts, and project managers. Aside from being expensive, the success of this approach required each foreign assignee to be able to quickly acclimate to the local Chinese culture, food, and language. It became important to the successful completion of the project for the foreign team members, of a Chinese led engagement team, to be able to also work in a harmonious multi-lingual / multi-cultural business environment.

Building Basic Foundations: Achievements and Challenges (1990-1999)

Following the Chinese time-honored principle of "Guanxi", it soon became clear that an often unspoken priority of Chinese management was their interest in working with the foreign JVs and advisory consultants to learn the new ways and methods of managing every aspect of the consulting engagements and the business models and practices. Because of the gap in the availability of large numbers of qualified domestic Chinese skills and the need to protect intellectual property, it quickly became the norm for the foreign companies and consultancies to negotiate, non-Chinese customary contract terms to define the limits of "on-the-job" training and knowledge transfer.[7]

As the demand for basic entry services diminished, new requirements were placed on the foreign JVs to provide their China SOE counterpart with more advanced and complex offerings such as market analyses, manufacturing operations, e-commerce, procurement, financial management best practices, process transformations, and solutions implementation services. To address these needs, some SOE / JVs, like GM / Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), relied on using tailored versions of the GM Buick fabrication and assembly processes and IT infrastructure solutions from the U.S. for operating its new plant located in Shanghai.[8] Other China domestic companies, like Hauwei, a large domestic telecommunications equipment manufacturer headquartered in Shenzhen, decided to enter into long term and phased consulting and solutions implementation programs with established foreign management and solution consultants, such as the team of foreign IBM

China is attempting to become the leader in wind energy.

consultants supported by the IBM Hong Kong office, to help transform its business processes and IT infrastructure.[9]

Regardless of the preferred approach to forming and managing these ventures, foreign companies faced some key challenges in developing a sustainable China business model. As the demand for IBM China consulting and solutions services grew, it became necessary to modify the practice model that relied on off-shore / landed project management and subject matter expert skills to a more self sufficient China Practice that could build deeper client relationships and manage most aspects of the new IBM global vertical industry segment going-to-market model. However, two important challenges arose: 1) How to manage intellectual capital and, 2) How to respond to the urgent "Y2K" crisis before the January 01, 2000 deadline.

Because one of the primary benefits of the industry vertical approach is to provide clients with business solution templates, the IBM China practice leaders took the lead in negotiating acceptable terms and conditions to protect and/or license Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Although China had acceded to the IPR international conventions in 1979 that would later lead to China's complying with the WTO's "GATT" and "TRIPS" agreements, the difficulty for foreign JV companies to fairly adjudicate disputes in China's courts remained an important issue.[10] A common response by the foreign JVs to this reality was to only intro-

duce back level products and manufacturing technologies into the China market to help mitigate the risks associated with reverse engineering or counterfeit knock-offs.

In the late 1990's most companies and governments urgently mobilized to fix the Year 2000 (Y2K) systems software issues. This global perceived crisis resulted in a dramatic increased demand for related consulting and solutions experts, and the decisions by the foreign China SOE / JVs and many domestic companies were to install next generation business processes and solutions on top of the Y2K fixes. As a result, the China SOEs became direct beneficiaries of the accelerated introduction and use of these new solutions and IT technologies that enabled the next business transformation phase that resulted in fueling the double digit GDP hyper-growth of next decade.

China Becomes the World's Factory (1999-2004)

Bird's eye view of Shanghai Pudong at night.

When I arrived in Singapore to start my international assignment in September 1999, The ASEAN "Tigers" were recovering from their recent economic collapse. In their attempt to quickly recover, each S.E Asian country was promoting its respective local economies as the hubs for Asia Pacific automotive, electronics, high-technology, petroleum, and software development industries. As a result, many of the global international enterprise companies had begun or were beginning to establish their HQs in Singapore and throughout the region. At the very same time, China was putting in place its revised industrial policies which resulted in a 100% increase in automotive production[11] and a 400% increase in the retail sales of consumer goods.[12] Due to the continuation of China monetary policy to de-value the Renminbi[13], and its perceived competitive threat from the ASEAN economies, China embarked on a plan to target new prioritized industry sectors to foster additional economic growth and to attract additional foreign direct investment.

Based on the relative success of its SOE / JV automotive and consumer electronics sectors, China now chose to focus on Telecommunications, Petroleum, High Technology, Steel, Energy, Biomedical, Rail Transportation, Shipbuilding, and Commercial Aviation industries. Since these targeted sectors were also the industrial development priorities of ASEAN, Korea, and Japan, the foreign multinational companies with established Asia Pacific headquarters and significant Asia Pacific manufacturing investments out-

side of China were compelled to re-assess their business strategies and plans for the region. With China's entry into the WTO in 2001[14], the need for its publicly traded SOEs and domestic companies to be Sarbanes-Oxley compliant[15] heightened, as did its need to adopt international product design and manufacturing standards[16]. The prior risk / reward equations quickly shifted to entice many foreign companies, including IBM in 2004, to move their Asia Pacific headquarters to China and to increase their China investment portfolio.[17]

The impact of these shifts to IBM's Asian Pacific Industrial Sector consulting and services practice was also profound. To complement its strong team of experienced practice leaders and consultants concentrated in Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore, IBM China put in place tactical plans to grow the relatively small China practice by hiring new seasoned and experienced partners, consultants, and industry subject matter experts. To quickly scale and complement the expanded core team, IBM's acquisition of PWC Consulting in July 2002 enabled the IBM China practice to fulfill the demand for providing industry consulting and solution offerings that were tailored to meet the China SOE / JV and domestic client requirements.[18]

As the China SOE/JV's multi-national companies continued to prosper, the demand for IT Outsourcing and Application Management Services led most large full service consultancies, including IBM Global Delivery, to hire and staff new centers located in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Dalian, and Chengdu.[19] Due to the exponential demand for qualified services skills, the Chinese government eased its work visa restrictions for Mandarin literate and multi-lingual proficient Taiwanese, Korean, and Singaporean business managers, consultants, and specialists to enter China and fill key positions.[20] This new policy also enabled IBM China to apply for work visas for qualified employees, and to come to China on long term assignments to fulfill critical jobs resulting from the dramatic increase in the demand for an expanded services offering portfolio.

As China's foreign trade and economic cooperation expanded, the leading China SOE / JVs and domestic companies began to respond to global market pressures to increase their manufacturing productivity while improving their quality and distribution costs. The period of 2003-2004, saw an increase in these businesses' demand for requests to assign foreign "level 5" developers and engineers, such as Japanese manufacturing quality teams, Korean steel production experts, European automotive production engineers, and American integrated supply chain consultants to work on the next generation of advanced product requirements. At the same time, the preference for Brownfield transformation projects was giving way to Greenfield development programs to build state-of-the-art labs, mills, and plants to house advanced equipment and technologies to support the use of Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) and Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) solutions and IT infrastructure.

Becoming an Innovator and Economic Force (2005 – 2009)

Fundamental to this period was the tactical shift by the China SOE / JV to focus on the need to attract and hire the best and brightest Chinese university graduates and experienced professionals to meet the market demands for growing its domestic and emerging consulting, solutions implementation, and customer support services.[21] This new domestic delivery model produced local teams of Chinese practitioner specialists and industry experts who were able to work on new and more advanced projects.

The continued increased global demand for Chinese exported manufactured products, and the domestic demand of imported goods, resulted in the creation of a critical mass of highly experienced Chinese professionals with expertise in developing and managing all aspects of advanced global supply chains and procurement. Many companies, including IBM, decided to establish their corporate procurement executive offices in China.[22] As the level of Chinese competencies grew, many foreign companies announced the establishment of China based global Centers of Excellence (CoE) to promote the use and demonstration of leading edge business solutions as exemplified by IBM's Global Supply Chain Innovation Center in Beijing[23], and Volvo Research & Education Foundation's CoE established in conjunction with the China Urban Sustainable Research "CUSTREC" in Beijing.[24]

China's economic expansion also resulted in the predicted dramatic growth of the Chinese middle class and the exponential demand for new housing, cars, electronics, and packaged goods. In order to successfully compete, many Chinese SOE / JV and companies began to migrate to new business models to enable integrated Product Development (iPD) and Product Innovation Management (PIM) methodologies to more efficiently manage the development and product introduction of newly developed Chinese competitive products. From 2004-2008 total export

Magnetic Levitation Train (Maglev) in Shanghai, China

of manufacturing goods grew 244%, while foreign direct investment increased by 153 %.[25] Bombardier and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China's (COMAC's) announcement to develop and co-market a new family of narrow-body commercial aircraft[26], and Volvo SA / Dongfeng Motor Company's JV to develop new entry level trucks and buses[27] are two important examples of new industrial sector cooperation. The highly visible "MagLev" high speed passenger rail project to link Shanghai with the Pudong International Airport, led by a Siemens / CSR JV, has made it possible

for China to be viewed as a global competitor in the development and manufacturing of advanced high speed railway technology. The China Transportation Ministry's authorization to spend $US106 billion in domestic railway infrastructure in FY2001, and CSR's newly announced JV with GE to manufacture future high speed trains in the US are prime examples of this successful policy.[28]

Anticipating the Future

Based on a review of the progression of China's impressive and planned economic growth over the last two decades, I believe there will be five primary drivers that will influence China's future:

1) Expanding China Global Investments and Acquisitions: China's aggressive M&A activity is exemplified by its decision to buy global hard assets in lieu of US Treasury Securities,[29] and the Chinese Investment Corporation's (CIC) massive acquisition and investment activity in global material resources ventures.[30] Zhejian Greely's acquisition of Ford's Volvo premium auto company and brand and its announced intention to invest up to US$12B in new China domestic automotive plants and development centers[31], and the newly formed Lenovo / NEC Japanese based PC JV[32] are two examples of an accelerated trend of the SOE / JV's morphing into new competitive Chinese owned global enterprise companies and off-shore business ventures. Over time, these new business models will attract additional Chinese private investors who will acquire, develop and introduce new branded products that appeal to domestic and global markets. This move, along with China's leveraging the brand value of its expanding portfolio of recognized global brands will become the primary contributing factor to the expansion of their export markets and an increase in its FY2010 3.5% of total foreign investments.[33]

2) Realizing Operational Productivity: China, with one fifth of the world's population, must determine an education policy which can effectively compete with established and emerging market economies. Regardless of its past success in becoming the world's factory, leading Chinese manufacturing companies will continue to be challenged by the competitive demands of operational productivity. This reality will place increasing pressure on the Chinese government to rationalize and integrate large numbers of world class college and post graduate researchers, engineers and managers to lead the marketing, development, production, and service support of China's innovative manufactured products.[34]

3) Promoting China Innovation and Free Trade: As China's businesses acquire more business assets and harness their latent human re-

sources, it has the potential of becoming a preeminent global innovator. China will continue to participate, influence, and comply with international financial reporting and product development standards.[35] Potential barriers to China's becoming a global innovator should be mitigated through their continued expansion of free trade agreements, such as those between China and ASEAN countries.[36] Continued energy investments, like China Petrochemical Corporation's 37.5% stake in the Saudi Arabian refinery Red Sea Refining Company[37], and the continuing pressure by the G20 to revalue and normalize its currency will determine the pace of making the economic transition from the leading manufacturer to a global innovator and trading partner.[38] Chinese innovation will also be aided by an expanding domestic market that will verify the acceptance of newly developed products and value chains.

4) Investing in an Expanding China Patent Portfolio: Ultimately, the underlying intrinsic value of the China's economy will be enhanced when it decides to encourage and fund Chinese entrepreneurs and existing businesses to invent rather than to continue their preference for incremental product improvement.[39] Following the examples of the UK, Germany, Korea, Japan, and the US in becoming innovation economies, China's promotion in the creation and expansion of vital Chinese patent portfolios will help form the bedrock foundation for long term industrial expansion. Central to leveraging its patent portfolio assets, China must also adopt new cross-license laws, which are legally binding and that can be fairly adjudicated in China in accordance with recognized international IPR legal standards.[40]

5) Developing the China Way and Brand: The Chinese economy is positioned to leverage the numerous unique and extraordinary advantages which can be used to define the China Way and Brand. This will only occur if China can harness its latent educated workforce and entrepreneurial industrial base to be free to expand its knowledge of how to market and manage an ever-increasing complex portfolio of SOE / JVs' manufactured products, global inbound - outbound logistics, integrated supply chains, and environmental renewable technologies.[41] New business schools, notably The China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) is positioning itself to prepare new China case studies and graduate new in-

novative Chinese business leaders.[42] The China Way transformation will be realized when Chinese researchers, marketers, engineers, and managers lead aspects of innovation that are needed for new China Branded manufactured products. SAIC's introduction of "YEZ", an environmentally sustainable negative carbon footprint vehicle[43], and Hauwei's entry into the global enterprise data router market may become recognized as early examples of China's transformation in becoming a global brand leader.[44]

Conclusion

Will there be a new China Way and Brand? England's invention of steam engine technologies resulted in the industrial revolution of the 19th century; America led the development and perfection of the mass production assembly line; Japan's pioneering JIT, TQM and SQC methods gave rise to the creation of lean manufacturing. This led to each country, in its own right , becoming an innovator and producer of global dominant products and brands. Like Britain, the United States and Japan, China is also positioned to leverage its experiences and knowledge to formulate and implement a positive plan to grow and participate in a broader global economy.

As Walter Russell Mead and Henry Kissinger pointed out in their 2007 Op-Ed article for the Council on Foreign Relations, "The rise of China is only part of a much bigger story – the rise of Asia".[45] The realization of a China Way will occur when its outdated isolationist tendencies, its support of outdated and uncompetitive SoE's, and its placing constraints and barriers on entrepreneurial investments give way to investing and incubating new innovative, high quality, Chinese developed and branded products, goods, and services.[46]

Perhaps W. Edward Deming, the father of quality control who took his ideas and principles to Japan following WWII, provides the best example for today's entrepreneurs and companies who wish to actively engage with China to help collaboratively develop and differentiate the future Chinese industrial economy.

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
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