


# The Journal

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
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## Foreword

Thomas J. Ward



### Peace and Religious Pluralism

The articles in this issue of the *Journal of Global Development and Peace* include contributions from academics in Africa and in the United States. The contributors to this issue from Global Development and Peace Program and the East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies each have a unique story and remarkable life experiences, which help to explain the clarity with which they address the issues that they raise. The articles provide insight into ongoing social, diplomatic and/or military developments in Africa, East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. Professor Solomon Hailu, who teaches International Community Development at Oral Roberts University in Oklahoma helpfully examines some of the mechanisms and protocols that are in place to promote human security among the member states of the African Union. Professor Kamal-deen Olawale Sulaiman of Nigeria's Ekiti State University's Department of Religious Studies points to historical lapses and locales where harmonious relations have existed between Islam and Christianity. Mr. P  p   Fran  ois Haba, a recent graduate of the Masters program in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies was educated in Africa, the United States, Europe and Asia. He speaks fluent English, French and Chinese. In his article he considers ways in which PRC-Taiwan cross strait relations can improve through the prudent utilization of multi-track diplomacy. Caitlin Olson, who served for three years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Sierra Leone, turns her attention in this article to the ongoing war in Thailand between Thai government forces and Islamic militants in the southern region of the country who seek independence. Will Carpenter has lived for a number of years in Thailand. He is currently working on a project there to address human trafficking. In this article Mr. Carpenter dedicates his attention to the ongoing conflict in Syria. Here he explores the role of Turkey as well that of both Turkish and Syrian Kurds in addressing Syria's war that continues to enflame that nation and its neighbors. Janaina Bourdignon, a human rights activist who hails from Brazil and currently interns at the United Nations, considers the impact of domestic violence on the lives of women in Palestine.

Professor Sulaiman's article touches on a central issue in today's world—the role that Islam plays in the violence that surrounds us. Some argue that Islamic terrorism stems from tenets of that faith and their applications in what is deemed a corrupt and corrupting body politic. One cannot deny that the teachings of the Qu'ran have been used as an apologetic for terrorist act.

But one would be in error if one assumed that such behavior is endemic to Islam. One would also be in error to point to violence in the Muslim faith and ignore the fact that, only a few years back, much of Central America was enflamed by Christian militants who instead of pursuing personal piety advocated in favor of « efficacious love, » which could be expressed in the violent elimination of those resistant to the advance of a more just socialist society, which it felt better reflected the Christian ideal and purpose. Indeed the Colombian revolutionary priest Camillo Torres Restrepo who was entrapped and killed by the Colombian military in 1967 had explained that any Christian who was not involved in the revolutionary cause was living in a state of « mortal sin. »

While the Christian faith has frequently been used to exhort the faithful to war since the days of the Crusades and even back to the Emperor Constatine's supposed encounter with the cross as the sign by which he was to conquer, experiences of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries contributed to the emergence of religious pluralism, where no particular faith or interpretation of Christianity prevailed, provided the basis upon which those with sharp differences on issues such as Christology, the Papacy or Mariology could embrace shared general religious principles and certain relationship protocols that discouraged imposing one's religious views on others. Just as the social contract caused people to surrender certain of their rights to « feel safe, » and just as smaller states at times sacrificed certain dimensions of sovereignty—foreign policy, the common defense, and control of commerce—for the sake of a more perfect union, so also the practitioners of different religious faiths might reserve their words and actions in certain forums for other words and actions that neither contradicted nor promoted the key underpinnings of faith. As we enter an increasingly secular or what the French refer to as a laïc state, the protection of religious sensibilities may be less certain; however, the religious pluralism that serves as the basis of the American experiment may have some relevance to the Islamic sphere where divides lead Sunnis to eliminate Shi'a even when they share far more than what divides them.

*Thomas J. Ward is Dean of the College of Public and International Affairs.*

Lapham's Quarterly, "No Smoke for Camilo," by Garret Keizer, <http://www.laphamsquarterly.org/revolutions/no-smoke-camilo>, accessed on July 23, 2015.

# **The Syrian Conflict; How Turkish and Kurdish Involvement Can Change the Tide of an Intractable Conflict**

William Carpenter



## **Abstract**

The focus of this research paper will be the uphill task of bringing Kurdish and more importantly, Turkish negotiators to the table whilst dealing with the untenable task of bringing about an end to ISIS's aggression and the Assad regime. Any element of conflict negotiation in Syria must include both the Kurds and the Turks for there to be feasible results. However, before one can discuss post-conflict reconstruction or stability there must be an end to said conflict. This paper will not seek to find a stop-gap solution to the Syrian conflict, but a way in which third party negotiators can determine the phases of escalation, de-escalation, or stalemate in the Syrian Conflict's life cycle in order to manifest a ripening in the Syrian conflict and eventual resolution.

## **Biography**

Will Carpenter is a Master's candidate in the Global Development and Peace program at the University of Bridgeport. He just returned from completing his internship with the Children's Organization of Southeast Asia (COSEA), where he worked as a project intern to fight human trafficking in the hill tribes of northern Thailand. He is from Watertown, CT, though he has spent time in Colorado where he worked with Americorps, California where he worked with the San Francisco Food Bank, and Thailand where he originally worked as an ESL teacher. He is currently writing his thesis on water scarcity and sanitation and would like to work in the this field in the near future.

## Introduction

The Arab Spring in 2011 brought with it a renewed hope that there would be a forthcoming stabilization or at the very least a gradual democratization in the Middle East. Peaceful demonstrations eventually morphed into armed uprisings and quickly spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and then ultimately Syria. Those watching across the world could understandably be optimistic about the potential fall of these long-standing autocratic regimes. Many thought that Syria would be a short, yet bloody revolution much like what occurred in Libya. However, as we have witnessed for going on four years, this has not been the case. The conflict has turned into an all-out sectarian war that has attracted international attention and action (Ruys, 2014; 253). The UN has reported that there have been over 190,000 civilian deaths in the past 4 years (UNHCR, 2014). Michael Totten describes it as an “existential fight to the death” (Totten, 28). Syria has been among the most affected by the Arab Spring, having experienced governmental shortfalls that thwart efforts to correct enduring conflicts and threaten the region’s overall stability (Stigall, 2014; 285). Initially, the international community was hesitant to fully recognize the situation as an armed conflict, instead categorizing it as a human rights violation and repression (Ruys, 2014; 253). However, in August of 2013, a report filed by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic wrote that, “Syria is a battlefield. Its cities and towns suffer relentless shelling and sieges. Massacres are perpetrated with impunity. An untold number of Syrians have disappeared” ( UNHCR 2013). An important distinction in the Syrian civil war, which raises important legality issues, is the sheer amount of foreign influence on both sides,

which can be seen in the form of recruitment of foreign fighters, military aid and training, airstrikes, and funding (Ruys, 2014; 255). There is no question that the influx of foreign fighters and military infrastructure from outside actors has led to an increase in the violence. There have been attempt at peace talks, the so-called Geneva II talks, but there has been no success in terms of an agreement.



The degradation of the governmental and sociopolitical mechanisms has had a disastrous effect on civil institutions. This has led to a disbanding of government infrastructure and the rule of law and has created an inevitable power vacuum (Stigall, 2014; 285). This has caused further tension in the region, created new conflicts and prevented any resolution or potential solutions from taking hold. There are those who feel that the threat of ISIS is overwrought and that they are in fact just filling the vacuum created by the civil-war in Syria. However, it is impossible to deny the fact that ISIS has carved up huge swaths of land and has created an Islamic caliphate under the reign of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the enigmatic leader of whom little is known.

In order for there to be a transition from the so called “existential fight to the death” to a time of peace and sustainable development, there will need to be a broad, international effort at rebuilding the rule of law, dispute

resolution mechanisms and main government functions within Syria (Stigall, 2014; 286). The focus of this research paper will be the uphill task of bringing Kurdish and, more importantly, Turkish negotiators to the table whilst dealing with the untenable task of bringing about an end to ISIS's aggression and the Assad regime. Any element of conflict negotiation in Syria must include both the Kurds and the Turks for there to be feasible results. However, before one can discuss post-conflict reconstruction or stability there must be an end to said conflict. This paper will not seek to find a stop-gap solution to the Syrian conflict, but a way in which third party negotiators can determine the phases of escalation, de-escalation, or stalemate in the Syrian Conflict's life cycle in order to manifest a ripening in the Syrian conflict and eventual resolution. However, with no political solution easily attainable and military battles and violence continuing, the number of people affected by the Syrian conflict will likely increase in 2015 ( UNHCR, 2014).

## **Analytical Framework**

### **A. Actors: Primary/ Secondary actors**

Understanding how Syria's political climate came to be is important in contemplating how to bring out about peace talks and negotiations. The Syrian conflict has developed into a horrific sectarian war between the Sunni Muslim majority and the ruling Alawite minority (Totten, 2013 ; 28). Al-Assad's supporters, his family, his clan are all at least marginal Alawites. The Alawites are a heterodox religious minority that only consists of around 12 percent of the Syrian population (Totten, 2013; 30). They have been considered infidels for at least a thousand years by the Sunni majority. The Sunnis, along with Syrian Christian, Kurdish, and Druze minorities, have been nominalized and have had

little success in achieving a significant political opposition (Totten, 2013; 30). Al-Assad has done everything he can in order to steer this conflict onto ethnic lines. However, he has also attempted to portray the Syrian conflict as a battle against radical Islamists instead of a despot clinging desperately to power.

The conflict has transformed into what Totten refers to as a "protracted red-on-red fight between an anti-American state sponsor of terrorism and the anti-American jihadists of Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front), the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, which is fighting alongside the Free Syrian Army (FSA) against Assad" (Totten 2, 2013; 8). In 2013, there were as many as 1,000 armed opposition groups operating in Syria, with numbers totaling over 100,000 fighters (Ruys, 2014; 254). The largest of which is the Free Syrian Army which was formed by Syrian Army deserters in 2011. The FSA has many different members, who at all times are representing different fronts in the war and different affiliates (Ruys, 2013; 253). The FSA is held together by a Supreme Military Council, yet it remains a frayed network of military brigades instead of a unified fighting force (Ruys, 2014; 253). All of these opposition groups are battling the Assad regime and in recent months ISIS. The Syrian Opposition Council has been recognized as the legitimate ruling power in Syria by more than 100 States and organizations including: the EU, the U.S., the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council ( Ruys, 2014; 253).

The former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, now known as ISIS, has subsequently branched off from al-Qaeda and established an Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq. The Assad regime still holds power in much of western Syria, which is the part of the country controlled by the Alawite minority. Apart from the



Alawites there are fighters from Hezbollah, a Shiite Islamist group backed by Iran, which frequently cross the more and more porous Lebanese border to join Assad's armies there (Tabler 2013). Subsequently, the Sunni dominated north-central region has been under control of a large collection of armed opposition forces. These include Jabhat al-Nusra (also known as the al-Nusra Front), and ISIS, which recently hoisted its black flag over Syria's principal dam on the Euphrates. In the northern region, long dominated by the Kurds, there is a subset of the militant Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, which has fought a long insurgency against the Turkish government and the Popular Protection Unit (YPG), which is the armed wing of the Kurdish political party PYD that operates without obstruction (Tabler 2013; Ruys, 2014 253).

The secondary actors' list is nearly as long. Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Turkey have all seen refugees cross their borders. Additionally, the U.S., Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have carried out more than 400 attacks on IS in Syria since September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2014 (BBC, 2014). France and the UK have also begun airstrikes in parts of Syria and Iraq. According to the US State Department there are over 60 countries that are a part of this coalition, although the majority are not directly involved in the airstrikes. On December 3<sup>rd</sup>, the US media began reporting that Iran had also conducted airstrikes, though this was denied by Iran (BBC 2014). The debated Iranian airstrikes were targeting ISIS fighters, not the Syrian Army fighters loyal to Assad. The UN Security Council initially vetoed any international action in Syria in 2011, with China and Russia casting the veto votes. The Gulf States who have been not so secretly funding ISIS would also have to be considered secondary actors in this conflict. Iran remains suppor-

tive of the Shia Alawites. Iran has been outright supportive of the Assad regime because it cannot afford to see a very strategic regional ally fall. The Assad regime also acts as a bridge of sorts between the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah in South Lebanon. Iran has continued to support Assad with financing and training of the Syrian Army (Pieper, 2013; 89). Russia also remains a steadfast supporter of the Assad regime throughout the conflict.

## **B. Root Causes**

The interests of all the actors involved in this conflict are myriad and complex. ISIS has recently expressed a desire to conquer more and more territory in hopes of creating an Islamic caliphate that would battle for hegemonic power in the world. Assad's Alawite faction is hoping to maintain power in Syria. The Free Syrian Army would like to establish more control over the day-to-day governance of a country in which they comprise the ethnic majority. "Of the three main currents in the opposition-secularists, moderate Islamists (including those in the Muslim Brotherhood), and Salafists -- the first two are more nationalist in orientation; their goals are more political than religious, and their agendas do not extend beyond Syria" (Tabler, 2013). The ethnic Kurds would also like more autonomy. Assad has essentially left them alone in the north and they have mostly waged war with the Islamists instead of the Assad regime. There are those who believe they would like to see a Kurdish state formed with their counterparts in Turkey, but that remains to be seen. The international community led by the U.S. would like to see a "degraded" ISIS, as Obama recently said. Before ISIS executed two foreign journalists, the international community was perfectly content to let Syria burn. When foreign nationals began being kidnapped and brutally

murdered, then and only then was there support for intervention. However, the international community as led by the US has no interest in a long, protracted war with so called “boots on the ground”. President Obama has made it clear that he expects this war to remain regional and that there must be support from another party in the fight against ISIS.

### C. Issues, Scope and Stage

The Syrian conflict is growing ever more convoluted and costly by the day. As mentioned above, the UN estimates that close to 190,000 civilians have been killed. Apart from those killed, Syrian refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) have felt the effects of this conflict the sharpest. There have been over 9.5 million people forced to flee in the Syrian conflict (Mooney, 2014). Additionally, there are an estimated 6.45 million people who have become internally displaced (Mooney, 2014). Syria now has the most IDPs on earth. On Average 9,500 people a day are being forced from their home, and at times not for the first time. The UNHCR has documented widespread attacks on civilians including: use of chemical weapons on civilians, systematic torture, rape, murder, kidnapping, attacks on hospitals, use of child soldiers, summary executions, massacres, sniper attacks on journalists and medical personnel, among others (Mullen, 2014; UNHCR 2014). Much of the displacement occurred because of “indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombardment and shelling” of cities as well as rebel factions ignoring international law by not providing assistance to IDPs ( Mullen , 2014). There are currently 3,032,619 registered Syrian Refugees and another 130,000 awaiting registration (UNHCR, 2014). This is the largest exodus of refugees since World War II ( UNDP 2014). There are refugee camps in Jordan that are the size of

small cities. The Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan has become that country's fourth-largest city with a staggering population of 180,000 refugees (Tabler 2013).

The political and humanitarian aspects of the conflict in Syria have created an increased acknowledgement that this has now become a development crisis as well (UNDP, 2013).



The war will have obvious and lasting effects on the economic development of Syria. The UNDP estimates that the war has driven back Syria's human development successes by 35 years with over 50% of the population now living in poverty. The unemployment rate was nearly 50% in 2013 with around 2.4 million jobs lost in the past few years. There has been an estimated \$48.4 billion in economic losses. 9.3 million are in need of some sort of humanitarian assistance. 12.6 million are now living in poverty and 4.4 living in extreme poverty ( UNDP, 2013). Additionally, there has been an estimated \$15 billion in damages and experts estimate that it will take nearly \$80 billion to put forth a reasonable reconstruction effort (UNDP 2013).

Furthermore, the Syrian conflict has been noted as having increasingly high levels of conflict-related injuries. The *World Report on Disability* estimated that one in 15 Syrian refugees in Jordan has been injured during the war and one in 30 refugees in Lebanon (Skinner, 2014; 39). A careful analysis of the study shows that young men are suffering the worst when it comes to war-related injuries,

which Skinner attributes to them being of fighting age, but also being responsible for gathering food and water, as well as checking on property back in Syria (Skinner, 2014; 39). The long-term treatment of those injured is a major humanitarian issue that is plaguing the health systems in Jordan, Lebanon and eventually Syria. Furthermore, Assad has said that the regime will consider all refugees who return to Syria injured as part of the anti-regime rebellion, thus leaving their future with more uncertainty (Skinner, 2014; 40).

In humanitarian crises chronic disease is often a major issue that is difficult to deal with. Syria is no exception. There is very little health education in Jordan and Lebanon and health care is accessible but very rarely affordable for those who left everything they owned behind. The study also analyzed injured refugees' struggle to conduct 'activities in daily living' (ADL) (Skinner, 2014; 39). This is a term used to describe basic tasks like feeding, bathing and dressing yourself. The study shows that 45% of refugees with some sort of impairment, chronic disease or injury struggle with ADL (Skinner, 2014; 39).

### **Analyzing the Syrian Conflict using Lund's Curve of Conflict**

The following is a timeline of key historical events in Syria as compiled by the BBC with respect to the Curve of Conflict. There have been very few instances of a long durable peace in modern Syria. The timeline shows periods of mostly unstable peace and crisis throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. During Syria's wars with Israel and intervention into Lebanon we see a progression from crisis into war. There has been a general ebb and flow to the conflicts in Syria, with the uprising in 2011 clearly being the most destructive and deadly.

In October 1918, Arab troops led by Emir Feisal, and supported by the British, capture Damascus, which effectively ended over 400 years of Ottoman rule. This is essentially the end of the durable peace in Syria. Subsequently, in July 1920, French forces occupy Damascus, forcing Feisal to flee abroad. In 1925 a crisis develops when nationalist Syrians form an uprising against their colonial leaders. France responds by swiftly attacking Damascus. In 1936 France agrees to Syrian independence in theory; however they still maintain economic and military control of the country. Not until post WW II do we see France relinquish power in Syria. This period can be determined to be what Lund would refer to as an unstable peace. (BBC Timeline, 2014).

In the late 1940s the Ba'th party was formed by Michel Aflaq and Salah-al-Din al-Bitar (Altunisk, 2002: 83). The formation of the Ba'th party was important because it directly appealed to poor people and minorities, including the Alawites. Before long the Alawites were the ethnic majority within the Ba'th party and they soon were able to form a political coalition that was rooted in the social, economic and political transformation of Syria (Altunisk, 2002: 83). A few relatively peaceful years later, in 1958, Syria and Egypt join the United Arab Republic (UAR). Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser heads the new state and immediately orders the disbanding of Syrian political parties. After independence from France, there were a series of coups that saw each coup leader struggling to retain power.

The Ba'th Party came to power in a coup in July of 1963. Soon after, a more extreme group called the NeoBa'thists came to power in yet another struggle. Altunisk writes, "The Ba'th regime dominated by rural minorities implemented policies that transformed the

socio-economic landscape in Syria and broke the power of the Sunni establishment” (Altunisk, 2002: 84). Soon after, in September of 1961, anger with the Egyptian leadership within the UAR led a group of Syrian army officers to grab power in Damascus and disband the union. In February of 1966, Salah Jadid leads a coup against the civilian Baath leadership, and soon after Hafez al-Assad becomes defense minister. In 1970 Hafez al-Assad overthrows president Nur al-Din al-Atasi and imprisons Salah Jadid. In 1973 Syria and Egypt go to war with Israel again but fail to retake the Golan Heights region they lost during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In 1980, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Muslim groups instigate uprisings and riots in Aleppo, Homs and Hama. In 1982 the Muslim Brotherhood instigates an uprising in the city of Hama. The revolt is repressed violently by the military, who are accused of killing tens of thousands of civilians. This military suppression of dissent is eerily similar to the response in 2011. After a few more years of relative unstable peace in 2000 Assad dies and is succeeded by his second son, Bashar (BBC Timeline, 2014).

In 2002 Syria is listed in a group of states that make up what President Bush referred to as the “axis of evil”. Following this, undersecretary of State John Bolton says Damascus is acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The period between 2002 and 2010 could be described as a relatively unstable peace. Assad had been releasing political prisoners and US officials had been engaging in talks with the Syrian regime. In 2010 the US had posted its first ambassador to Syria in 5 years (BBC, 2014). Conversely, they also issued sanctions against Syria, claiming it was attempting to harbor terrorist groups and develop weapons of mass destruction. The uprising began as a peaceful pro-democracy rallying call that

eventually led to what most thought would be a bloody but short Libyan-style revolution to overthrow the dictator Bashar al-Assad. The beginnings of the pro-democracy rallies could be considered an unstable peace. However, after March 2011, we see a quick degradation into the crisis stage, where, according to the BBC, “Protests in Damascus and the southern city of Deraa demand the release of political prisoners. Security forces shoot a number of people dead in Deraa, triggering days of violent unrest that steadily spread nationwide over the following months” (BBC 2014). In July 2011, President Assad sacks the governor of the northern province of Hama after mass a demonstration there, and the opposition parties meet in Istanbul to form a unified opposition (BBC, 2014). This 3 month span is when the Syrian conflict spiraled from crisis to war. The Syrian conflict is particularly confusing and troubling with the sheer amount of opposition factions and foreign interventions. There are few who can confidently predict what will happen in the next coming months, yet it safe to assume there will be more bloodshed and violence as this war continues to rage.

### **The Syrian Conflict’s Intractability**

The Syrian Conflict is still relatively young compared with similar Middle Eastern conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It can be described as having only been at the war level on Lund’s Curve for roughly 3 years. However, due to the incredible amount of violence and large number of entrenched parties involved, one can safely define it as being an intractable conflict. What started as a Libyan style revolution to overthrow despot Bashar al-Assad has turned into an all-out sectarian war between moderate Sunni rebels from the Free Syrian Army, government Alawite forces, multiple Sunni extremist groups, Kurdish fighters, and more re-



cently a coalition of Western and Arab forces conducting air strikes. Third parties often have difficulty gaining ground in third party negotiations because the parties involved in the conflict, in this case the Assad regime, ISIS, the Free Syrian Army, and the Kurds, have little interest in settling any disagreement or seriously considering any third party negotiated solutions to the current crisis. A key factor in determining if a conflict is intractable or not is the style of leadership in the affected states. If a leader has obvious political or economic interest in maintaining the violence, getting the parties to the negotiating table will be increasingly difficult (Crocker et al., 2004; 8). In Syria's case Assad has vested interest for both economic and political reasons. For al-Bagdadi of ISIS, he retains a "strong personal identification" to the end game of ISIS's jihad and ideological extremism. For both men there is also an unstated fear for their own personal safety should peace ever come to this region. Intractable conflicts are more often than not led by what Crocker et al. refer to as spoilers. Spoilers are actors for whom negotiation is simply a lull in the conflict, people who view the conflict as providing more stability than the uncertainty of peace, or leaders who have no desire to negotiate because victory or triumph over their adversaries is the only satisfactory end (Crocker et al., 2004; 9). ISIS has no interest in negotiating with anyone. Their stated goals have been to create an Islamic caliphate across the Middle East. They have brutally murdered anyone who stood in their path including ethnic minorities, Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims alike. Assad has similar designs to hold onto power for his ethnic minority the Alawites. There is a seemingly endless supply of spoilers within the Syrian conflict. In the early stages of the civil-war when the Assad regime was bombing cities, using chemical weapons, killing civilians and opposition forces alike,

and conducting air raids on Syrian cities, both China and Russia vetoed any UN Security Council measure to intervene. Russia, Syria's main arms supply, and China cited a need to respect the sovereignty of Syria (Charbonneau and Nichols, 2013, Reuters). ISIS can be considered both a primary actor and a spoiler in this case. There are a number of other potential spoilers such as Turkey, who desperately wants to avoid a united Kurdish front, Hezbollah, and the Gulf States who continue to fund ISIS. Additionally, there are the supposed thousands of foreign fighters that ISIS has managed to recruit from all corners of the globe. Their social media recruitment arm is well-trained and highly active at recruiting both men and young girls to join the fight against the West.

### **Third-party mediators' responses**

There are a variety of responses a third party can undertake when dealing with intractable conflicts. Crocker et al. lists them as: 1) let it burn; 2) engage only when national interests clearly dictate; 3) engage wherever there is violent conflict; and 4) leave it to others (Crocker et al., 2004; 8). The third party mediators can come from varying different backgrounds such as superpowers, middle powers, IGOs such as the United Nations, or NGOs. This paper argues that two third-party mediators, Turkey and the Kurds, have a responsibility and interest to respond directly to the Syrian conflict. A third mediator, the U.S., will take a more indirect approach, yet still have a strong presence in the region. Turkey would be involved with the direct backing of NATO members and in particular the U.S. All three have strategic reasons to mediate in Syria. For the U.S. there are strategic motives relating to geopolitical relationships and regional security. The U.S. has been supplying arms and training, provided security guarantees, and provided major eco-

conomic assistance programs in Syria. These tools are enacted to ensure U.S. influence in the region (Crocker et al., 2004; 30) For Turkey there are increasing humanitarian motives where we hope to create a “strong civic expression and ethical imperative” for action to end Syrian Arab and Kurdish suffering. Additionally, in Turkey’s case, there are both humanitarian and strategic motives as the battle moves ever closer to their border. Pieper writes, “Turkish public diplomacy over the Syrian civil war has become very vocal and illustrative of the Turkish sensitivity to the geopolitical instability on its borders (Pieper, 2013; 89). Turkey also has the opportunity to improve its international reputation as a growing regional power by combating terrorism and providing humanitarian assistance in one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Kurds are also utilizing both humanitarian and strategic motives in mediating this conflict. The Kurds are desperate to help their kin across the border as well as see increased autonomy within Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

As Crocker et al. point out, there is still debate as to whether intractable conflicts with a religious bent to them are more intractable than others. What started off as a brutal sectarian civil war has morphed into a protracted fight against Islamic extremism as well as an entrenched despot. With ISIS and Baghdadi we see a religious-ideological issue that will make it that much harder for warring elites to compromise without being accused of abandoning their principles (Crocker et al., 2004; 83).

### **Leverage of each side**

It is extremely important for the mediating parties to use possible leverage when dealing with intractable conflicts. They must correctly understand and analyze the conflict, gain the primary actors’ attention, create key

coalitions, and ensure international support (Crocker et al, 2004; 94). The leverage each side holds seems to be evolving every day. The airstrikes that the U.S.–led coalition has launched have seemingly stalled ISIS’s rapid land grab. However, ISIS has been simply changing tactics; hiding artillery, moving in smaller groups, etc. Assad’s power is now as entrenched as ever. A prolonged battle with Islamic militant groups was exactly what his regime needed to hold on to power. Assad will seek to move closer to Tehran, Moscow and Hezbollah in order to maintain control over Syria. The Kurds have emerged as a relatively moderate and fierce fighting force. The Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the YPG in Syria and the P.K.K have all seen increases in their usable leverage in this fight. There have been calls to arm and support them in the fight against ISIS. The U.S. is slowly losing the soft power it had accumulated by being too lenient with the Assad regime. By focusing solely on ISIS the U.S. and the international community have seemingly aligned their interests with Assad. While President Obama has specifically stated that he would not work with Assad, there are undeniable similar goals between the two. ISIS is still able to attract small numbers of foreign fighters from the West. However, most of these fighters are relatively untested and fairly useless. The Chechen fighters have proven to be the most beneficial. As long as ISIS maintains its social media campaign it will continue to draw foreign fighters.

### **BATNA**

The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is described by William Ury as being, “your best course of action for satisfying your interests without the other’s agreement” (Ury, 1993; 22). The BATNA of the U.S. can be described as being a continuation of the ongoing airstrikes against

ISIS strongholds and creating a proactive diplomacy initiative to attract non-US boots on the ground. Those boots on the ground would likely include FSA, the YPG Kurds, and ideally Turkish artillery and brigades. The Assad Regimes' BATNA would be to lean even further on Iran to bring in reinforcements for its protracted civil-war and modernized weaponry to help keep it in power. Kurdish and YPG's BATNA would be for increased international help in order to continue their fight against ISIS and eventually establish more autonomy for the Kurdish state. ISIS's BATNA would be for the fighting to continue, which would allow them to continuously recruit foreign fighters and money. Turkey's BATNA would be for the international community to agree on forcing the ousting of Assad as well as quelling the P.K.K.'s push for further autonomy.

### **Ripening the conflict: how Turkey and the Kurds can restructure the balance of power**

Conflict ripeness can be achieved when two adversaries understand that they are in a mutually hurting impasse and see that an end to the conflict is conceivable (Smith and Smock, 2008; 31). However, the Syrian conflict is not yet ripe for mediation. There have been 9 million forced from their homes, 190,000 killed and it has become as Michael Totten describes it an "existential fight to the death" (Totten, 2013; 28). This conflict is by no means ready for mediation. Any agreement made now would likely collapse shortly thereafter, similar to the previously attempted Geneva II peace talks. The sheer amount of foreign fighters that ISIS has managed to attract is also cause for great concern. If they are able to keep recruiting numbers in this fashion it will certainly prolong the conflict. Here is where Turkey comes into play. Turkey has historically been categorized as a fa-

cilitator or mediator in scholarly analyses relating to Iranian nuclear desires (Pieper, 2013; 81). Being that Turkey is a NATO member, it was seen as providing a bridge between the East and West. Turkey has had credibility in the West due to its affable relationship with the U.S., NATO membership and potential inclusion in the E.U.

By increasing pressure on Turkey to be held accountable, we may move further along the peace process. Turkey must be shown the cost and benefits of action vs. inaction in Syria. Turkey, as of yet, has been insulated from the violence and the human, political and economic costs of the Syrian conflict. Combined with pressure and assurances of a ceasefire from Turkish Kurds, the U.S. must convince Turkey that a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Syrian Arabs and Kurds should be on the table. Smith and Smock argue that mediators can promote accountability in a few different ways. " 1) Appealing to transcendent or locally legitimate principles (e.g. patriotic duty, responsibility to the people, a leader's place in history); 2) Mediators can use formal institutions and practices to promote accountability ; 3) turning an international spotlight on the conflict, perhaps via media attention or the involvement of IGOs, NGOs, or international solidarity groups" (Smith and Smock, 2008; 34). These three methods and in particular persuading the Turks of their humanitarian responsibility to Syrian Kurds will apply pressure on the Turks and foster understanding and an appreciation of the costs of their indifference and inaction in the Syrian conflict.

Recent media attention on the Kurdish fighters has portrayed them as religiously moderate and fierce and brave warriors. This effort to portray them as long-suffering, noble warriors has been quite successful in the secular

West.. There have been multiple news segments in Western media on the all female battalions that ISIS supposedly fears most, due to the erroneous myth that ISIS fighters think if they are killed by a woman they won't go to heaven. Increasing media attention on these moderate Kurds who are battling against Islamic terrorists has led to foreign fighters from the U.S. and Europe to look for a way to join the fight against ISIS by joining ranks with the Kurds. Ironically, Kurdish people are Sunni Muslims. Yet, they are not Arabs, which is a distinction that makes them appealing to the Western media. A continued focus on the Kurds in Western media will appeal to the moderate and liberal Western states who are uneasy with the idea of another long, protracted battle in the Middle East. Along with the media focus on the Kurds there will need to be a continued effort from UNDP, UNHCR and various NGOs to underscore the plight of all civilians, refugees and IDPs in Syria and neighboring countries.

### **The Kurdish Question**

The Kurds make up about 10% of the population in Syria. The Syrian Kurds are Sunni Muslims as are the FSA and ISIS. Yet, the Syrian Kurds are not Arabs. This is a very important distinction. The Kurds number around 30 million and have for many years sought autonomy due to persecution and oppression. Yet, creating a Kurdish state would mean redrawing the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey (Vick, 2014; 32). Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds have historically gotten along just fine. Turkey buys a lot of its oil from Northern Iraqi Kurds. Turkey also recently allowed the Peshmerga forces from Iraq to cross into Syria through their border. However, they would not allow the P.K.K to send reinforcements to Kobani. Turkish Kurds must convince Prime Minister Er-

dogan that they are not solely interested in independence and that their primary interest lies in stemming the bloodshed in Syria and furthering their minority rights within Turkey. The P.K.K. must be able to control its own factions in Turkey. They have suffered injustices there, but must not let previous transgressions interfere with the peace process.

It is equally important for the U.S., Turkey, and the Kurds to cultivate leaders who can take on responsibility during negotiations. However, Turkey has been as of yet reluctant to assist the Kurdish fighters in Kobane, because of their ties with the Kurdish Workers' Party, or P.K.K. The P.K.K. has been waging a war in Turkey for more autonomy for the past 30 years. Yet, as recently as two years ago, peace talks have occurred there. The initial reason for that war was to achieve Kurdish independence, but has recently changed into an attempt to gain minority rights, which allowed Prime Minister Erdogan to enter into talks with the Kurds (Vick, 2014; 33). Turkey, the EU and the US all consider the P.K.K a terrorist organization (NY Times, 2014). Yet, concessions must be made by Ankara regarding Turkish Kurds. If the P.K.K. are willing to put down their arms within Turkish territory, there must be more reforms to protect their minority rights and allow for more inclusion in governmental affairs in Ankara.

Perhaps in response to the growing violence between ISIS and the YPG, the P.K.K. began a coordinated assault on police stations outside of the city of Diyarbakir in July 2013. This essentially put an end to any peace talks the P.K.K. was partaking in with Ankara (Lawson, 2014; 1356). This continuation of large-scale protests in South-Eastern Turkey led to reforms by Prime Minister Erdogan. The reforms include allowing the Kurdish



language to be spoken in private schools and political campaigns (Lawson, 2013; 1356). These measures failed to appease the Turkish Kurds and soon there were more P.K.K activities in the South-East of Turkey. Erdogan responded by “stepping up Turkey’s ongoing rapprochement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)” (Lawson, 2014; 1536). As third-party mediators, we must applaud Erdogan’s steps while urging him to do more. If the P.K.K. can be appeased while not losing face internationally Turkey stands to benefit immensely.

There must be a restructuring of the Kurdish alliance. This entails convincing the PYD and the Peshmerga forces that the P.K.K must be contained as well as creating broad support from the various Kurdish groups within Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Specifically, the P.K.K must adopt moderate policies and those who have been advocating violence must be dealt with. The P.K.K needs to be harnessed and the rest of the world needs to be assured that any assistance provided to the PYD or the Peshmerga forces will not end up in the hands of Kurdish extremists in Turkey. The next step must be to convince the PYD to formally join the Free Syrian Army. Until now the PYD has not formally opposed the Assad regime and has shown little interest in doing so. They were perfectly content to stay out of the way until ISIS began its march. However, in May 2014, YPG forces united with fighters from the Kurdish Front and the FSA to push ISIS fighters out of several towns in al-Raqqah province (Lawson 2014; 1355). The PYD leaders also pushed to decrease the influence of the Syrian branch of the KDP by imprisoning the party’s activists in al-Qamishli (Lawson, 2014; 135). This may prove to be a very important step. If the PYD was able to use force to control branches of the Kurdish rivals, there is a precedent for them to contain

the P.K.K. The Kurds must be convinced to take the fight to Assad as well as ISIS. To that end, there needs to be more inclusion and unity among the leadership of the FSA. The Muslim Brotherhood has far too much influence with the FSA and to avoid similar levels of nominalization there must be room for the Kurds. Turkey has called for Assad to step down, now it’s time for the Kurds to do the same.

### **Turkey’s Historical Precedent of Third-Party Negotiation**

Turkey has a recent history of partaking in Arab and Israeli negotiations as a third party. In the past twenty years Turkey has shown a new eagerness to play third party negotiating role in regional conflicts (Altunisik and Cuhadar, 2010: 371). Turkey’s shift towards a central role in negotiating has been seen as a drastic change to Turkey’s previous isolationist stance in regards to regional conflicts (Robins, 1991: 65). In a post-Cold-War context, the regional vacuum that was created, plus an increase in both political and economic performances and closer ties with the EU, led to an increase in Turkey playing the role of third party negotiator in the Middle East (Altunisik and Cuhadar, 2010:389). The end of the Cold-War brought about new opportunities for regional involvement. Turkey found itself bordered by unstable states that were engaged in rampant conflict with one another that often left Turkey at risk of having the conflict cross over the border. Yet, in the “New World Order”, as President Bush called it, regional powers like Turkey were increasingly expected to address regional problems (Altunisik and Cuhadar, 2010: 373). Turkey faced challenges including the Gulf Wars, the collapse of the Peace Process, the Israeli attack on Lebanon and many others during this time. Using active mediation and facilitation of these regional issues, Turkey

was in essence trying to protect itself as well (Altunisik and Cuhadar, 2010: 373). Turkey originally began with what Altunisik and Cuhadar describe as a facilitative mediation role before seeing that role evolve into a principal power mediator role. However, domestic politics as well as previous hesitations in letting Turkey assume the third party role may limit Turkey's success.

The second Iraq War in 2003 was a major development that allowed for Turkey to play a more central role in the Middle East. The Iraq war undoubtedly changed the regional geopolitical scene in a variety of manners. The first was the increase of Arab rivalries and the creation of a vacuum in regional political matters (Altunisik and Cuhadar, 2010 : 373). Furthermore, the decline of typical regional powerhouses like Egypt and Iraq allowed for states such as Turkey and Iran to fill those gaps. Iran's growing power in the region was a huge concern for the international community and in particular the U.S. Turkey was able to capitalize on their issues by engaging in a more direction-oriented role in regional conflicts. This created new issues for Syria as well. In the post-Iraq War Middle East, Syria found itself extremely isolated and accused of being a member of the so called 'Axis of Evil'. Syria remained a major weak spot for regional and Turkish security (Altunisik and Cuhadar 2010: 374). Yet, at the time Turkey had what could be deemed as somewhat warming relations with Syria and therefore was able to create a new way in which to be useful to the West.

Domestically, Turkey was outperforming all of its regional rivals as far as economic performance and military might were concerned. Subsequently, Turkey was often thought of as a bridge between Western and Eastern civilizations (Yanik, 2009). Turkish politicians were fond of using the 'bridge' imagery

which instilled a sense of Turkish 'exceptionalism' and at the same time created a legitimate platform for Turkey to conduct its mediations for actors from different civilizations (Yanik, 2009: 532). This works well with what Smith and Smock advocate for, 'creating a balance between parties'. Turkey as the sole NATO member in the Middle East can act as a bridge in engaging with Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, the Free Syrian Army and other secondary actors in the region.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring beginning in 2011 there were those in Ankara who felt that Turkey had a chance to push forth "Turkey's unification with the Middle East" (Pieper, 2013; 88). Turkey has an opportunity to promote its role as a regional power with increased influence. Prime Minister Erdogan and foreign minister Davutoglu were spreading a "vision of a country which no longer depends on Europe, whose future lies in its neighboring and broader vicinity and as whose natural epicenter is universally acknowledged (Pieper, 2013; 88). Turkey saw the overthrow of despotic regimes as a chance for more legitimate, accountable and effective regimes. Turkey could be held up as the ideal; an Islamic, democratic country who remained politically secular unlike theocratic Iran.

Concurrently, as ISIS, Assad and the Free Syrian Army continue to wage violence, the international community's best option is to disengage from both ISIS and Assad for the time being and in essence, "let it burn". There have been some positive signs recently that ISIS has been slowed, but it is still too early to tell if their counter-moves will be effective. The current siege of the city of Kobane perfectly encapsulates the situation in Syria today. The besieged city on the Turkish border is on the brink of collapse, followed by US airstrikes and an influx of

Kurdish fighters. As mentioned, this is where the strategy for ripeness lays. We see reluctance from Turkey to get involved, yet as recently as October they allowed Peshmerga fighters to cross into Syria across the Turkish border (Fahim and Shoumali, 2014). This decision can be seen as a drastic shift on the part of the Turkish government. Ironically, Turkey's "let it burn" strategy relating to Syria has angered some of the U.S. and Kurdish leaders. Yet, Turkish Foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu said that the Turkish government was now helping the Peshmerga cross over into Kobani (Shoumali and Kamil, 2014). This decision, along with U.S. airstrikes and weapons drops, has renewed hope in this region. This strategy is what the Obama administration has called for: air strikes and local forces providing boots on the ground.

Ibrahim Kalin, Deputy Secretary General of the Presidency of Turkey, stated in an op-ed piece for the WSJ that Turkey will cooperate with the U.S. and other allies to properly train and equip what they deem as moderate Syrian opposition fighters. He also went on to argue that "peace, security and stability in Syria cannot be established with the Assad regime remaining in power" (Kalin, 2014). Kalin contends that it was Assad's war that created a vacuum in which ISIS was allowed to flourish.

Moreover, the U.S. needs to acknowledge that there is a clear connection between ISIS and the Assad regime. This connection is a primary concern for existing regional actors, and in some cases more of a concern than ISIS itself (Omar, 2014). The lack of pressure put on Assad during the beginning of the Arab Spring is a sore spot for many Arab nations. Without a clear stratagem for dealing with Assad there can be no worthwhile agreement on ISIS. Manal Omar, writing for the USIP, argues that the U.S. "should address the fact that they are concerned about

Syria and acknowledge that the Islamic State and Assad are interconnected problems" (Omar, 2014). In doing so, it would create a more trustworthy relationship between the U.S. and the Middle Eastern actors involved. By creating dialogue and establishing a resolve in bringing down Assad, the U.S. will then be able to create the strong partnership it needs in creating a strategy to ripen the conflict.

The U.S. must also do more to convince Arab states and Turkey that participating in the coalition will not endanger them. In fact, they should embrace the coalition as there is no escaping ISIS attacks simply by being Muslim. Omar contends that their input is absolutely essential in putting an end to the violence and bloodshed in the Middle East (Omar, 2014). Bringing the hesitant Arab states to the fold would not only be a boost militarily, it would provide much needed legitimacy in the region. Moderate, predominantly Islamic states can counter the highly effective, dangerous propaganda that has been established with ISIS. Omar suggests that they do so by "framing the fight against the militant group as a battle to protect the honor and name of Islam, and by standing at the forefront of a strong coalition, they can negate and repudiate (if only in this case) the common perception that their foreign policy is dictated by the U.S. (Omar, 2014).

Aside from bringing Turkey and the Kurds to the negotiating table, there is much work to be done by UNDP in Turkey to alleviate the stress of refugees. The UNDP program, Mitigating the Impact of the Syria Crisis on Turkish Communities in the Southern Anatolia Region is helping to further the resilience and absorption capacity of Turkish communities in the southern border areas affected by the Syria crisis (Kilis, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa). It is tasked with ensuring sta-

bility and avoiding any escalation of tensions between Turks and Syrian refugees (UNDP 2013).

There are a limited number of ways to create “entry points” where mediators can begin to work with a conflict. Crocker et al. delineate four separate categories:

“1) a geopolitical shift in the external environment may directly impinge on the calculations of the parties and their allies; 2) a dramatic shift may occur in the conflict’s internal dynamics as a result of a sharp escalation in the fighting or the prospect of descending into a deeper and bloodier abyss; 3) a major change in the leadership structure of one or more parties may create openings for vigorous mediation initiatives; 4) a new mediator arrives on the scene with the skills, resources, connections, and creativity to get the warring parties’ attention” (Crocker et al., 2004: 94).

Turkey has increasingly called for the ousting of Assad and called the Assad regime an illegitimate one, with Prime Minister Erdogan even calling for Assad to step down (Pieper 2013; 89). If the international community can unite in its efforts to, at the very least, acknowledge that more needs to be done to topple Assad, Turkey will be more willing to intervene in the fight against ISIS. If the P.K.K. can be contained and a new Kurdish leadership can assure Ankara that they have no desire for independence, there can also be increased support for Kurdish fighters.

## **Conclusion**

The Syrian conflict remains as fractal and convoluted as ever. Furthermore, the conflict consists of close guerilla-style fighting, assassinations, massacres, horrific sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, direct targeting of civilians and very little in the way of set bat-

les. Most of the factions involved seem to be avoiding battles if at all possible. There are three fundamental changes that have taken place in Syria that have had a major impact on the region as the conflict drags into its fourth year. The first is the decidedly ethno-sectarian bent the conflict has taken on. Kurdish, Turkish, Christian, Druze, Bedouin as well as Shia fighters have all taken up arms against Sunni extremists. Secondly, these rival factions of opposition groups have also fought each other. Third, major parts of Syria have been lost by the Assad regime in Damascus, which has allowed Kurdish groups like the PYD to declare autonomous Kurdish zones (Lawson, 2014; 1356). These three factors have led to members of ethnic and religious minorities to cross borders and directly involve themselves in the conflict. Because of this, the regional uncertainties have led the Turkish and Iraqi governments to become more assertive politically when they find themselves confronted with conflict potentially spilling over their borders (Lawson 2014; 1356). Based on this logic, the likelihood of Turkey and the Kurds becoming more involved in the conflict in Syria is increasing daily, potentially creating an entry point for there to be a mediation process in this horrific conflict.



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## **An Examination of the Islamic Textual Evidences for Peaceful Relations Among Muslims and Christians**



Kamal-deen Olawale Sulaiman

### **Abstract**

Many Christians and even Muslims are of the opinion that Islam is inherently against any form of friendliness with Christians. In fact, many assume that Islam prescribes the normative relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims to be one of war and intolerance. This paper therefore seeks to examine some of the Islamic textual evidence for peaceful relations among Muslims and Christian. It examine the Islamic textual evidence for friendliness and intimate relationships with the Christians, sanction for interfaith marriage as proof of Islam's promotion of harmonious interfaith relationships, visiting and hosting them, exchanging gifts with them, giving charity (*sadaqah*) and *Zakat al-Fitr* to them etc. The paper is library-oriented research which means data and materials are drawn from books, articles, magazines and relevant websites. The paper reveals that Islam encourages relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly the Christian, to be one of respect and kindness, as practiced by the Prophet (SAW) throughout his mission. It also reveals that Islam sanctions interfaith marriage, visiting and hosting non-Muslims, exchanging gifts with them, giving charity to them and even *Zakat al-Fitr* among numerous others. It is recommended that a Muslim should make his relationship with them conducive for *da'wah* and positive influence, just as he would with a Muslim. Furthermore, Muslims are to safeguard their faith and pursue their own moral and spiritual development, as Allah has warned them to in Qur'an. Hence, Islam respects other people's rights to follow their respective faiths, and "there is no compulsion in religion".

### **Biography**

He holds a Ph.D in Islamic Studies from Lagos-State University Nigeria and also a Lecturer at Department of Religious Studies, Ekiti-State University, Nigeria. His research interest is Islamic Civilization and Contemporary Issues. He has attended various conferences, Seminars, Workshops and he is a member of some learned professional bodies within and outside Nigeria. He has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals that consist of eighteen publications from reputed Universities within Nigeria and twelve publications from Universities outside Nigeria: Europe, Kuala-Lumpur, Lahore, Chitagong, Adis-Ababa, Malaysia, Bridgewater, Pakistan, Rotterdam, Japan, California, and Multan. He also has ten foreign publications by academic research bodies in London, U.S.A, Creece, Ethiopia, Cambridge, India, Canada Australia, Turkey, and New-Delhi. In addition, he has several articles under consideration and many ongoing research works in both foreign and local journals.

## Introduction

Many people are often able to minimally manage their faith until they interact with larger circles of people in places, such as schools or workplaces, and are confronted with many misconceptions about Islam. It is in response to the need for empowering Muslims to not only preserve their religion, but to share its beautiful message with the rest of humanity, that this paper was written.

Muslims live in a world where interactions between people of all faiths and nationalities are increasingly common, whether through travel, television, radio, telephone or the internet. Trade and services now transcend national boundaries, while societies are becoming increasingly multicultural and multi-religious. In this context, peaceful and amicable relations between Muslims and other religious groups are essential not just for the advancement of Muslim societies, but for facilitating better communication and reception of the Islamic message. This *da'wah*-conducive relationship should not compromise Islamic values and the security of Muslims' lives.



Yet many non-Muslims and even Muslims are of the opinion that Islam is inherently against any form of friendliness with those who do not ascribe to the faith. In fact, many assume that Islam prescribes the normative relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims to be one of war and intoler-

ance. This position is commonly pushed by antagonists of Islam for the dual purpose of undermining a Muslim's pride in his faith and a non-Muslim's confidence in having any interactions with Muslims. It is incumbent upon Muslims in today's world to understand the true positive and realistic attitude of Islam to interfaith relations in order to feel uplifted and strengthened against those who may attempt to undermine their faith. Hence, the question discussed in this article is phrased as a non-Muslim might ask it.

## Friendliness and Intimate Relationships with the Christians

The kindness<sup>1</sup> and fair, peaceful relationship spoken of in Qur'an (60:89) applies to all peace-loving non-Muslims, whether they are of monotheistic, polytheistic, or non-religious persuasions.

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1. Hammudah Abdalati, *Islam in Focus* (Riyadh: WAMY 1994), 25.

Regarding the general treatment of non-monotheists, such as the Zoroastrians (*Majus*), the Prophet (SAW) is reported to have said, "Treat them as you treat the People of the Book".<sup>2</sup>

The majority of scholars state that Zoroastrians are polytheists<sup>3</sup> and thus that this precedent "Treat them as you treat the People of the Book"<sup>4</sup> also applies to people of other creeds besides the People of the Book.<sup>5</sup> Hence, the statement of the Prophet (SAW) is interpreted to mean that non-Jews and non-Christians may be treated with the rights, kindness and friendliness accorded to Jews and Christians ("People of the Book").<sup>6</sup>

Though, for moral, ethical and spiritual rea-



sons, marriage to polytheists and eating of their slaughtered meat is not permissible to Muslims<sup>7</sup>, kindness and justice are to be given to all non-Muslims. Disgracing or reviling others' beliefs is forbidden in Islam, as Allah says in the Qur'an, "Do not revile those whom others invoke instead of God, lest they in retaliation revile Allah out of ignorance" (Q.6:108).

The Prophet (SAW) exemplified this in his response when it was said to him, "Pray to Allah against the polytheists and curse them!" The Messenger (SAW) replied, "I have not been sent as the invoker of curses; I have only been sent as a mercy."<sup>8</sup> In another *hadith*, he is also

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2. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam*, (London: Al-Birr Foundation, 2003), 49.

3. *Ibid.*, 49

4. *Ibid.*, 11

5. Sa'id Ramadan, *Islamic Law Its Scope and Equity* (London: Macmillan, 1961), 108.

6. Examples of the Qur'an's use of the expression "Ahl al-Kitab" include 2:105,2:109,2:144-146,2:159,2:213,29:4647,3:100,3:110,3:113,4:123, etc.

7. See Q.60:10 and 2:221.

8. Muslim bin al-Hujjaj bin Muslim al-Qushairi: *Sahih Muslim* (Cairo, 1393A.h) No.1192.

reported to have said, "I have been sent to join ties of relationship"<sup>9</sup>; and when Aisha wanted to retort to some Jews who had insulted the Prophet he said to her, "O Aisha, be gentle and beware of being harsh and of saying evil things"<sup>10</sup>.

This considerate relationship is extended to the permission for Muslim men to marry upright or chaste Christian or Jewish women ("People of the Book")<sup>11</sup>. Muslims are also allowed to eat meat slaughtered by Jews or Christians.<sup>12</sup>

## Interfaith Marriage

The fact is that Islam tolerates a Muslim man initiating and having a relationship as close and intimate as that of marriage with a Christian or Jewish woman provided they are *Abhal:Kitab* and chaste: "...Lawful unto you in marriage are chaste women among the People of the Book..." (Qur'an 5:6).

In spite of the difference in faith, this verse points to the extent of the expressions of love and kindness that a Muslim is allowed to offer some non-Muslims. It is also proof that Islam does allow genuine friendship with non-Muslims, for marriage is a relationship that the Qur'an characterizes as one of "tranquility" and "mutual love and mercy" (Q.30:21), qualities that also characterize the closest of friends.<sup>13</sup>

However, it is not a relationship that is considered particularly desirable for several reasons:

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9. *Ibid*, No. 410

10. Al-Bukhari, Abu 'Abdullah Muhammad bin Ismail: *Ai-Jami al-Sahib (Sahib al-Bukhari)*, (Cairo), vol.8, no.410.

11. See Qur'an, 5: 5.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Relations with Non-Muslims*, Islamic Education Trust, Nigeria, 1430/2009, 50.

- (a) Since it is not lawful for Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men, they could find themselves without husbands if the practice of taking non-Muslim wives is widespread among Muslims. This would be very unfair to Muslim women.

(b) A non-Muslim wife of a Muslim has the right to continue practicing her religion, and the husband is not allowed under the Shari'ah to put force or pressure on her to change. She is therefore presumed to believe that Muhammad (SAW) was not a Prophet, and that Islam is a false religion! It is hard to see how this relationship can aid in the spiritual development of either the husband or the children. Indeed if she is committed to her own religion she is most likely to pass it on consciously or unconsciously, openly or secretly, to her children, since the mother is the first teacher, and early training goes deep. Moreover, in a predominantly non-Muslim environment it would make their Islamic upbringing extremely difficult.

(c) Islam being a world-view and a value system based on the Qur'an, the Hadith and the Shari'ah, which the wife does not recognize or accept as true, there are likely to be conflicts of values, rights and responsibilities between the spouses.<sup>14</sup>

For all these reasons, it is desirable for Muslim men to marry Muslim women, (including converts to Islam), rather than women of other religions however attractive they may be.

### Trusting Non-Muslims

The Qur'an makes mention of the fact that Muslims are trustworthy. Qur'an 3:75 states:

Among the People of the Book are some who, if entrusted with a board of gold, will (readily) pay it back; others, who, if entrusted with a single silver coin, will not repay it unless you constantly stand over them demanding it.

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14. Ibid.

Seeking help from non-Muslims was also done at the time of the Prophet (SAW) and is thus permissible provided it does not endanger or compromise Islamic values and principles. For example, non-Muslims may be consulted and assigned some positions of trust in technical matters at private or governmental level, such as in the fields of Medicine, Transport (e.g. pilots of air carriers), Agriculture, Industry, Military equipment, etc. In such areas, however, it is also encouraged that Muslims should collectively strive to attain some autonomy and independent strength *vis a vis* their status in comparison to non-Muslim states, in pursuit of greater social equity and effective political and economic inter-dependence in the world.

The Prophet (SAW) employed Abdullah ibn Uraiqit, a polytheist, to be his guide on his "Hijira" (i.e. "flight; migration") from *Makkah* to *Madinah*. Aisha narrated that:

The Prophet and Abubakr employed a man from the tribe of Bani Ad-Dail and the tribe of Bani 'Abu bin 'Adi as a guide. He was an expert guide and he broke the oath contract which he had to abide by with the tribe of Al-'Asi bin Wail, and he was of the religion of *Quraysh* pagans. The Prophet and Abubakr had confidence in him and gave him their

riding camels and told him to bring them to the Cave of *Thaur* after three days. So, he brought them their two riding camels after three days and both of them (The Prophet and Abubakr) set out accompanied by 'Amir bin Fuhaira and the Dili guide who guided them below Makkah along the road leading to the sea-shore.<sup>15</sup>

A person's state of unbelief, therefore, does not necessarily mean that he is untrustworthy. The Prophet's life was at stake yet this particular polytheist was trustworthy, and the Prophet trusted him. Other trusted non-Muslims included Abu Talib, the Prophet's beloved uncle, who gave the Prophet security in Makkah, and Mut'im bin 'Adi, who was one of the leaders of Makkah that sympathized and helped the Prophet (SAW) especially during the years of the Boycott by the Makkans<sup>16</sup>. It is also a well-known historical fact that the Prophet (SAW) trusted the Christian

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15. Al-Bukhari, Abu 'Abdullah, ... Op.cit., vol.3, hadith no.464.

16. Salim Al-Bahnasawy, Non-Muslims in the Shari'ah of Islam (Egypt: Dar an-Nashr lil-Jami'at, 2004), 67.

Ethiopian King, Negus, with the lives of the first group of Muslim refugees escaping persecution from the polytheists of Makkah<sup>17</sup>.

Also, a credible Jew or Christian who has medical expertise may treat a sick Muslim<sup>18</sup>. Such a person may, likewise, be entrusted with funds or other financial transactions. We find in a sound *hadith* that the Prophet, peace be upon him, hired a polytheist as a guide at the time of his migration to *Madinah*, so he entrusted him with his life and money. The people of the tribe of Khuza'ah, who

were both Muslims and Non-Muslims, acted as scouts for the Messenger of Allah, (SAW). It is also reported that the Prophet, peace be upon him, ordered Muslims to seek treatment from Al-Harith ibn Mldah, who was a disbeliever. But when a Muslim physician with the expertise is available, one should seek his or her treatment and not turn to anyone else. The same applies when one has to entrust a person with funds or deal with him in business. If a Muslim has to confide in or turn to someone from the people of the Book for medical treatment, he may do so. It is not prohibited to befriend Jews and Christians. And when the Muslim has an opportunity to talk to them, he should address them in ways that are polite and sincere. Indeed, Allah, the Exalted, says: "And do not argue with the people of the Book, except in ways that are best." (Qur'an 29:46) In a *hadith* on the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah, Abu Al-Khattab tells us that, the Prophet, peace be upon him, sent a man of the Khuza'ah tribe to gather intelligence, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, accepted his report despite the fact that he was a disbeliever. This proves, that it is quite permissible to take the advice of a non-believing physician for diagnosis and treatment, provided he is not suspected and his fidelity is not doubtful.<sup>18</sup> Even as late in the sequence of revelation as the Farewell Hajj, the Prophet (SAW) asked Al-Harith ibn Kildah, a non-Muslim physician, to treat the illness of Sad ibn Abi Wagqas<sup>19</sup>. Trustworthiness, therefore, is an essential factor to consider when seeking the assistance of a non-Muslim, or anyone else for that matter.

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17. Safiur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, Al-Raheeq al-Makhtum (The Sealed Nectar: Biography of the Noble Prophet), (Riyadh: Darussalam Publications, 2002), 118-123.

18. As – Sayyid Sabiq: Fiqh Us-Sunnah (Beirut Lebanon, Darul –Fikr 1992), vol.4, hadith no.6A.

19. Salim Al-Bahnasawy, Non-Muslims in the ... Op. cit., 67.

## Non-Muslims were allowed into the Mosque of the Prophet (SAW)

The respect Islam has for non-Muslims is such that the Prophet (SAW) endorsed receiving non-Muslim guests in his Mosque. For example, in the year 10 A.H.<sup>20</sup> the 'Year of Deputations', the Prophet (SAW) received about 60 Christian delegates from Najran.<sup>21</sup> "They ate, slept, and were even permitted to pray in the Prophet's Mosque in Madinah.<sup>22</sup>" This shows the extent of respect the Prophet (SAW) had for the right of these Christians to practice their faith. Reports also indicate that he received some pagans of Banu Tha'qif from Taif in his Mosque in 9A.H.<sup>23</sup> It is also said that their "tent was erected in the corner of the mosque so that they could listen to the Qur'an and see the people in prayer<sup>24</sup>.

Furthermore, the *hadith* collection of Imam Bukhari has records of non-Muslim prisoners of war who were held in the mosque<sup>25</sup>. According to Imam al-Shafi'i, "If a polytheist could sleep in a mosque, then definitely a Muslim can," and in *al-Mukhtasar* it states, "There is no harm in a polytheist staying in any mosque except in the Masjid al-Haram Inviolable Mosque of Makkah."<sup>26</sup>

Some Muslims unfortunately quote Q.9:17-18 as evidence for the prohibition of non-Muslims entering mosques. The verses read:

20. Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Qur'an*, (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), 76.

21. Ibn al-Qayyim, *Abkam An al-Dbimmab*, (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm Lilmalayin, 1964), 691.

22. Saeed Ismaeel, *The Relationship between Muslims and Non-Muslims* (Al-Attique International Islamic Publishing, Lagos: Sawtul Haqq, 2000), 59.

23. Imtiaz Ahmad, "Friendship with Non-

Muslims" in *Speeches for an Inquiring Mind* (Madinah: Al-Rasheed Printers, 2001), 57.

24. S. F. Al-Mubarakpuri, *The Sealed Necter (r-Rabeequl Makhtum)*, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Darussalam, 2002, 523.

25. Al-Bukhari, Abu 'Abdullah, ... *Op. cit.*, vol. 5, no.658.

26. Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh us-Sunnah*, ... *Op. cit.*, vol2, no. 73a.

It does not befit those who ascribe divinity to any other than Allah, to maintain the mosques of Allah... The mosques of Allah shall be visited and maintained by only he who believes in Allah and the Last Day, and who is steadfast in his prayers. . .

It is noted that prohibiting non-Muslims from entering all mosques based on this verse is not tenable:

... in view of the fact that in 9H that is, after the revelation of this Surah, the Prophet himself lodged a deputation of the pagan Banu Thagif in the mosque of Medina (Razi). Thus, the above verse expresses no more than the moral incongruity of the unbelievers' "visiting or tending God's houses of worship<sup>27</sup>.

Ibn Kathir notes that what is prohibited for non-Muslims to enter is [only] the *Masjid al-Haram* (the Inviolable Mosque in Makkah).<sup>28</sup>

## Visiting and Hosting Non-Muslims

Visiting non-Muslims is not only permissible but an encouraged act of *da'wab* and relationship-building. Imam Bukhari, for in-



stance, records that Anas said, "A Jewish boy used to serve the Prophet (SAW). Once he fell ill and the Prophet (SAW) visited him and said to him, 'Embrace Islam.' So he did."<sup>29</sup> "Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab narrated that the Prophet (SAW) also visited his uncle Abu Talib when he was ill<sup>30</sup>.

Muslims are also permitted to accept invitations from non-Muslims if it does not cause any harm to anyone, just as the Prophet demonstrated (SAW). For instance, Anas ibn Malik narrated that:

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27. Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Qur'an ... Op. cit.*, .258, n.27.

28. Ibn Kathir Abu 'l- Fida Ismail; *Tafsiru 'l- Qur'an 'l- A'zim* (Daru l- Kutubi 'l- 'Arabiyah (Cairo,)), vo1.4, 388.

29. Salim Al-Bahnasawy, *Non-Muslims in the ... Op. cit.*, 57.

30. Al-Bukhari, Abu 'Abdullah, ... *Op. cit.*, vol 7.

Allah's Messenger (SAW) had a neighbour who was a Persian [a Zoroastrian], and he was an expert in the preparation of soup. He prepared (soup) for Allah's Messenger (A) and then came to him to invite him (to that feast). He (SAW) said, is Aisha (and you should also invite her to the meal). "He said, 'No, "then Allah's Messenger also said, 'No (then I cannot join the feast). "He (the Persian) returned to invite him, and Allah's Messenger said, "She (Aisha) is also here." He said, 'No" whereupon Allah's Messenger also said, 'No" (and declined his offer). He (the Persian) returned another time to invite him and Allah's Messenger again said, "She is also here." He (the Persian) said, 'Yes" on the third occasion. Then he accepted his invitation, and both

of them set out and went to his house<sup>31</sup>.

Finally, Muslims are allowed to host non-Muslims in their homes. A frequently cited example is the report of Asma', the daughter of Abubakr, who said, "My mother came to me and she is a polytheist. I said, 'O Messenger of Allah, if my mother came to me and she is willing, do I establish a link with her?' He said, 'Yes, establish a link with your mother<sup>32</sup>." The kind of relationship that is prohibited between a Muslim and non-Muslim is that which makes a Muslim compromise the essential teachings of Islam, and do what Islam prohibits.

### Exchanging Gifts with Non-Muslims

It is a time-honoured tradition of Muslims to give gifts, irrespective of the religion of the recipient, and numerous hadith narrations abound to this effect. For example, Mujahid narrated that Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-'As slaughtered a sheep and said, "Have you presented a gift from it to my neighbor, the Jew, for I heard the Apostle of Allah (SAW) say, Jibril kept on commending the neighbor to me such that I thought he would make him an her?"<sup>33</sup> Umm Salamah also narrated that the Prophet told her, "I have sent al-Najashi [the Abyssinian king] a robe and some milk".<sup>34</sup>

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31. Muslim bin al-Hujjaj bin Muslim ... *Op. cit.*, no. 958.

32. Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh us-Sunnah ... Op. cit.*, vol.3, no.103a.

33. Abu Da'ud, Sulaiman bin al -Ash'ath al- Sijistani: *Sunan Abi Da'ud*, (Cairo, 1372 A.H), no.2446.

34. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Lawful and ... op. Cit*, 317

True friendly relations entail reciprocal exchanges of friendship. Accordingly, receiv-

ing gifts from non-Muslims is also permissible to a Muslim. A well-known case from the lifetime of the Prophet (SAW) has been reported:

When Salman Al-Farisy first came to Al-Madinah, he was not yet a Muslim. He knew that the Prophet (SAW) was dignified and would not accept charity. He entered upon the Prophet (SAW) and said, respect your dignity and I present a gift to you, not a Sadaqah (charity). "The Prophet (SAW) extended his hand and ate, and so did the Companions. Al-Hafiz Al-Iraqi commented on this saying, "This hadith shows the lawfulness of accepting gifts from a polytheist as Salman had not embraced Islam at that time<sup>35</sup>.

Moreover, it is reported that the Prophet (SAW) accepted gifts from non-Muslim kings."<sup>36</sup>

### Giving Charity (*Sadaqah*) to Non-Muslims

A Muslim is free and even encouraged to give his wealth to any one he so wishes, particularly the needy and his blood relatives without regard to faith. The Messenger of Allah said, "Whoever believes in Allah and in the Hereafter should take care of his neighbor,"<sup>37</sup> and "Jiblib continued to remind me of the neighbor's rights till I thought he would tell me that the neighbor inherits from his neighbor."<sup>38</sup>

When the Prophet (SAW) first migrated to Madinah, and was concerned about the meager resources available to assist those in poverty, he instructed his Companions to give charity only to those who accepted Islam."<sup>39</sup> In correction of this Prophetic

instruction, Allah revealed the verse:

35. Salim-Al-Bahnasawy, *Non-Muslims in the ... Op. cit.*, 68.
36. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Lawful and ... Op. cit.*, 317.
37. Al-Bukhari, Abu 'Abdullah ... *Op. cit.*, vo1.8, no.29.
38. Ibid, vo1.8, no.27; See also no.28.
39. Ibn Kathir Abu 'l- Fida Ismail; *Tafsiru ... Op. cit.*, 63.

It is not for thee (O Prophet) to make people follow the right path, since it is God alone who guides whom He wills; and whatever good you may spend on others is for your own good provided you spend only out of a longing for God's guidance. For whatever good you may spend will be repaid unto you in full and you will not be wronged. (Q.2:272)

The Prophet then explicitly enjoined Muslims to give charity to all who needed it, irrespective of faith<sup>40</sup>. Also, there is full agreement among all commentators that the above verse... lays down an injunction binding upon all Muslims<sup>41</sup>. In fact, Imam al-Razi derives from this verse the conclusion that withholding charity must never become a means of attracting unbelievers to Islam, for faith, in order to be valid, must be based on conviction and free choice<sup>42</sup>.

Ibn Kathir states on the issue of one's charity possibly being used for un-Islamic purposes (if one gives to a non-Muslim):

'Ata Al-Khurasani said that the *ayah* ["verse"] means, "You give away charity for the sake of Allah. Therefore, you will not be asked about the deeds [or wickedness] of

those who receive it." This is a sound meaning... [The giver] will not be asked if the charity unintentionally reached righteous, evil, deserving or undeserving persons, for he will be rewarded for his good intention. The proof to this statement is the *ayah*, "And whatever you spend in good, it will be repaid to you in full, and you shall not be wronged"<sup>43</sup>.

In addition to Q.2:272, Allah praises those who, "... give food, despite their love for it, to the poor and orphans and captives" (Q.76:8). Ibn Abi' Shaybah observes that, "Captives in Muslim society were obviously unbelievers, as reported by al-Hasan and others"<sup>44</sup>.

40. M. Asad, *The Message of the Qur'an* (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), 61.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibn Kathir Abu 'l- Fida Ismail; *Tafsiru ... Op. it.*, 63-64.

44. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al -Zakat*. Trans. from Arabic by Dr. Monzer Kahf (London: Dar al-Tagwa, 1999), 449.

"The term *asf*r denotes anyone who is a "captive" either literally (e.g., a prisoner) or figuratively, i.e., a captive of circumstances which render him helpless; thus, the Prophet said, "Thy debtor is thy captive; be, therefore, truly kind to thy captive". The injunction of kindness towards all who are in need of help and therefore "captive" in one sense or another applies to believers and non-believers alike.<sup>45</sup>

One can give *sadaqa* to the dhimmi<sup>46</sup> and the (non-Muslim) soldier, and one is rewarded for that. Allah praised a group of people (for this) when He said, "And they feed, for His love, the indigent, the orphan, and the captive" [Q. 76:8]. The captive is a [non-Muslim] soldier..."<sup>47</sup>

The Prophet's example was one of regular charity towards Muslims and non-Muslims. The works of *Seerah* (History of the Prophet) record that during the peace treaty of *Hudaibiyyah*, the Prophet (SAW) gave 500 dinars as financial assistance to Abu Sufyan (the leader of Makkah) for the poor of the predominantly idol worshipping Makkans during their period of famine<sup>48</sup>. This gesture demonstrates the fact that Islam encourages the consolidation of peaceful relationships with non-Muslims.

### Giving *Zakat al-Fitr* to Non-Muslims

*Zakat al-Fitr* was made obligatory in the month of Sha'ban in the second year of the *Hijra*. Its purpose is to purify one who fasts from any indecent act or speech and to help the poor and needy. This view is based upon the *hadith* reported by Abu Dawood, Ibn Majah, and al- Daraqutni from Ibn Abbas. The Messenger of Allah (SAW) enjoined *Zakatal-Fitr* on the one who fasts, to shield one's self from any indecent act or speech and for the purpose of providing food for the needy. It is accepted as *Zakah* for the person who pays it before the *'Eid Salah*, and it is *sadaqa* for the one who pays it after the *Salah*<sup>49</sup>.

45. M. Asad, *The Message of the Qur'an ... Op. cit.*, 916.

46. A Non-Muslim subject of an Islamic state, protected by a covenant.

47. Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh us-Sunnab ... Op. cit.*, vo1.13, no.103a.

48. Imtiaz Ahmad, "Friendship with ..." *Op. cit.*, 56.

49. Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh us-Sunnah*, ... *Op. cit.*, vol.3, no.87a.

It further explains that *Zakat al-Fitr*, expiation (*kaffara*) and vows are like voluntary charity as far as giving to People of the Pledge is concerned. Abu Hanifa, Muhammad, and some other jurists permit paying these charities to People of the Pledge on the grounds that texts about these charities are general, such as the *ayah* [verses],

If you make your sadaqa public, that is good. But if you conceal it and give it to the poor, that is better for you, and We will erase some of your bad actions from you" (2:271), and "The expiation in that case is to feed ten poor people with the average amount you feed your family" (5:92), and "And anyone who is unable to do that must feed sixty poor people (58:4).

These *ayahs* make no distinction between poor believers and unbelievers, which is an expression of the generally required good treatment of the People of the Pledge. Obviously these scholars believe it is undoubtedly better to give to the Muslim poor since it helps a person who obeys Allah. Abu Hanifa established the condition that an unbeliever must not be fighting against Muslims in order to be given *Zakat al-Fitr*. Lastly, Abu Ubayd and Ibn Abi Shayba report that some followers [of the Companions of the Prophet] gave monks *Zakat al-Fitr*<sup>50</sup>.

### Giving Zakat to Non-Muslims

The Qur'an states:

Alms are for the poor and needy, and those who are in charge thereof (to administer it), and those hearts are being reconciled, and for those who are in bondage, and those who are in debt, and in the cause of Allah, (and for) the wayfarer. This is an ordinance from Allah, and Allah is All-Knowing, Wise (Q.9:60).

This verse is the basis for the establishment of *Zakat* in Islam.

50. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Zakat*. Trans... *Op. cit.*, 449.

Muslim scholars unanimously agree that "Zakat cannot be paid to non-Muslims that fight Muslims."<sup>51</sup> This *ijma'* (consensus) is based on the verse: "God only forbids you to turn in friendship towards such as fight against you because of our faith, and drive you forth from your homelands, or aid others in driving you forth..." (Q.60:9). This is because financial help to enemies could be used against Islam in one way or another.

The majority of Muslim scholars believe that, with the exception of "those whose hearts are being reconciled," *Zakat* should not be given to any non-Muslim.<sup>52</sup> This majority view is founded on the *hadith* narrated by *Mu'adh*, that the Prophet (SAW) instructed him, "Allah prescribed *Zakat* on their wealth to be taken from the rich among them and rendered to the poor among them," in which the word "*them*" is interpreted to refer to Muslims. This *hadith* is agreed upon as authentic<sup>53</sup>.

However, in the view of other scholars:

...this *hadith* does not clearly exclude the non-Muslim poor since it may simply mean that *Zakat* should



be collected and distributed in the same area. This hadith is often quoted to support the policy of non--transportation of *Zakat* from one land to another<sup>54</sup>.

Indeed, the manner in which the narrator, Mu'adh, implemented the Prophet's instruction indicates that he interpreted the word "them" to mean everyone in the region (and not just the Muslims). It is also notes that, "Mu'adh implemented this instruction by dividing Yemen into regions in such a way that *Zakat* was collected and distributed within each region autonomously. He wrote letters to the effect that *Zakat* be distributed within the same clan

51. *Ibid*, 447.

52. *Ibid*, 449.

53. *Ibid.*, 451.

54. *Ibid*.

from which it was collected." <sup>55</sup>

Non-Muslims are included in at least one of the categories of the recipients of *Zakat*. While prescribing laws for the distribution of *Zakat*, the Qur'an includes among the recipients those "whose hearts are being reconciled" (in Arabic, "*mu'allafat qulubuhum*").

The following *hadith* indicates how this category was treated by the Prophet (SAW). Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab narrated that Safwan ibn Umayyah said, "By Allah, when the Prophet gave to me, he was the person I hated most. He continued to give to me until he became the person I loved the most."<sup>56</sup> Also, Those whose hearts are being reconciled were often pagan Bedouins whom the Prophet (SAW) used to reconcile through giving *Zakat* in order to bring them to faith.<sup>57</sup> From these and other accounts,

"those whose hearts are being reconciled" include "persons who have recently become Muslims or who need to strengthen their commitment to this faith, and individuals whose evil can be forestalled or who can benefit and defend Muslims."<sup>58</sup>

Some jurists are of the view that this clause is inoperative after the time of the Prophet (SAW).<sup>59</sup> Their views are based on a precedent of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab who cancelled the payment of *Zakat* towards some recipients of this category.<sup>60</sup> Some other prominent scholars of the past and present, however, are of the view that this injunction is operative even today.<sup>61</sup> It

55. Imam al-Shawkani, *Nayl al-Antar* Vol.2, (Al-Halabi Publishers, n.d.), 161.

56. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Zakat*. ... *Op. cit.*, 377.

57. *Ibid.*, 380.

58. *Ibid.*, 377.

59. *Ibid.*, 381.

60. *Ibid.*, 382.

61. A. Mawdudi, *Tafsir alQur'an*, vol.2 (Delhi: 1983), 9.

mentions that scholars that view the applicability of the verse as permanent include al-Zuhri, Abu Ja'far al-Baghir, Qadi Ibn al-'Arabi, al-Khattabi, Ibn Qudama, one group of Malikis, and the followers of the Hanbali, Zaydi and Ja'fari Schools of Thought.<sup>62</sup>

It also expounds: Allah mentions reconciliation of hearts among the categories of *Zakat* -s pending and the Prophet (SAW) used to give generously for reconciliation, as stated in famous reports. He continued to do this until he died. It is unacceptable to abandon the Book of Allah and the tradition of the Messenger (SAW) except by authentic annulment from Allah or His Messenger, and annulment is not confirmed by mere possibility. Moreover, such annulment could only take place during the life of the Prophet

(SAW), because the texts required for annulment ceased to be revealed upon his death. A text in the Qur'an can only be annulled by another text in the Qur'an itself, there is no such text. By what virtue is one asked to abandon Qur'an and *Sunnah* and revert to mere human opinion or the statements of a Companion? Scholars do not consider a statement of a Companion strong enough to stand in opposition to analogy, so how could such an opinion stand against the Qur'an and *Sunnah*? Al-Zuhri also says, "I know of nothing that annuls the category of those whose hearts are being reconciled." Lastly, Umar's action does not contradict the Qur'an or *Sunnah* since, when Muslims do not need those individuals who were paid in the past, they may choose to cease such payment, and if the need arises in the future to pay the same individuals or others, that can be done. In reality, this principle applies to all categories. A category may not exist at a certain time, but that does not mean it is eliminated because it may exist at some later time.<sup>63</sup> It must be noted here that the share of those belonging to this category is not on account of their inability to meet their material needs but for "*reconciliation*" of their hearts."<sup>64</sup>

In spite of this, it is reported that 'Umar interpreted the word "*masakin*" in the verse (Qur'an 9:60): "Alms are for the poor and the needy (*masakin*)..." as non-Muslims<sup>65</sup>. Ibn Abi Shayba

62. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Zakat*, *Op. cit.*, 380-386.

63. *Ibid.*, 385-386.

64. Said Ramadan, *Islamic Law: ... Op. cit.*, 133.

65. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj* (Cairo, 1382 A.H.), 144.

also cites 'Umar's comment that the verse includes People of the Pledge ("*Ahl al-Ahd*")

<sup>66</sup> who are chronically ill.<sup>67</sup> Al-Tabari reports that 'Ikrimah understood the word "needy" to refer to the poor among the People of the Book.<sup>68</sup> Other scholars who allowed the paying of Zakat to non-Muslims include Ibn Sirin and Al-Zuhri.<sup>69</sup> Zafar, a student of Abu Hanifa, also sanctioned it for People of the Pledge.<sup>70</sup>

There are some reports which suggest that the needy among non-Muslims were helped from the collective Zakat funds during the early days of Islam<sup>71</sup>. It is recorded that 'Umar even ordered the payment of a monthly allowance from the treasury to a Jew when he saw him begging from door to door, on the grounds that he was covered by the categories of Q:9:60.<sup>72</sup>

In addition, some past and present day scholars still also hold the view that the poor and destitute (and not just "*those whose hearts are to be reconciled*") among non-Muslims may be helped out of the Zakat funds."<sup>73</sup>

### Guarantee of Rights and Protection of Non-Muslim Citizens

The Prophet (SAW) commanded that non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State are to be protected against internal oppression and external aggression. A non-Muslim citizen of an

66. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Zakat*, *Op. Cit.*, 448.

67. *Ibid.*, 450.

68. *Ibid.*, 451.

69. *Ibid.*, 450.

70. *Ibid.*, 450.

71. Abu 'Ubaydah, *Kitab al-Amz'yal* (Cairo, 1353 A.H.), 611-612.

72. Abu Yusuf *Al-Kharaj (n.d.)*, R 126.

73. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-Zakat...Op. cit.*, 447-452.

Islamic state is called a "Dhimmi" (i.e., protected person) <sup>74</sup>." Christians and Jews, along with Magians, Samaritans, Sabians, and later Zoroastrians and others, were treated as minorities under the protection of Islam (*dhimmis*).<sup>75</sup>

Numerous *hadith* enunciate the importance of upholding the rights of a *dhimmi*. On separate occasions, the Prophet (SAW) is reported to have said, "Whoever hurts a *dhimmi*, hurts me, and he who hurts me angers Allah"<sup>76</sup>, "Whoever hurts a *dhimmi*, I am his adversary, and I shall be an adversary to him on the Day of Resurrection"<sup>77</sup>, "On the Day of Resurrection, I shall dispute with anyone who oppresses a person from among the People of the Covenant, or infringes on his right, or burdens him beyond his strength, or takes something from him against his will"<sup>78</sup>, and "Anyone who kills a person from among the people with whom there is a treaty (*mu'ahid*)<sup>79</sup> will not smell the fragrance of Paradise, even though its fragrance extends to a walking distance of forty years"<sup>80</sup>."

It is required for the State to uphold that "they enjoy the same rights we enjoy"<sup>75</sup>. For example, Khalid ibn al-Walid says: I have stipulated that if any one of them becomes unfit to work on account of old age or for some other reason, or if anyone who was formerly rich becomes so poor that his co-religionists have to support him, then all such persons will be exempt from paying the *ji.Uya*<sup>81</sup> and they, together with their dependents, will get a pension from the

74. Sa'id Ramadan, *Islamic Law*. ... *Op. cit.*, 121.

75. Jane L. Smith, "Islam and Christendom: Historical, Cultural and Religious Interaction from the Seventh to the Fifteenth Centuries," *The Oxford History of Islam*. Ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 307.

76. Relations with Non-Muslims ... *Op. cit.*, 50.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.*

79. Sa'id Ramadan, *Islamic Law*... *Op. cit.*, 109-110.

80. Al-Bukhari, Abu 'Abdullah ... *Op. cit.*, *vol.9*, no.49, in *Alim 6. 0*.

81. Salim Al-Bahnasawy, *Non-Muslims* ... *Op. Cit.*, 3.

Islamic Treasury as long as they choose to reside in the Islamic state<sup>82</sup>.

Also, it describes the early Islamic state's practice of *dhimmi* rights as follows:

The specifics of the requirements for Christians who enjoyed *dhimmi* status were spelled out in what has come to be referred to as 'the covenant of Umar,' which exists in several versions and most likely was attributed to rather than designed by the second caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-44). The covenant stipulated prohibition of the building of new churches or repair of those in towns inhabited by Muslims, although in some cases when financing was available Christians did construct new places of worship... *Dhimmis* were allowed to keep their own communal laws, although they could apply to a Muslim judge if they wished. ... Christians occupied high positions in the caliphal courts as physicians, engineers, architects, and translators, and sometimes they were treated as having virtually equal rights with Muslims. Muslim writers and poets sometimes gave great tributes to Christians in their literature<sup>83</sup>.

It is true that Muslim administrations,

however, have at times imposed some inequitable conditions and restrictions upon *dhimmi* communities. It states that this may be explained by the fact that after the lifetime of the early caliphs, the *dhimmi* status seems to have been a changing one, in that laws were made and either broken or forgotten... never free from the whims of individual rulers who might choose to enforce strict regulations, or from the caprice of mobs expressing their passions in prejudicial and harmful ways [as may be observed even today in the policies of non-Muslim dominated nations towards their minorities]. In general, the first Arab Muslim dynasty, that of the Umayyads, was fairly flexible in terms of its Christian citizens, but in Islam's second century the laws became more stringent. Under the reign of the caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-61), laws against *dhimmis* were most severe, sometimes resulting in persecution of Christians as well as of Mu'tazilis, Shiites, and others [Muslim sects] considered opponents of the state. Through the Middle

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82. Sa'id Ramadan, *Islamic Law... Op. cit.*, 123).

83. *Ibid.*, 123.84.

ages there was a hardening of attitudes against *dhimmis*, due more to political than to religious reasons, especially after the period of the Crusades.<sup>84</sup>

Despite these changing attitudes of rulers and the Muslim masses, knowledge of the implicit rights of *dhimmis* in an Islamic state compelled other Muslims to campaign for justice. Examples of this include "the fervent protest of the public, led by Muslim jurists, against the Caliph Walid ibn Yazid when he exiled non-Muslim citizens of Cyprus to Syria"<sup>85</sup>; and the reprimand sent by Imam al-Awza'i to the Governor of Lebanon who exiled some non-Muslim civilians

that lived in the same areas as some armed rebels.

The following extract from the letter that he wrote to him speaks for itself: "*Dhimmis* of the hill-tracts of Lebanon have been exiled and you know the fact. Amongst them are men who had not taken part in the revolt. I fail to understand why common people should be punished for the sins of particular individuals and be deprived of their homes and properties. The Qur'anic injunction is quite clear that ultimately everybody will have to account for his own actions and nobody shall be held responsible for anybody else's actions. This is an eternal and universal injunction, and the best advice therefore, that I can give to you is to remind you of one of the directives of God's Prophet that he himself will stand up as plaintiff against all such Muslims who are unkind to those non-Muslims who have entered into an agreement with them, and tax them beyond endurance."<sup>86</sup>

### Muslim minorities living within Non-Muslim states

When deriving laws, traditional scholars of the Muslim world substantially accommodated local customs and practices in societies that newly embraced Islam<sup>87</sup>. Such scholars as Abu

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84. Jane I. Smith, "Islam and Christendom: ... *Op. cit.*, 308.

85. *Ibid.*, 308-309.

86. Abul-'Ala Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Karachi, Pakistan: Jamaat-e-Islamic Publications, 1955), 99,188.

87. *Ibid.*

Hamid al-Ghazali emphasized the universality and flexibility of Shari'ah<sup>88</sup> and the role



of public interest (*maslaha*) in the revision of rulings (*fatawa*) that were previously deduced only on the basis of analogy with an explicit scriptural ruling.<sup>89</sup>

This flexibility permits rulings specifically for Muslim minorities in a non-Muslim state, in order to foster a positive relationship between Muslims, the state, and fellow citizens. A Muslim living anywhere in the world belongs to the *Ummah* (community of believers), and provided he or she is granted the right to his/her identity and practice of Islam, it is permissible for a Muslim to reside, study or work in a non-Muslim land.<sup>90</sup>

However, in order to be granted entry, he must agree to abide by certain conditions, whether for visa or migration purposes. A Muslim who is born in a non-Muslim land is usually given automatic citizenship and is naturally bound by same agreements, since all believers are characterized as those "who are faithful to their trusts and to their pledges" (*Q.23:8*). Once a Muslim chooses to remain a citizen or resident (rather than migrate to another land), he is required to acknowledge the nation's legislation and conduct himself within the scope of the law. Upon acceptance of these conditions of residence, a Muslim is bound by them, as stipulated by the Islamic rule "*al-muslimoon 'inda shurootihim*" (i.e. "Muslims are bound by their conditions").<sup>91</sup> This obligation on Muslim minorities in non-Muslim lands illustrates Islam's endorsement of peaceful interfaith co-existence.

Moreover, a Muslim should not just be dutiful to his host country but actively contribute towards improving it. This is because Muslims are enjoined to be "*the best nation ever raised for*

89. *Ibid.*

90. Wael B. Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 112-113.

91. Al-Asqalani Ibn Hajar: *Fath al Bari bi Sharh al-Bukhari* (Cairo, 1378 A.H), vo1.7, no.230.

*mankind*' (*Q.3:110*). 'Ikrimah explained this verse, saying, "In the past, people were not secure in other people's lands, but as Muslims people of any color feel secure among you."<sup>92</sup> while Abu al-Su'ud elaborates that, "You are the best community for people, which clearly means helpful to other people."<sup>93</sup> Al-Khatib also says, "A feature of the Muslim nation is that it should not keep any beneficial advantage to itself but should share its benefit with other human societies."<sup>94</sup> These explanations accord with the Prophet's statement, "The best among you is the best towards people,"<sup>90</sup> and the example of the Prophet Yusuf (SAW), who was a foreigner residing in Egypt, and even offered his services at the level of government (*Q12:54-55*).

The obligations of Muslims in non-Muslim lands explains that "the relationship between Muslims living in this land and the dominant authorities in this land is a relationship of peace and contractual agreement of a treaty. This is a relationship of dialogue and a relationship of giving and taking... It is absolutely essential that you respect the laws of the land that you are living in... We have to maintain those things that are particular to us as a community, but we also have to recognize that there are other things that are not particular to us but rather general to the human condition that we can partake in."<sup>95</sup>

Examples of this friendly yet faith-retaining integration may be found throughout the history of Muslim minority groups in non-Muslim lands. Muslims in China, for instance, are celebrated for successfully constructing an

88. T. J. Winter, *British Muslim Identity: Past, problems, prospects* (Cambridge: The Muslim Academic Trust, 2003), 12.

indigenous Muslim identity within the country and making significant contributions to their homeland.<sup>96</sup>

92. Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim* (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1999), 173.

93. Taha Jabir al-Alwani, *Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections* (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2003), 27.

94. *Ibid.*, 28.

95. Taha Jabir al-Alwani ... *Op. cit.*, 2 S.

96. *Ibid.*

### Duty to Non-Muslim Relatives and Parents

Numerous mentions are made in both the Qur'an and *hadith* on the obligations of being considerate and loyal to the ties of kinship, irrespective of the religious background of one's kinsmen. Allah states in the Qur'an: "Be mindful of your duty to Allah in whose name you appeal to one another, and of your obligations in respect of ties of kinship" (Q.4:2). This message is emphasized by the Prophet (SAW) in the following narration: "Anas related that the Prophet said, 'He who desires that his provision be expanded and that his days be lengthened should join ties of kinship.'"<sup>97</sup>

This duty is sustained despite prevailing tensions between family members. Abdullah ibn Amr, for instance, relates that the Holy Prophet (SAW) said, "One who reciprocates in doing good is not the one who upholds the ties of kinship. It is the one who upholds them when the other party severs them."<sup>98</sup> Asma', the daughter of Abubakr, reports, "My mother came to me and she is a polytheist. I said, 'O Messenger of Allah, upon whom be peace, if my mother came to me and she is willing, do I establish a link with her?' He said, 'Yes, establish a link with

your mother."<sup>99</sup> Another version of this tradition states that Asma' said, "My mother has come to see me and she is hoping for something from me. Should I gratify her?' He said, 'Yes, be benevolent towards your mother...'"<sup>100</sup>

Similarly, Abu Dharr relates that the Prophet (SAW) said, "You will soon conquer the land of Egypt. Then treat its people kindly, for there are ties of treaty and kinship with them."<sup>101</sup> When

97. Shaykh Abdullah ibn Bayyah, "Muslims Living in Non-Muslim Lands", [http://sunnah.org/articles/mushms\\_in\\_nonmushm-lands.htm,2005](http://sunnah.org/articles/mushms_in_nonmushm-lands.htm,2005)

98. Ibrahim Ma Zhao-chun, "Islam in China: The Internal Dimension", *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol.7, no.2 (UK: July 1986), 373-383.

99. An-Nawawi, *Riyadh us-Salibein*, no.321, Transl. from Arabic by Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (London: Curzon Press, 1974), 74.

100. *Ibid.* ... *Op. cit.*, no.324, 75.

101. Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh-us-Sunnah*, ... *Op. cit.*, vol.1.3, no. 103a.

Q.26:215 was revealed, Abu Hurairah relates that the Holy Prophet (SAW) summoned the Quraysh and said to them, "O Bani Abd Shams, O Bani Ka'ab ibn Lu'ayy safeguard yourselves against the Fire; O Bani Murrah ibn Ka'ab, safeguard yourselves against the Fire; O Bani Abd Manaf, safeguard yourselves against the Fire, O Bani Hashim, safeguard yourselves against the Fire; O Bani Abdul Muttalib, safeguard yourselves against the Fire; O Fatimah, safeguard thyself against the Fire, for I can avail you nothing against Allah. I have ties of kinship with you, and these I shall continue to honor."<sup>102</sup>

## Conclusion

In this paper, it is revealed that Islam has encouraged relations between Muslims and non-Muslims to be one of respect and kindness, as practiced by the Prophet (SAW) throughout his mission. It is equally revealed that Islam sanctions interfaith marriage, visiting and hosting non-Muslims, exchanging gifts with them, giving charity to them and even Zakat al-Fitr among numerous others. Allah has given Muslims a responsibility to be witnesses unto mankind (*shuhada 'ala al-nas* (Q.2:143), and the best nation rose for mankind (Q.3:110) through their example of goodness (*birr*) and God-consciousness (*taqwa*) (Q.2:177, 189, 44; 3:92; 58:9). It is recommended that a Muslim should make his relationship with them conducive for *da'wah* and positive influence, just as he would with a Muslim. Furthermore, Muslims are to safeguard their faith and pursue their own moral and spiritual development, as Allah has warned in Qur'an. Hence, even though Islam respects other people's right to follow their respective faiths, and "there is no compulsion in religion", Muslims are cautioned to hold strongly to their faith, and not turn away from submission to Allah's will and final guidance to mankind as contained in the message of the last Prophet, Muhammad (SAW). However, those who insist that Islam forbids showing kindness to peaceful non-Muslims would do well to remember Allah's explicit words (Q. 60:8-9).

102. An-Nawawi, *Riyadh us-Saliheen...* *op. cit.*, no.327, 75.

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## **The African Union's Doctrinal and Structural Evolution of maintaining Peace and Security in Africa**

Solomon Hailu



### **Abstract**

The African Union has laid down the doctrinal and structural preparations to maintain peace and security in Africa. The establishment of doctrinal and structural arrangements is an indication of a good first step towards building comprehensive regional security architecture. However, it would be premature to assume that the African Union has reached at operational level of readiness to effectively address turbulent internal conflicts across the continent. Among other things, the Union needs to keep building its technical and operational capabilities in maintaining regional peace and security. These efforts involve more resources from member states, the UN, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), altruistic Philanthropies, international NGOs, donor governments and Multinational Corporations with business stake in Africa.

### **Biography**

Solomon Hailu, Ph.D is an associate professor of International Community Development at the Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He has extensively written on international and regional peacekeeping operations in Africa. His most recent book is *Promoting Collective Security in Africa: the Roles and Responsibilities of the United Nations, African States, Institutions and Western Powers*.



The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was credited for its achievement in unifying the African countries against colonialism and Apartheid. However, the OAU was widely criticized for its failures to resolve conflicts within its member states throughout four decades of its existence. The OAU had essentially ignored intrastate conflicts mainly because of its own doctrine of noninterference in the internal conflicts of member states. Article III of the OAU Charter has effectively restricted the OAU intervention in the internal affairs of member countries.

The OAU's exclusive devotion to the doctrine of non-interference was built on a number of influences. One such influence came from the Pan African Movement ideals of creating greater continental unity. The Pan Africanists alleged that internal conflicts are stumbling blocks to their vision of continental unity by encouraging further disintegration of the continent. They emphatically pressed on the OAU to focus more on the liberation of the African continent from racial and colonial oppression. Such rhetorical solidarity over continental unity and the overriding necessity to complete the liberation of the continent from colonial or white minority rule exhausted the possibilities of internal entities' right to self-determination. The Pan Africanist ideals did not only undermine the legitimacy of internal groups' demands for autonomous rights but also furnished the African states with an exclusive right to crush the separatist movements for fear of posing threat to the leadership and national unity.

The OAU's doctrine of noninterference was further influenced by the United Nations' principles of the sovereign equality and non-interference in member states domestic affairs. Under its sovereignty principle, the UN considers all member states as legal equals in the international system no matter if these

states may be lacking internal legitimacy. The UN allows all member states to exercise equal sovereign right in the conduct of international relations, including the right to establish diplomatic representation in the UN and foreign countries.



The UN adopted the principle of noninterference in the internal conflicts of African member states, partly on the grounds that it would be a violation of their sovereignty if the international body supported internal military struggles arising from challenges to the existing rule. The UN Charter Article 2 (7) clearly states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Similarly, the OAU adopted the UN norm of sovereign equality and noninterference in member states as stipulated in Article III (1) & (2) of its Charter.

The OAU's doctrine of noninterference was further vindicated by the willingness of the superpowers and former colonial powers to accept the OAU member states as sovereign states. From the onset, post-colonial Africa states were exclusively built on external sovereignty which was underwritten by the superpowers and colonial powers. The outside powers accepted the post-independent African rulers as the only legitimate state repre-

sentatives even though they lacked internal recognition.

Clearly, African states did not evolve from within. Most importantly, internal social and political forces were largely excluded from the peaceful process of making their own state. The absence of inclusive political process forced internal forces to consider armed struggle as the only viable option for self-determination. Some groups have been fighting their rulers for equitable access to social and political rights within the existing state structures while others have been engaged in a vicious civil war to create their own independent state. The latter groups felt that they were wrongfully subjected under the existing rule.

The issue of external sovereignty provided the mechanisms through which African rulers claimed the right to manage their domestic power structure as they wished and thus increased the bargaining power that they were able to exercise in international affairs. This means African rulers were able to exploit the support from the external patrons, especially the two superpowers, to suppress their internal oppositions and extend their political tenure throughout the Cold War.

However, the end of Cold War politics brought a dramatic power shift in the African civil wars. That is to say that the sudden withdrawal of the superpowers' military, ideological and financial support to the African regimes led internal insurgencies to regain military momentum over government forces. In some African countries the impact of the end of the Cold War was felt almost immediately. For example, regimes in Ethiopia, Liberia and Somalia were quickly deposed. Regimes in former Zaire, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Burundi crumbled within a few years after the Cold War lid was

officially lifted in 1989. Other African regimes agreed to peaceful political settlement in the face of intense military confrontation with internal forces. Overall, Africa witnessed the biggest number of internal wars in its history during the 1990s and the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Many in Africa and outside have pointed their fingers at the OAU for not doing anything to resolve the widespread internal conflicts across the continent. However, the OAU remained in a complete silence for a couple of reasons. As explained above, the OAU was entangled by its own doctrine of noninterference to deal with conflicts within states. The OAU also lacked a formal regional security mandate and structures to manage and resolve internal conflicts in the continent.

Understanding the OAU's overall institutional setbacks, the member countries began to discuss ways in which the regional level security mandate and structure could be established within the OAU system. In light of that, member states established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution during the OAU summit in Cairo in 1993. The new mechanism was given the mandate to lead and coordinate intervention in the continent.

Although the establishment of the Mechanism was a positive step in the right direction, the Mechanism could not be instrumental in conducting interventions in member states as the doctrine of noninterference continued to impede the new initiative. The Cairo declaration clearly states that the Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, the principle of non-interference had continued to clog the organization.

This underscores the fact that the OAU was not yet prepared to deal with its doctrinal deficiencies. Ideally, the OAU should start designing a new regional security system by overcoming its underlying doctrinal shortcomings. Obviously, overcoming the existing doctrinal constraints involves the critical task of doctrinal revisions and overall organizational reforms. Clearly, such an attempt would work only if member states show a high level political will to commit national resources.

In that endeavor, the OAU heads of State and government began to discuss the need for the continental body to undergo an overall doctrinal reform to effectively handle turbulent intrastate conflicts across the continent. They reached a unanimous agreement to amend the OAU Charter during their Fourth Extraordinary Session in Sirte, Libya in 1999. The Lomé, Togo OAU summit (2000) adopted a new Charter known as the Constitutive Act to replace the OAU Charter. In May 2001, the Constitutive Act was ratified by the two-thirds of the OAU member states.

Unlike the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act provides the doctrinal and legal grounds for the African Union to conduct military intervention within its member states. For instance, Article 4 of the Constitutive Act makes provision for the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

Furthermore, the heads of State realized that the OAU needed to undergo institutional reform alongside the doctrinal changes. To that end, they unanimously adopted a declaration to replace the OAU with the African Union (AU) during their 5th Extraordinary

Summit in March 2001 in Sirte, Libya.

During the Lusaka summit of 2000, African Heads of State and government decided to develop priority AU structures (also known as organs) together with their functions and modus operandi. The AU priority organs are the Assembly, the Executive Council, a Secretariat, the Commission and the Permanent Representative Committee. Some of these structures were inherited from the OAU. The summit also discussed the establishment of newer AU organs such as the Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice, the African Central Bank loosely based on the European Union structure. Other AU structures such as the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) were created as African versions of the UN structures.

The AU also established its own unique structures known as the Panel of the Wise, Peace Fund and Specialized Technical Committees. The African Union was officially launched during the AU summit in Durban, South Africa in 2002. The Constitutive Act has been in effect since then.

The AU is formally mandated to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. Article 3 (f) of the AU Constitutive Act states that one of the objectives of the AU is to promote peace, security and stability on the continent. Article 3 (f) stipulates that the AU is authorized to take appropriate means (peaceful or military) to resolve conflicts between member states as may be decided upon by the Assembly. The AU is also authorized to conduct conditional interventions inside member states as enshrined in the Constitutive Act Article 4 (h). This means circumstantial interventions within member states now rest within the legitimate doctrinal and/or legal limits of the African Union.

This marks the AU's significant doctrinal departure from OAU's commitment to traditional concern for sovereignty and non-interference.

The AU is the only international organization that has established a legal and doctrinal intervention framework to conduct military interventions within states to prevent the mass killing of the civilian population. Even though Article 53 of the UN Charter authorizes regional organizations to undertake intervention in their respective regions, it doesn't specifically authorize regional organizations to undertake military interventions within sovereign states under situations where the government or other internal groups commit atrocities against the civilian population.

As part of the broader regional security strategy, the AU developed partnerships with appropriate African regional mechanisms. Article 16 of the Protocol Related to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union provides specific guidelines for utilizing the support of the African regional mechanisms in conflict prevention, management and resolutions in a way consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union. The Protocol clearly asserts that the activities of the Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union. However, African regional mechanisms are expected to develop standard doctrinal and structural capacities to carry out interventions within their respective regions.

The AU protocol further states that in the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the AU Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council,

which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 7 (k) of the Protocol Related to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council states that the AU Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Chapter VII of the UN Charter also provides specific provisions for regional arrangements or agencies to conduct interventions within their region or beyond upon authorization by the UN Security Council. However, regional organizations, including the AU, may not conduct interventions in the regions without prior authorization from the United Nations.

The AU's peace and security mandate has been formed based on the proper doctrinal and structural foundations. The establishment of those frameworks set out a good beginning for the African Union to build upon. The next step would be to build the AU's standard technical, professional and operational capacities. It would be premature to assume that the mere existence of doctrinal and structural arrangements would enable the Union to handle the complex task of conflict resolution which may involve early warning and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian action and disaster management in the continent.

The success of the AU depends on a number of factors. First, member states should show a high level political will and resource commitment to support the mandates of the Union. Especially, their financial and troops contributions are indispensable. Second, the UN should continue to offer support in building the capacity of the African Union in conflict analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis, and in joint peacekeeping opera-

tions. Third, international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other regional banks should support the Union in meeting its budgetary obligations. Fourth, donor governments should recognize the Union through diplomatic representation and create close working relationships in areas of finances, joint military exercises and information exchange.

Last but not least, the Multinational Oil companies and other corporate businesses operating in Africa need to financially support the African Union's missions of peace and security in Africa. They need to realize the fact that their business does not exist in a vacuum. Without doubt, durable peace and stability in Africa is intertwined with expanding their business opportunities. Most recent discoveries of oil in west, central and east Africa signals more business potential for Multinational Oil Companies. But the Multinational Oil Companies must be willing to invest in peace and stability in Africa by making financial contributions to the AU Peace Fund.

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## **Giving Love a Bad Name: Intimate Partner Violence in Palestinian Refugee Camps**

Janaina Bordignon



### **Abstract**

While sexual violence is far from being a recent topic in both scholarship and activism, less attention has been invested in the understanding and problem-solving of intimate partner violence (IPV). For a female refugee, considered to be the most vulnerable to human rights violations, such susceptibility is exacerbated by the specificities of conflict and post-conflict environments. Under the understanding that almost 3,000 million female Palestinians currently reside in refugee camps, the present paper analyzed the current humanitarian programs designed to address IPV in the occupied Palestinian territories through a feminist perspective, which adds the underlying understanding that “patriarchal ideologies and institutional practices underpin violence against women” (Clark et al. 2010, 314). In such regard, the gaps identified were categorized as (1) protection to staff, (2) a focus on relief rather than humanitarian services, and (3) a lack of integration among institutions towards comprehensive services. Hence, this work argues that gaps within service provision are interdependent and presents a draft proposal, based primarily on the recognition that addressing the lack of integration among institutions should be a primary concern. Thus, instead of each institution providing limited wider services, it is suggested that each non-profit focus on their main area of expertise or capability and becoming part of a strategic regional referral network, resulting in the sustainability of a long term expansion of services to victims of intimate-partner violence.

### **Biography**

Janaina Bordignon, a current student in the M.A. in Global Development and Peace program at the University of Bridgeport, is originally from the south of Brazil. She has 6 year-experience in advocacy, lobbying and counselling regarding sexual and gender-based violence projects, and currently works as a Gender Policy Consultant to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations. Outstanding graduate from Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos for a B.A. in Teaching English as a Second Language, Janaina has also worked for two years as a Research Assistant for the federal Brazilian government, studying and sharing best linguistic practices towards gender equality in the provision of health services to female health care users.

*"[My husband] says women are like a spring; they need to be stepped on."  
(Johnson 2007, 600)*

## Introduction

Due to their stateless person status, female refugees are the most vulnerable to human rights violations (Ward and Vann, 2002; Millers, 2011). The necessity of now supporting themselves and their families forces them to risk their own safety by leaving the camp in the pursuit of resources or even submit to on-site prostitution in exchange for protection, water or food. Moreover, the gaps within law enforcement and accountability mechanisms facilitate the targeting of women, not only by militia groups, but also peacekeeping officials, other refugees, and even intimate partners. In the case of Palestinian female refugees, there are also culturally-rooted factors, such as forced marriage and honor killing, enhancing their vulnerability to human rights violations.

While sexual violence is far from being a recent topic in both scholarship and activism, less attention has been invested in the understanding and problem-solving of intimate partner violence, or IPV, especially within the context of refugee camps. Equally hindering to women's empowerment, as well as sustainable human and economic development, intimate partner violence is defined as "all types of sexual, psychological and physical violence or deprivation of social, economic and political rights, practiced by one of the partners against the other." (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011, 66)

Since the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981, several international instruments have been installed to address vio-

lence against women, as well as efforts from local, national and global non-profits and organizations. Nonetheless, intimate-partner violence continues to be an issue worldwide, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, or OPT, being no exception. In 2009, according to the Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Women's Affairs, "67% of women reported that they have been subjected to verbal violence on a regular basis, 71% to psychological violence, 52.4% to physical violence and 14.5% to sexual violence, with 44.7% of the women reporting exposure to several forms of violence at the same time." (2011, 15) Even though such statistics are already problematic, one must consider that these numbers could be conservative due to the underreporting of intimate-partner violence cases, mostly because of cultural traditions, ideological beliefs, legal obstacles, as well as a lack of local studies.

Considering the almost 3,000 million female Palestinians currently residing in refugee camps, this paper works under the understanding that intimate-partner violence is a very relevant human rights violation. According to the Human Rights Watch report entitled "A Question of Security: Violence against Palestinian Women and Girls", despite of improvements in the status of Palestinian women, they still "remain worse off than men by just about every measure" (2006, 26). Therefore, it is assumed that female refugees experience intimate-partner violence in particular ways, since conflict zones deprive them from frames of reference, social structures, provision of services, and mobility. As a consequence, such context forces a woman "to rely on others in a way that makes her increasingly vulnerable to violence" (Miller YEAR, 78).

Thus, under the understanding that intimate partner violence directly harms women's well

-being and empowerment, this paper is a response to the claim that in order to decide on efficient and effective practices for the eradication of violence against women, further research must be developed (Hossain et al., 2014). Hence, the present research aims at analyzing current programs designed to address intimate partner violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories through a feminist perspective, which adds the underlying understanding that “patriarchal ideologies and institutional practices underpin violence against women” (Clark et al., 2010, 314). Finally, the current project also aims at considering alternatives to enhance the exercise of women’s rights in the current context of the OPT.

### **Risk Factors of Intimate Partner Violence in the OPT**

The risk factors leading to intimate-partner violence have been receiving increasing attention in literature for the past three decades, due to the understanding that all types of violence against women are damaging to the social, political and economic fabric of a state. Violence against women “causes negative effects that are not only limited to women and girls, but which also extend to future generations” (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011, 16) through the social, political, economic and cultural dimensions. Moreover, violence against women (VAW) is a wide term which encompasses distinct types of violence, with their own mechanisms, as well as a risk factors and consequences.

As intimate-partner violence is the focus chosen for this paper, it is relevant to comprehend that it is never a result of a single action or factor; on the contrary, it is a product of a complex relationship between different social, economic and political factors. Haj-Yahia and Clark (2013) argue that occur-

rences of IPV are directly affected by poverty, low levels of education, unemployment, and large-size families residing in crowded spaces. In other words, unstable areas severely limit employment opportunities, causing a decrease in financial stability, often forcing families to live in smaller houses and prioritize jobs over formal education. According to Clark, when conducting a survey with women in the OPT, “respondents where household were financially affected by measures taken by occupying forces were 40% more likely to report psychological violence, 51% to report physical violence, and 55% to report sexual violence compared with those whose households were not financially affected” (2010, 314).

Concerning the level of education, the Demographic and Health Surveys in the Arab World concluded that, in the case of males, low education was directly correlated to increased violence rates, while “all three of the surveys conducted among Palestinian women revealed that young age and low education were associated with increased risk of IPV victimization” (Haj-Yahia and Clark, 2013, 798). Therefore, households with low levels of education from both wife and husband present the highest likelihood of both occurrence and recurrence of intimate-partner violence. In response to results such as these, scholars often argue that formal education is the key to addressing such issues. Nonetheless, IPV also occurs within wealthy and highly educated households; therefore, alternative types of education are also foundational to achieve gender equality - notably awareness campaigns concerning gender-based violence implemented in schools, communities, and within governmental departments.

The National Committee to Combat Violence against Women has argued that the

main risk factors behind intimate-partner violence in Palestinian society are culture, norms and traditions (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011). One of the examples provided is the patriarchal role division concerning child rearing, since it limits women to the private sphere while contributing to male dominance in all spheres. The women who participated in the focus group also vocalized their awareness of the manners in which they replicate a culture of male dominance by raising their children differently based solely on their gender.

Concerning politics, it has also been stated that “the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and the denial of Palestinian citizens’ rights at all social, economic, and political levels” (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011, 10) increases the oppression of the rights of women, especially concerning protection and maintenance of well-being. As female local stakeholders explain, they perceive the insults towards their husbands through occupation policies as a motivator for the latter to commit IPV upon their arrival in the domestic sphere. Similarly, Maha Abu-Dayyeh Shamas, a local feminist activist, explains that, “given the patriarchal context, wherein men take pride in being the breadwinners and protectors of their families, men take out their anger, frustration and sense of inadequacy at being harassed and humiliated by Israeli soldiers on their own women” (Arat, 2004, 517).

In regards to unemployment, Palestinian women have expressed that, when their husbands do not have a job, there is a tendency towards higher levels of frustration, as well as higher consumption of alcohol and other drugs (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011). As previously mentioned, the National Committee to Combat Violence against Women (2011) also rein-

forces that, in cases where the female becomes the breadwinner in the family, intimate-partner violence also increases due to the consequent challenge to traditional gender roles within Arab families. Therefore, one could argue that the root of IPV could be cultural and affected by gender stereotypes, placing employment rates per se as secondary risk factors, especially if the focus is policy-making.

Besides the aforementioned risk factors, Palestinian female refugees are also affected by the unsure and precarious life conditions of refugee camps while coping with crisis and conflict. In a context where state institutions have been systematically harmed or even destroyed, “no alternative accountable authority leaves the vulnerable members of the society at great risk” (Arat, 2004, 517). In zones of conflict, violent behavior is normalized among civilians as it replicates throughout targeted communities. Moreover, recent research has shown that political violence and conflict increase the levels of male-to-female intimate-partner violence (Clark et al., 2010; Miller, 2011; National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011). Therefore, the new geopolitics of war also jeopardize women by raising the levels of intimate-partner violence they experience. According to Clark, even in such cases, IPV is still rooted in culture, since “preexisting gender inequalities are exacerbated and traditional gender roles are challenged in environments in which forms of collective violence persists” (Clark, 2010, 314).

As previously mentioned, the factors which contribute to the occurrence and recurrence of intimate-partner violence are numerous and often interconnected. Most commonly, unemployment, low levels of education, poverty, ongoing conflict, political violence, and cultural norms were identified. Furthermore,

it was argued that most of the risk factors are secondary and consequential to the culturally rooted patriarchy vocalized by the victims. In order to identify other potential risk factors, as well as current patterns of reaction mechanisms, further local research must be performed. Finally, it is relevant to remember that, regardless of the risk factors which contribute to occurrence and recurrence of IPV, no action or circumstance justifies or normalizes any type of violence against another human being. For such reason, educational campaigns and awareness workshops which explore rights, duties and networking for humanitarian purposes are vital for critical thinking of cultural traditions and reform towards safer environments. One of the many significant targets would be a phenomenon known as “culture of silence”, the main reason for the underreporting of IPV, which is explored in the section below.

### **The Culture of Silence**



The culture of silence built around sexual violence is not singular to any area or state, not even to one of the genders. In the case of intimate-partner violence, the culture of silence refers to the social and cultural norms which limit the victims’ freedom to report and pursue justice. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, underreporting has been justified by negative social stigma, institutional mistrust, family pressure, the risk of increased violence, as well as financial depend-

ency on the violence perpetrator (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Additionally, psychological trauma, institutional distrust, and the taboo around sex can be perceived as directly related to the maintenance of the culture of silence surrounding IPV.

First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that “sexual violence is a difficult and painful topic for victims to discuss because sex is a taboo topic” (Miller 2011, 78). Furthermore, the retelling of traumatic events often causes victims immeasurable levels of stress, since a common reaction to all types of violence is a deep desire to forget rather than relive such experiences through the access to memories. Moreover, a negative social stigma is imposed on victims of IPV. A practice of victim-blaming occurs where victims are made responsible for the crimes committed against them. Additionally, a strong sense of shame is attached to not only the victims, but also their families. Hence, in a cultural context where family honor is highly significant, there is also a lot of family pressure to keep it a “private problem”. Also, from a patriarchal perspective, a husband owns his wife, and therefore is entitled to act according to his own system of beliefs, which could encompass that violence can be justifiable. In accordance, Haj-Yahia and Clark conclude that, “given the relative widespread acceptance of violence against a wife perceived to be errant in Arab countries [...], it is likely that these norms translate into greater risk of IPV” (2013, 799). Also, considering state actions, an attitude of disinterest and neglect can be perceived from official actors, who have allocated only “0.02 percent of the ministerial budget in 2005” (Human Rights Watch, 2006, 32) to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), created in 2003 with the purpose of monitoring governmental actions and assuring gender equality.

The lack of institutional trust has also been



understood as a factor which reinforces the culture of silence in societies. In the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it is directly affected by the inexistence of laws referring to intimate-partner violence, subordinating women to a patriarchal legislative system. Firstly, regardless of the legal procedure at hand, stereotypical attitudes have been identified in officials, police officers, and decision makers when handling cases of violence against women (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011). According to the current legislation, a woman victim of IPV is offered the choice between divorce and pressing charges on the basis of physical harm. Concerning the former, a divorce process on the basis of IPV demands the testimonial of at least two eyewitnesses, as well as a medical report (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Within such culture and also in consideration of the operational mechanisms of intimate-partner violence, such criterion significantly limits the legal process for the victims. Additionally, there is a legal restraint that these witnesses cannot be related to the petitioner.

Another legal option would be to press charges for spousal abuse. However, the challenge in this case would be that most cases of spousal abuses are considered minor offenses, easily denied by the legal actors. The only exception are cases of extreme violence, such as violence resulting in at least 10 days of hospitalization, demanding mandatory prosecution only provided the hospitalization period exceeds 20 days (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Beyond legal obstacles, the lack of legislation to punish occurrences of IPV or to protect women from violence also harms the building of a governmental network which provides victims with assistance beyond the court, such as “sanctuary for victims and

sanctions against violence” (Haj-Yahia and Clark, 2013, 799), as well as protection of lawyers, psychologists and social workers working in organizations devoted to fighting violence against women. In accordance, joint efforts from thirteen NGOs in 2002 resulted in the launching of a Palestinian Violence against Women Forum, so that the government could be pressured into establishing an official referral system (Human Rights Watch, 2006), which would directly and positively improve the victims’ institutional trust.

Also affecting institutional trust, as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs explains, often institutions are created with the purpose of sabotaging the work being done by feminist organizations. As explained, the process of challenging social norms “is often faced with rejection at first by those used to the status quo, especially when it conflicts with the interests of those in power” (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011, 31). Because individuals often perceive organizations as a unit, the work of some directly affects the trust directed to others within the same sector. Due to cultural factors mentioned previously, as well as the threat of increased violence from the intimate partner, victims demand more than a long criminal lawsuit in order to believe that institutions could liberate them from their situation of oppression. As a result of current praxis, only “1.2 percent of the [Palestinian] women polled who had experienced domestic violence had filed a formal complaint against their husbands with the police; less than 1 percent had sought counseling and protection at the police station” (Human Rights Watch, 2006, 33).

Finally, there is another relevant factor that explains the difficulty for victims of intimate-partner violence to come forward, report the abuse and pursue legal justice: financial de-

pendency on the violent perpetrator. Especially in refugee camps, the scarcity of resources and employment opportunities heavily affect one's freedom to mobilize. Moreover, when there are children or other relatives sharing such space, decisions concerning the well-being of others also affect one's choice to remain in a context where IPV occurs.

Intimate-partner violence is a recurrent issue and is far from being a new challenge to both women's rights literature and activism. This section aimed at exploring the complexity surrounding the reasons which limit women's choices in reporting cases of intimate-partner violence in the context of the occupied Palestinian territory. Having thus contextualized the identified common risk factors in the area for the occurrence of IPV, we will now move to the next section which focuses on the description and analysis of institutions with current programs addressing IPV in the region.

### **Intimate-Partner Violence Projects**

Even though intimate-partner violence is a subtype within the greater scope of violence against women, it presents its own mechanisms, risk factors, as well as prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. For such reason, this section explores local and global institutions, which currently have projects implemented for the purpose of supporting victims of intimate-partner violence. According to the Ministry of Women's Affairs, there are a small number of institutions dedicated to addressing violence against women in Palestinian society. Nevertheless, "these institutions tend to be concentrated in the central West Bank, rather than geographically spread across different areas in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip." (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011, 34) By the time of this research, the

organizations addressing IPV in the occupied Palestinian territories were: SAWA – All the Women Together Today and Tomorrow, NGO Forum to Combat VAW (Al-Muntada Coalition), Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC), The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy – MIFTAH, and The Mehwar Centre, which are contextualized below.

#### **a. SAWA – All the Women Together Today and Tomorrow**

Created in 1998 by Palestinian women for Palestinian society, Sawa is an independent, non-profit civil society organization for the eradication of violence against women. Concerning women victims of intimate-partner violence, two programs are offered: a 24/7 hotline in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as education workshops to bring awareness to communities.

The hotline was started only a year after the non-profit's creation, at the time relying on the dedication of eight volunteers. Through the call center or email, victims are offered initial guidance – medical and legal - and preliminary support. Additionally, SAWA's official website explains that it promotes a holistic approach in order to avoid potential legal obstacles in case the victim decides to press charges, being offered assistance with document filling, a counseling section, company throughout the process and documentation management.

In addition, SAWA is also involved with the prevention of IPV, offering awareness-raising meetings and workshops on sexual and physical violence, as well as sex education, in order to "advocate mutual honesty and respect between the two sexes, highlight prevention techniques, and inform participants

about services available through the SAWA hotline” (SAWA, 2015). One could question the reason why psychological violence is not covered in the educational programs, since statistics have shown that it is the most recurrent type of violence in the occupied Palestinian territory. Nonetheless, they are also extended beyond schools, reaching community centers, as well as organizations interested in promoting gender equality in the region. Because of such practice, the number of gender-sensitive agents is replicated, facilitating not only cultural, but also legal change. For instance, in January this year, SAWA provided a training course for Practicing Lawyers in Ramallah so that they improve their practices when addressing female victims of all types of violence.

Another great factor in SAWA is that the developed workshops present a participatory approach, being developed and implemented according to the profile of the region and the needs expressed by them. Moreover, once a year, SAWA offers a three-month training course followed by close monitoring in order to maximize the quantity of volunteers spreading the information. Finally, the SAWA has had its efforts internationally acknowledged as it was nominated for the 2012 Human Rights Prize of the Republic of France by the French Consulate.

**b. Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Against Domestic Violence Against Women (Al Muntada Coalition)**

Located in East Jerusalem, the Al Muntada coalition was initiated in 2000 due to the recognition of the “seriousness of the problem and its negative repercussions on women and society in general”, according to the official website. Having comprehended the need to acquire leverage through representativeness,

fourteen non-profits have combined knowledge and efforts to eliminate gender-based violence in the occupied Palestinian territories by bringing it to the public sphere.

Involved with several significant transnational accomplishments, such as the drafting and approval of the National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women (2011 – 2019), the Al Muntada coalition has three main areas of focus: advocacy, lobbying, and information dissemination. Concerning IPV, the Al Muntada coalition affects it directly through the publication and exchange of studies, reports, and media campaigns regarding the issue. Moreover, it also promotes the organization and implementation of workshops for both communities and institutions. Unfortunately, because related information is highly limited in the English language, further details are not available.

Even though the forum does not provide any relief or humanitarian services, it is by far the most influential group in the region regarding advocacy and lobbying, which can be perceived by their accomplishments and involvement with multi-level negotiations, as well as legislative projects. Hence, the Al-Muntada coalition is not only relevant, but necessary in the area, as it complements the complex work of reform with networking and further legislation regarding intimate-partner violence.

**c. Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC)**

Also located in East Jerusalem, the Women’s Center offers multiple comprehensive services in order to assist women who have had their rights violated. The Center’s official website emphasizes the naturalization of violence against women – political, sexual, and gender-related – and states that it is “proud

of its uncompromising commitment to provide legal aid, social counseling and protection services to women in an environment where human rights abuses are rampant and women's issues are regularly overlooked".

Among several efforts, WCLAC has been training staff to work in emergency shelters and safe homes for women victims of domestic violence since 2010 in order to share their experience gained after more than a decade dealing with the consequences of VAW, and especially IPV. Moreover, the Center also promotes awareness by the publication of statistical reports and the creation of workshops, prepared according to the target community, which evokes the values of sustainable participatory development. Regarding lobbying, the official website explains that the Center works towards reform in six areas: "marriage age, commonwealth, polygamy, divorce, custody and equal legal status (for example as witnesses in marital disputes)."



Nonetheless, current investment is also put towards the maintenance of comprehensive services, offered in Ramallah, East Jerusalem, Hebron and Beit Jala. The services offered include legal advice and court representation, and counseling. Concerning the latter, they are provided with the purpose of empowering victims to make the necessary changes in their lives in order to achieve their goals.

Working on more than 400 cases every year concerning violence against Palestinian women, WCLAC has also become a reference for its emergency protection shelter and further development includes its replication in other areas. Built specifically for women who have been victimized by intimate-partner violence and other types of domestic violence in the West Bank since 2006, the shelter is considered an emergency solution, however no information is available concerning the limit period of stay for the victims. Thus, claiming to offer "life-saving emergency protection", it is assumed to refer to short-term temporary housing.

#### **d. The Mehwar Centre**

With the support of Unifem, UN WOMEN and the Government of Italy, the Mehwar center became the first multi-purpose national center in the entire Arabic Region. Its purpose is protecting and reintegrating women exposed to intimate-partner violence, as well as women and children victims of other types of domestic violence, while increasing rights awareness in the occupied Palestine territories.

Through a holistic approach, the center offers services for victims for a period up to 3 months. The greatest differential is that such services are not only offered to the female victims, but also extended to their children. The system entails a ten-year-project started in 2007, functioning around the period during which victims are hosted in the shelter. Therefore, during such phases, the victim and/or her family are exposed to vocational training, educational services, psycho-social assistance, health care, and legal assistance in court. Despite the short period of time in which individuals are allowed to be in the shelter, the understanding that the family demands rehabilitation in multiple areas in or-

der to be empowered and reintegrated into society is a powerful insight.

**e. Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD)**

The Palestinian Working Women Society for Development, or PWWSD, is located in the Jordan Valley, the Gaza Strip and the Yatta area. Created in 1981, the PWWSD also offers humanitarian services while promoting lobbying and advocacy.

The institution offers a wide range of services in that regard, such as psychological consultation, individual and family counseling, a toll-free counseling line, women's and children's support groups, speech therapy for children, community awareness sessions, and professional supervision, which aims at continuous development of the counselors. Unlike the aforementioned organizations, the PWWSD extends counseling services to other family members who have been affected by the violent environment, which could be considered a more progressive view towards approaching IPV within family settings. Moreover, there is evidence of a strong concern with the quality and professionalism of professionals, which is indicative of the seriousness of the harms caused by intimate-partner violence.

Finally, even though shelters or temporary homes are not part of the system, a concern for the inclusion of females living under such circumstances is evident by the provision of a toll-free counseling line. Another final example of innovation and creativity is a program entitled Zewada Restaurant, created to offer work opportunities for working women in order to promote self-sufficiency and resilience.

**Gaps and Alternatives**

First of all, needless to say that the present work does not intend to undermine the work provided in the area so far. On the contrary, for respecting the efforts continuously given to the issue despite of the current geopolitical context of conflict, this paper aims at providing such issue with additional attention in the hopes of contributing to more effective practices. Furthermore, Palestinian women must be acknowledged for their courage in not only vocalizing their concerns, but also engaging in assuring that women are no longer underrepresented and undermined in the domestic, labor, social and legislative spheres.

Concerning the identified gaps, they can be understood as part of a snowball effect. In other words, the challenges are interconnected as the consequences of one are directly related to the occurrence of another. This paper argues that while there is a strong network for advocacy and lobbying, a less fortified front is built concerning rehabilitation and reintegration, along with other related services. Thus, potential gaps to be improved concern protection to staff, a focus on relief rather than humanitarian services, and a lack of integration among institutions towards comprehensive services.

Firstly, while most of the institutions offer continuous training for counselors for the purposes of professional development, no protection is provided for the ones working on the ground. The improvement of workers' performances is vital; nevertheless the work with IPV in the occupied Palestinian territories demands additional concern with the safety of the ones dedicated to a reform process. In addition to the risks due to the ongoing conflict, the aforementioned reports have contextualized that there is a systematic movement against the achievement of women's rights in the region. Therefore, in an environment where violence has become



naturalized, additional protection must be granted for those on the ground, also resulting in the motivating factor for others to commit, expanding both areas of implementation and provision of services.

Moreover, a recurrence of similar services was noticed throughout the non-profit landscape regarding lobbying, counseling services, and emergency shelters. On one hand, such a phenomenon can be very positive as it shows alignment of information and purposes, promoting best practices across different regions. Nonetheless, if such services focus on relief more than rehabilitation and reintegration, even though it is better than the provision of no services at all, long term goals may be more difficult to be achieved. For instance, most of the organizations offered a variety of services to the victims of IPV, such as counseling and emergency shelters, but did not extend them to the violence perpetrators, to their children or other family members involved. As much as such practice is understandable due to the limited funding and availability of personal, it also results in two main implications.

Because intimate-partner violence most often occurs from male partner towards their female partners in a household where they share space with other family members, as well as their own children, not allowing others – especially their own children – to be part of the program might just be enough to discourage them from leaving their situation of violence. After all, due to the expectations set on the domestic role of mothers, leaving their offspring in an aggressive and unpredictable environment would go against their own system of cultural beliefs. Therefore, even though it is already a foundational step to have such services offered, a need for expansion is recognized in order to facilitate the process as much as possible, in consid-

eration of the counter factors resulting from the aforementioned culture of silence.

Another unintentional consequence of providing services limited to the females who are victim of IPV is the reinforcement of the victim-blaming culture. What is meant by this is that offering counseling services only to women, while their perpetrators continue to carry on their routines without a need for accountability, could reinforce the common sense knowledge in public opinion that the victims have done something wrong which resulted in (therefore justified) violence, which is why they are the only ones who need to change in order to avoid future human rights abuses. Needless to say counseling services are essential for women to be empowered and break previous cycles of violence; nonetheless, they are not the only ones who demand assistance from third parties to revisit and adapt their cultural beliefs and consequential actions. Therefore, when only women are faced with the necessity to change, responsibility is assigned to and reinforced onto them, while a lot less attention is given to the ones who choose to apply violence in their own households.

Hence, media and public awareness workshops, as it is often done by these institutions, should focus on the education of the community, moving beyond the education of women concerning their rights. Offering perceptions which do not normalize or accept violence from any human being to another should be the aim of these efforts, as women's rights is not an issue to be dealt by solely by women. After all, research and empirical knowledge have been indicating that gender equality in all spheres improves a state's human and economic development.

With their main focus on relief rather than humanitarian services, most of the organiza-

tions offer emergency shelters, providing victims – and sometimes their children – with a maximum period of stay of 3 months to be housed. As previously mentioned, the legal obstacles are innumerable, causing legal cases to take longer than 3 months to be concluded. Besides, the development of skills for the economic empowerment of victims of IPV, followed by their insertion in the market and establishment of a stable income, are likely to demand a longer period as well. In such context, options for micro-financing could also be explored. As previously mentioned, the negative effects caused by intimate-partner violence are long lasting; hence, follow up counseling services would also be recommended, so that victims are offered a network of support not only constituted of feminist institutions, but also of other victims who share similar goals.

Finally, a lack of comprehensive services as a result of integrated work was identified during data analysis. Such phenomenon is considered a prime to be addressed, as it would result in fewer occurrences of the other gaps discussed in this section. As previously mentioned, even though there is a strong network for lobbying and advocacy, such as the Al-Muntada coalition, less attention has been given to the joint efforts towards rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, realistically comprehending the process and limitations involving funding, this paper presents an innovative approach considering the present projects and sociopolitical context of the region. Optimizing funding and time, different institutions could focus on the provision of certain services in which they are more experienced or for which they can offer a greater infrastructure, thus jointly building a system through which victims would navigate towards empowerment and justice.

Concerning legal settings, a strong network

between the non-profits could generate a joint confidential database for information, including testimonials, legal documentation concerning cases, as well as health-related documents. The assurance of confidentiality would motivate both health professionals and witnesses to produce the necessary testimonials to support the advancement of legal cases. As a consequence, a collaborative system would produce evidence-based databases, which would facilitate the overcoming of the limitations imposed by the current legislative system.

Concerning the establishment of a stronger network of services, the question of who would be responsible for funding and monitoring such project remains to be addressed. In 2011, the National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women was created with the goal of promoting “the principle of the rule of law based on respect for women’s rights and improving institutional mechanisms in Palestinian society in order to protect and support abused women and allow them to live in a society free from all forms of discrimination, and based on equality, dignity, and respect for human rights” (National Committee to Combat Violence against Women, 2011, 39).

Through a cross-sectoral approach, the National Strategy provides a general framework for the purposes of regulating the work performed by institutions on different levels and with different objectives towards the eradication of violence against women. Divided into seven strategic objectives, the strategy organizes funds, provides both framework and networking, as well as monitors and promotes constructive feedback under the understanding that women’s rights are human rights. Through all these strategies, different policies refer to the exact work promoted by the aforementioned non-profits. Therefore,

the organization and presentation of a project would already have the space and support from multi-level institutions and organizations whose objective is to guide organizations into more effective practices throughout all spheres of the phenomenon of violence against women.

## **Conclusions**

Acknowledging the efforts and hard work of Palestinian women in addressing intimate-partner violence, as well as the importance of fighting a highly recurrent issue, the present paper aimed at comprehending the context of IPV in the occupied Palestinian territories. In addition, it considered the services offered by the 5 institutions with programs targeting victims of IPV in order to identify gaps and consider potential alternatives.

The gaps that were identified were categorized as protection to staff, a focus on relief rather than humanitarian services, and a lack of integration among institutions towards comprehensive services. Moreover, this paper argued that most of the gaps are interconnected or, in other words, that one results in the occurrence of another; nonetheless, addressing the lack of integration among institutions would directly affect other obstacles. Therefore, a project is presented where, instead of each institution providing limited wide-range services, each non-profit would focus on the provision of their areas of expertise, resulting in the sustainability of long term expansion of services and capabilities. Such project would be able to be supported by several of the strategic policies of the National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women, developed in 2011, in order to provide institutions working against violence against women with framework, networking, funding and monitoring.

Finally, research has shown that violence against women resulted in joint efforts from both Palestinian and Israeli activists who set as a priority the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Concerning the greater context of the ongoing Israel – Palestine conflict, a wide consensus of its intractability can be perceived. Nonetheless, USIP experts in intractable conflicts teach that there is no such thing as an intractable conflict (Crocker et al., 2004, Smock and Smith, 2008). Among the recommended strategies, exploiting optimal moments for intervention with renewed ideas and making use of side channels are ways to approach a conflict through shared concerns as opposed to forcing an issue on parties, none of which are willing to collaborate in resolving it (Crocker et al., 2004). In other words, parties can be led to believe that, if they can collaborate on one issue, then they might address more complex issues as well. Under such understanding, an interesting phenomenon occurs. According to Arat, female activists from both backgrounds agree that they “don’t approve of the attempts to turn [...] [their] situation into a religion or sectarian conflict” (2004, 518). In this case, perhaps, violence against women might be the common concern that eventually leads parties to negotiation. At last, regardless of its potential to contribute to conflict resolution, organizations and institutions dedicated to fighting violence against women already reach outcomes and have earned greater international attention.

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## **Islamic Insurgency in Thailand's Deep South: Sights Set on Accountability**

Caitlin Colón



### **Abstract**

The main focus of this paper is on the increasing frequency and radicalization of violent crimes and the correlation to the growth and transformations of the Islamic insurgency and their clashes with the Buddhist Thai government and police officials in the southern most provinces of Thailand. This paper will examine the conflict in its current state while analyzing the historical movement of the government, politics and the Islamic insurgency in the deep southern regions. The author presents a proposal to focus on a conversation that must be initiated by U.S. officials with the Thai government and police leaders, to begin a dialogue regarding a two tiered, educational accountability campaign. Discussion in its self will act as a means of ripening the conflict for a potential future agreement between primary actors.

### **Biography**

Caitlin Colón received her B.A. in English from Western Connecticut State University. She served as a U.S. Peace Corps Education volunteer in Sierra Leone where she lived and focused on teaching English, library development and community literacy programs. After returning to the U.S. in 2013, she worked for North American Marine Environment Protection Association where she was the Marketing and Event Program Manager while working on the development of national youth environmental education programs. Caitlin recently spent two months in Nicaragua studying Spanish and working with the families of disabled and underserved children. She is currently a Masters student in the Global Development and Peace Program and a Graduate Assistant for the College of Public and International Affairs at the University of Bridgeport.

## **Introduction**

The main focus of this paper is on the increasing frequency and radicalization of violent crimes and the correlation to the growth and transformations of the Islamic insurgency and their clashes with the Buddhist Thai government and police officials in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. This paper will examine the conflict in its current state while analyzing the historical movement of the government, politics and the Islamic insurgency in the deep southern regions. There are two parts to ensuring conflict ripeness: First, assessing ripeness and then enhancing ripeness. After overviewing an assessment of the conflict, a plan of action to approach the conflict to enhance ripeness will be presented.

## **History, Geography & Background of the Conflict**

A little over 100 years ago, the Kingdom of Patani was officially assimilated into the kingdom of Siam (now called Thailand). It is the only country in Southeast Asia, and one of the few in the Third World, that has never been colonized. Since then, the southern regions of Thailand have been left unsettled in uncertain stages of rebellion. In these regions, people have grasped a firm hold of their local identity, unwavering from their language, religion and historic narrative. While the rebellion has, more recently, been centralized through the demands of Islamic insurgencies and unrelenting violence, the ultimate goal of the southern provinces, the Islamic insurgencies and the Malay-Muslims, is to be granted autonomy and be recognized as an independent state, eradicated from the Kingdom of Thailand. Violence persists specifically in the deep southern regions of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat. These regions are predominantly populated by Muslims.

Roughly 94% of the country's population is Buddhists and about 5% is Muslim and 1% Christian. The southern region's population is approximately 80% Muslim and speaks Malay, while the majority of Thailand is Buddhist and speaks Thai. The population in the south consisted of settlers of Malay ethnicity with their own culture, religion, language and kingdom. The majority of the Muslim population in Thailand is Sunni with a small Shia minority. Thailand's three southernmost provinces: Narathiwat; Pattani and Yala, have been faced with much discontent under Thai rule. The mainly Malay-Muslim region was once an independent sultanate until its annexation by Thailand (formerly called Siam). The population of the southern regions were forced to speak Thai and change their names to fit Thai culture. As many refused the oppression, they chose to continue practicing their religion and language in private, which caused much displeasure in the 1940's.



## **The Development of the Insurgency**

Wattana Sugunnasil (2006), in his publication titled "Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks" states that "The separatists' struggle, which was initially based on a Malay national liberation struggle, has taken on undertones of a radical Islamist ideology."

There is an overlaying concern that the violence has dramatically affected the local economy in the southern provinces. There is a constant atmosphere of fear and division along religious borders as well as a growing anxiety that what started as a separatist movement will turn into a focus on the religious aspects of Buddhism versus Islam. There have been attempts to ease the separation and apparent divides but these attempts dramatically failed and only widened the divide. According to Gunaratna and Acharya: In the 1960s, there was a massive transmigration of Thai Buddhists from other parts of Thailand to the south. This relocations policy, named 'Self-Help Land Settlement Project,' was meant to 'balance up' the racial and religious demographics of the southern provinces. Under this policy, each migrating Thai Buddhist family was to be granted property, which was scarce in southern Thailand. By 1969, about 160,000 Buddhists had moved into the area. The process of social and cultural assimilation was very much resented by ethnic Malays. Malay Muslims decried this 'territorial invasion' as cultural colonization by the central government. As a result, a number of radical Muslim movements developed in southern Thailand.

Moving from the 1960s to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, on January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2004, about 50 Muslim militants raided a weapons depot staffed and guarded by Thai security forces and police, taking hundreds of weapons. In the process, the attackers killed four Thai Buddhists and continued to threaten any present Muslims to confirm that they were on the right side. Simultaneously, as this attack was happening, over 15 schools and about 3 police posts were attacked. These well-planned attacks forced the government to publically recognize the insurgence and their highly trained militants. Then, on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 2004, a historical mosque by the name of Sultan Muthaffar

Shah Mosque was the setting in which a seven hour standoff took place between Thai police and southern insurgents. "The siege ended with the Thai army storming the building and killing all 32 militants holed up inside. Ten years later, the memory of the Krue Se incident lives on in the minds of the local population, fuelling grievances that feed into the insurgency." On October 25, 2004, protesters surrounded the police station in Tak Bai town, in Narathiwat province in the south. The police confronted the protesters aggressively with tear gas, then eventually bullets. Amongst the initial burst of violence, seven people were killed. Protesters had their hands tied behind their backs and then piled by the hundreds in the backs of police trucks to be transported to a prisoner camp 115 kilometers away. After the journey ended, 78 protesters had died of asphyxiation. The long lasting effect of the deaths has caused permanent resentment and distrust of the government police forces. Locals from Tak Bai town are resentful that no type of memorial has been put into place or recognized on behalf of the government recognizing the deaths of these protesters. Locals now refer to October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2004, as the Tak Bai massacre. Since the series of violent attacks in 2004, over five thousand people have been killed.

### **Primary Actors**

According to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), primary actors are those parties that are directly involved in the conflict. The purpose of this paper presents two clear primary actors involved in this particular conflict. The Thai government and its police forces, which are represented predominantly by Buddhists are on one side of the conflict while, on the opposing side, the many factions of Malay-Muslim insurgency groups in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and

Narathiwat struggle to reject oppression while maintaining a firm grasp of their regional identity, religion and language.

### Secondary Actors

USIP states that “*Secondary actors* are not actual parties to the conflict but nevertheless have a high degree of interest in and influence over it, often due to their proximity.” Malaysia has been attempting to mediate peace talks between government officials and assumed leaders of insurgency groups. Outside of the ten or more known insurgency groups, individual Malay-Muslims have been committing acts of radical violence as independents, which complicates any chances at cease-fires or agreements. Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya state in their book, *The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice* that, “Northern Malaysia remains an active intellectual and material support for the insurgent groups of southern Thailand.” Some Malaysian Islamists provide refuge, financial support, training, and ideological indoctrination to key Islamists from southern Thailand. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has agreed to assist Thailand, as they are aware that the threat will cross borders and stimulate Malaysia’s own Islamists.

### Interests of Both Sides

The Thai government and police forces (predominantly Buddhists) have a direct interest in the elimination of the continuous violence in the south in order to focus on the development of democratic stability. The governmental security forces stationed in the southern provinces have a strong interest in maintaining peace in the area in order to save their own lives, the lives of their families and their fellow Buddhists. The Thai government vows to keep the southern provinces as part

of Thailand to ensure a demonstration of the government’s strength, unity and unwillingness to negotiate with terrorists.

On the opposing side of the government and Buddhist security forces are the Malay-Muslims and the Islamic insurgency members. The members of the many named insurgencies strive to achieve an independent state in the southern provinces to ensure the elimination of cultural and religious oppression from the government. This achievement of autonomy would show their strength to the national and international community and re-instate a sense of ethnic and religious pride once again.

### Analytical Presentation of the Causes of the Violence in the Deep South

Based on the Analytic Framework presented by the United States Institute of Peace, the current stage of this conflict is wavering between crisis and war. In current acts of violence in the southern provinces, signs of ethnic cleansing, radicalization, inhuman murders of innocent civilians, rape, beheadings and the taking of hostages have escalated and shifted the stage of the conflict to a higher degree, moving closer towards a war on terrorism. Based on Michael S. Lund’s conceptual tool, the “curve of conflict:”

Crisis is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight and may be engaged in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes but have not exerted any significant amount of force. The probability of the outbreak of war is high.

Lund’s definition of crisis supports the analysis that the conflict in southern Thailand is in the crisis stage as the violence between armed forces continues in the form of “low-level skirmishes.” An expertly phrased analysis and presentation of an overview of the causes for the outburst of frequent violence can be

found in Aurel Croissant's (2007) statements in the publication titled "Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand:"

Ethno-religious violence in Thailand – as in most multi-ethnic societies – is not caused by a single factor but by multiple causes. This analysis holds the view that "structural" factors (historical concerns, religious differences, and social and economic marginalization) resulted in local grievances and a latent crisis in inter-ethnic relations. The drift toward militancy, however, is caused by recent changes in the "enabling environment" of insurgency in southern Thailand that are allowing the insurgency to grow.

Croissant argues that the violence in southern Thailand is the effect of multiple causes. There are a variety of issues that come into play when developing an analytical analysis of the causes of violence in the south. Below, one will find an outline of the most prominent and direct causes of the growing and long-standing violence in the south based on current research.

### **Consistent Political Unrest and Southern Policies**

A constant change and uncertainty in political rule has drawn all of the national and international attention away from the continued growing and radicalizing violence in the southernmost regions, leaving the disruption known as the "silent war." Without a long-standing political party or leader in Thailand, efforts to identify insurgency leaders in order to negotiate have been short-lived or left as promises unfulfilled. When Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup in September 2006, the Thai government experienced periods of instability. These instable political moments have paralyzed the administration and lead to the col-

lapse of the scheduled Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in April 2009. This was a severe embarrassment for Bangkok while the international eyes were upon the cancellation of the summit. As all of the political and national security leaders remained entrapped in the disorder of uncertain Thai politics, the issues involving the violent insurgency in Thailand's southern provinces were sidelined.

### **Cultural, Ethnic & Religious Oppression**

The Thai government does not recognize the Malay language in any government documents or in nationwide government schools. In the south, the government schools are seen by the Malay-Muslims as the training grounds for Thai colonial power as they are required not to use the Malay language, recognize their culture or practice their religion. The Muslims, in retaliation, burn the schools and the teachers are targeted. Many Thai teachers in the southern region have requested reassignment to other posts leaving the southern schools to be abandoned or understaffed. The southern provinces are not usually considered when the government launches campaigns focused on national development. The approaches of the Thai government officials and the police personnel have been deemed insensitive to the religion, language, and culture, that constitute the identity of southern Thai Muslims. "A number of studies demonstrate how political violence and terrorism often encompass tensions involving the defense not only of basic rights but also of identities. Thus, the roots of the conflict in southern Thailand lie in the perceived or real threat to minority identity due to Bangkok's suppressive policies toward the southern Thai Muslims in the name of national integration."

The Malay-Muslims feel ostracized by a state determined to retire and abolish their lan-



guage and cultural traditions. There is a belief among the Muslims of Malay descent that they have been perceived as outsiders, harshly marginalized and forced into a category of second-class citizens. Many of the local government officials are corrupt, unproductive and lack a true understanding of the Malay-Muslim culture.



**External and Internal Jihadist Influence**

According to Peter Shadbolt, the 2004 Tak Bai massacre, where almost 80 Malay-Muslims were killed inhumanly by Thai police, was a huge transformational moment for the insurgency. The radicalization of a younger generation had begun to develop as a methodological approach for the now angry Islamic insurgency members.

In reference to the Tak Bai massacre, Shadbolt makes the following observation: “What we are seeing is a transfer of power within the insurgency from an older generation, which favors negotiation, to a younger radicalized generation who see negotiation as an act of betrayal to the ideology of separatism. There is now a split in the leadership. The Tak Bai incident, viewed by many as a strategic blunder on the part of the Thai security, has been instrumental in turning ‘unarmed’ sympathizers into brutal insurgents.”

The recruitment of youth through a calling for Jihad against the Thai state has proven to be a developing issue. An Islamic teacher

known as Ustadz Soh had a plan to gather a group of about 10 middle-aged ustadzes (teachers) and train them in Malaysia. After training, each ustadz was responsible for recruiting about 10 young men, or even sometimes, boys. These young recruits were usually in their late teens and early twenties. The new recruits were train in hiding in deep parts of the jungle and took vows of silence while undergoing ideological indoctrination and spiritual preparation. “Their attacks were suicidal.” *Berjihad di Patani* is a document which appears to have inspired the brutal attacks of 28 April 2004.

*Berjihad di Patani* is claimed to be the only known statement of radical Muslim militant beliefs and missions. The attacks that are happening in the southern areas of Thailand are similar to jihadist developments in other parts of Muslim territories. Terrorist methods of attack have become more frequent as insurgents become more radicalized.

**Lack of Organization in the Insurgency’s Mission**

In the southern provinces of Thailand, there is a high level of separate insurgency groups with unknown leaders. Below is a chart that outlines the main insurgency groups in the southern provinces:

Organization	Formed	Characteristics
BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional)	1960	Base of support lay mainly in the <i>ponohs</i> , today three separate wings: BRN Congress, the main military wing; BRN Coordinative Group, focusing on political agitation and urban sabotage; BRN Ulema, which coordinates a following among the Islamic clergy; largest and best organized faction
GMIP (Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani)	1995	Formed by Afghan veterans as an off-shoot of the older Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani; urban group; close relations to KMM (Kumpulan Mujahideen Malay), its Malaysian counterpart
PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organisation)	1968	Active in guerilla operations until the early 1990s; secularist organization with presumably no military capability on the ground
New PULO	1995	Split as a dissent faction from PULO in 1995, but formed a tactical alliance with PULO two years later
BNPP/BIPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani-Pattani National Liberation Front/Barissan Islam Pembebasan Pattani-Pattani Islam Liberation Front)	1963	Drew support from both traditional aristocrats as well as from religious elites; its objective was neither mere autonomy nor integration of Patani with Malaysia but complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic State, <i>daral-Islam</i>
Bersatu (Barisan Kemerdekaan Pattani-United Front for the Independence of Pattani)	1989/97	Established in 1989, reinvigorated in 1997 as an umbrella organization for loose political coordination between PULO, New PULO, GMIP, and BRN

Croissant's Table 1 clearly identifies the main insurgent factions in the southern regions along with their historical lineage. Though the above list outlines only six of the main insurgent groups, there are many more and smaller factions that are more difficult to identify. It is proven to be problematic to conduct peace talks or negotiations when the groups are spread out, each with their own history and reasons for assimilation. To make matters worse, vows of silence among insurgency groups have caused a lack of understanding of the different groups' demands and goals. These problems have created an intractable conflict as the goals of the insurgencies are scattered and the leaders with any type of major influence are hidden and unnamed.

### **Leverage of Both Sides**

Amy Smith and David Smock note that the primary actors or antagonists may be depending on many different forms of power. Each side can use the reliance of power as leverage when analyzing the conflict for further ripeness. One must be aware of all sides' points of leverage in order to conduct a proper and accurate conflict analysis. On one side of the conflict, the government and police forces, which are predominantly Buddhist, have the authority to declare independent states. They also have the political power to recognize Malay-Muslim culture, language and religion in governmental affairs and schools along with the political authority and knowledge of how to regulate equality nationwide. All of these powers are tools of leverage that the government has against the Islamic insurgency groups. On the opposing side of the conflict, the Malay-Muslim insurgency members have the leverage and ability to continue the acts of violence in the southern regions in retaliation. Their many forms of leverage can take shape in forms of be-

headings, kidnappings, burning of bodies and instilling consistent fear among locals. They have the power to continue the radicalization of their missions. The insurgencies have the leverage to continue the recruitment and training of more youth while utilizing pre-existing relationships in obtaining and developing a higher volume of illegal weaponry and bombs.

### **Spoilers**

Potential spoilers in this conflict are radicalized Islamic rebels committing acts of violence as individuals and not as representatives of any insurgency group. The southern provinces of Thailand share a 573 kilometer long border with Malaysia. This has made cross-border movement extremely easy and difficult for authorities to monitor. There is a large number of southern insurgents that receive support and sanctuary from across borders. As Malaysia is considered a secondary actor and has a high level of interest in the resolution of the violence along its borders, the Islamic insurgents along the Thailand border that are aiding and training the Thai insurgents are labeled as spoilers when developing a strategy to ripen the conflict for negotiation. In an interview at his office in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's prime minister has stated in regard to their attempts to talk with the insurgencies that "although we talk to them, there are so many different factions. While the ones who talk to us might be willing to cease fighting, the others who are on the fringe may refuse to acknowledge or accept the agreements that have been reached. There are so many groups. There are even individuals who take action on their own, so it's very difficult to get them to agree to anything."

## Literature Review

Now that the conflict's history, development, actors, interests, causes, leverage and spoilers of each side have been outlined, a plan to enhance the conflict's ripeness must be articulated and presented. An approach to enhancing the conflict's ripeness has been shaped by the inclusion of the literature on this subject. Many scholars have devoted large quantities of time in the field and detailing their research and findings. Their countless articles have shaped an analytical framework and developed theories and plans with hopes to diminish the rising tensions and violence in Thailand's south.

Aurel Croissant's work titled "Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand" focuses on tracing the roots of radicalism to a set of causes such as religion, culture, economy and politics. These causes have resulted in cultural discrimination, economic deprivation and complete political alienation. The article then continues to discuss the political consequences of the unrest in the region and claims that the insurgency contributes to the dilution of liberal democracy in all regions of Thailand. Croissant's claim that the insurgency is causing the erosion of respect for basic human rights suggests that it leads to the deepening of the already existent political and cultural divide in Thai society.

Wattana Sugunnasil's article titled "Islam, Radicalism and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks" reviews the transition of the separatist struggle from a focus on Malay-Muslim oppression to adopting radical Islamist ideology. Sugunnasil proves that the separatist struggle's focus has "shifted to that of radical Islamist politics by calling for a jihad against the Thai state... and their Muslim allies."

The main argument of this article is a claim that the major shift in the separatist struggle is the result of a document titled "Berjihad di Patani." This document inspires the enhancement of radicalization and encourages violence against all who are against them: Buddhist or Muslim.

In 2013, Jay Lamey published an article titled, "Peace in Patani? The Prospect of a Settlement in Southern Thailand." This article focuses on a more recent potential for an autonomy arrangement. Lamey argues that an autonomy arrangement could potentially address many of the protests of the Malay-Muslim people. Lamey supports his claim with research regarding other positive outcomes of other Southeast Asian examples of autonomy agreements.

Also in 2013, Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya published a book titled *The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad or Quest for Justice?* This book focuses on the Muslim discrimination due to religion and language over many decades. Many attempts at assimilation have failed, deepened the divide and heightened the anger. After an in-depth historical background and analysis of the religious and cultural oppression, Gunaratna and Arabinda suggest a recipe for change. They claim that the resolution will require an accurate combination of efforts being "farsighted leadership, good governance, intelligent dominance, cooption of Muslim elites and support from Kuala Lumpur." The main analysis throughout this book encompasses a probable escalation scenario. This scenario assesses what is still a localized conflict and its potential to expand into an international Islamic jihad leaving damaging footprints in surrounding provinces, Bangkok and possibly expanding to other Southeast Asian nations. The literature presented in this paper has assisted in the development of a proper strategic analy-

sis of the conflict while contributing to a plan to enhance the conflict's ripeness to ensure its future ability to adapt to negotiation.

### **Strategic Analysis**

Southeast Asia's "most violent internal conflict" is fueled by forces of oppression. The increase of the police presence in the region with no sign of accountability has heightened the levels of hostility in the region. Thailand's government must recognize and publically announce that the resolution of the conflict is a national priority. The southern regions need to have more vocal involvement in their government. 3<sup>rd</sup> party negotiators must ripen the Thai government's willingness to negotiate. They must be pushed to understand that because there are no clear leaders of the insurgency, time must not be wasted on a continuous effort to identify invisible leaders of Muslim insurgency groups while thousands of innocent Thai civilians, both Muslim and Buddhist, are being slaughtered as time goes on. Malaysia has already been playing the role of 3<sup>rd</sup> party mediator. They have provided a neutral setting for negotiations but struggled to identify appropriate and influential leaders of the many insurgency groups. According to Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton (2011) in their book *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, identifying the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA* is a critical part in the construction of the beginning stages of a negotiation. One will struggle to make a wise decision when in negotiation unless one is comfortable and has an understanding of their alternative options. 3<sup>rd</sup> party negotiators must present the government leaders and police forces with their BATNA and a set of options to begin the discussion. Since the only clear leaders in the conflict are those of the government forces, the talks must begin with them. Western powers and influences must bring their

attention to this crisis. The western powers have the leverage and the powerful alliances to expose the severity and inhuman acts that have been committed by the Thai government forces through the use of media attention. This may begin the thought process for the Thai government to consider discussion. By the West using this threat of exposure, the Thai government may reconsider their current stance and/or re-evaluate their lack of focus on accountability and the eventual resolution.

### **Approach for Ripening the Conflict for Negotiation**

Utilizing the history behind the conflict, the proposed causes of the conflict, the analytical framework presented and the research completed by an abundant group of scholars focused on the conflict, one can analyze the current conflict while making a proposal as to what the first step should be towards preparing the conflict for a potential, future negotiation. The goal is conversation. The most effective approach is two-tiered. This approach involves conversation between the United States representatives and the leaders of the Thai government and police forces. This conversation will touch upon the creation of an education campaign that will help to develop an accountability system focused on both sides of the conflict.

The other tier of this approach involves a conversation between Malaysian government officials and the Malay-Muslim insurgency leaders. The U.S. will speak with Malaysian government officials to encourage a conversation about their responsibility to put pressure on the Malay-Muslims to emphasize accountability for the inhuman acts committed against innocent people. As Malaysia has been involved in the failed attempts to host negotiations between Thai police and insur-

gency leaders, Malaysian forces would be ineffective contributors to the conversation with Thai security forces. The Malaysian government could be utilized more efficiently and play a more influential role by addressing the Malay-Muslim insurgency groups as the majority of Malaysians are predominantly Muslim and therefore, have the leverage of conversing with insurgency leaders on religiously and ethnically tolerant playing grounds. The accountability discussion that the U.S. will have with the Thai government and police forces will mirror the conversation that the Malaysian officials must have with the Malay-Muslim insurgency leaders. These discussions need to address the human rights violations committed on both sides of the conflict and the concern that the international community holds.

The U.S. must offer to take the necessary steps to conduct a proper evaluation of the conflict at hand. This conversation can lead to suggestions of the U.S. supporting a human rights educational campaign in cooperation with the Thai government and police. As the U.S. is working with the Thai government to begin a dialogue concerning an educational campaign to promote accountability regarding inhuman acts, the insurgent members seeking autonomy and independence must begin discussions about their own educational campaign focusing on accountability. Because both sides of the conflict are submitting claims that the opposing side is violating basic human rights, it is critical that third party mediators such as the United States and Malaysia help to begin these pertinent discussions regarding accountability. The mere talk of the prospects of this educational campaign will ripen the conflict and prepare the government to conduct an analysis of their own operations and violations.

## **Conclusion**

The conflict between the Thai government police forces and the Malay Muslim insurgencies is a highly complex conflict and has undergone years of scholarly analysis and research. Many experts on this conflict have proposed options for a resolution and have supported their options with an overabundance of research and proof. The main purpose of this paper is to propose a conversation, initiated by U.S. officials, with the Thai government and police leaders, to begin a dialogue regarding a two tiered, educational accountability campaign. Discussion in itself will act as a means of ripening the conflict for a potential future agreement between primary actors.



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## Application of Multi-Track Diplomacy to Conflict Transformation and Political Reunification: A case study of the Taiwan Strait conflict



P  p   Fran  ois Haba

### Abstract

The analysis of the conflict using the curve of Michael Lund reveals that the primary cause was the control of Chinese territory and the reunification of the mainlanders with the Taiwan Chinese. The two political groups in Taiwan (Chinese Nationalist Party or KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party DPP) and China are the main actors whereas Japan and the United States are the secondary actors. While both the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT have been claiming “One China” principle which is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) respectively, the DPP posits a Republic of Taiwan. The conflict has escalated into war, crises and unstable peace with 4 main climaxes (1954-1955; 1958-1959; 1959-1978 and 1995-1996). The initial issue was the sovereignty dispute over China and Chinese people in both the mainland China and the island of Taiwan. Due to the de-Sinification and the Taiwanisation policies as well as divergent socio-political and economic developments, the issue has evolved into an identity issue creating 3 identifiers: few Chinese, more Taiwanese and some ‘*Chinanesse*’.

Peacemaking process: The United States has prevented a reunification war; the tracks 2, 3 and 4 diplomacy have advanced the economic interdependence and social interactions with no political reunification. Yet political and cultural identity concerns still exist.

Recommendations: it is important to apply the nine tracks of the multitrack diplomacy approach which could favorably contribute to transform the actors with their relationship, the issues and the rule mainly the “one China, different interpretations” principle. Such a conflict transformation strategy can create favorable conditions to reach a perpetual peace agreement necessary for a political reunification in the Taiwan Strait.

### Biography

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Fluent in French and Chinese, he worked as a Biology teacher and a humanitarian specialist in Guinea. In the United States, he has worked as a developmental specialist for Amego Inc. in Massachusetts, as a research intern at Save the Children USA in Fairfield, Connecticut in 2014 and as a Graduate Teaching Assistant at the University of Bridgeport from 2013 to 2015. In April 2014, he presented with Dr. Hess a conference at the University of Bridgeport entitled “Emerging Africa responds to the growing Chinese engagement”. He has been the recipient of numerous honors and awards from the Chinese Scholarship Council, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the University of Geneva and the University of Bridgeport.



## **Introduction and Historical Background**

Taiwan, consecutively known as Ilha Formosa, Formosa, Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, is a set of Islands consisting of Taiwan, Kinmen, Orchid, Pescadores, and Matsu located approximately at one hundred and twenty kilometers from the Southeastern bank of China across the Taiwan Strait. Initially inhabited by the aborigines, Taiwan has been ruled successively by the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Spanish, and the Japanese (Cauquelin, 2004: 6).

The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) integrated Taiwan in 1885-1895 as a complete province. At the time, many dwellers departed from China to the islands (Kan and Morrison, 2014:3-4). Following the fall of the Qing dynasty, the Kuomintang (KMT) founded in 1911 the Republic of China (ROC), the first democratic republic in Asia.

After the Second World War, upon the defeated Japan's surrender, the Republic of China's military troops occupied the island of Formosa in August 1945 and claimed its recovery from Japan on October 25, 1945. In August, as an aftermath of the Potsdam Declaration, the Republic of China was authorized to recover Formosa as the province of Taiwan.

In 1949, the Kuomintang-led government

with its leader Chiang Kai-Shek retreated to Taiwan due to the takeover of mainland China and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist Party in China. The involvement of external actors in the conflict management or resolution has been quasi limited to the deterrence diplomacy conducted by the United States since 1958 when the dispute culminated into the first climax. While this contributed to prevent a reunification war, it has led to a division into "two Chinas" across the Taiwan Strait: the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan (Wei, 2013).

During the presidencies of both Chiang Kai-shek and his successor Chiang Ching-kuo, the principle of "one China" was indisputable and the reunification of Taiwan with China was the common goals targeted by both the PRC and the ROC. Therefore, the main issue was a power struggle over who among the PRC and the ROC was the legitimate government of the China.

President Lee Teng-hui, successor of Chiang Ching-kuo, announced the end of the communist revolution in 1991, acknowledged the PRC as the legitimate ruler of the mainland and declared the sovereignty of the ROC over the islands of Taiwan. In May 1999, he defined the cross-Strait relations as "special state-to-state". His successor Chen followed his footsteps, ignored the "1992 consensus", adopted the "Five Nos" policy and pushed for Taiwan's independence.

Throughout the years, the growing role of China contributed to the expansion of its strong diplomatic relations and the acceptance of its "one China" position in international affairs. Consequently, the ROC lost a considerable number of allies and was expelled from the United Nations and many

other international organizations.

There is a continuous consolidation of a democratic regime in Taiwan whereas China supports its “soft authoritarianism” jurisdiction. According to Li (2014:120), both the KMT and the CCP have adopted a meticulous strategy. In Taiwan, the KMT expects to demonstrate to voters the advantages of good relations with China after the burdened eight-year rule of Chen Shui-bian—DPP—who supported the Taiwanization practice and the pro-independence stance. China believes that economic interdependence will convince the Taiwanese, leading them to develop a willingness to warmly embrace the motherland and reunify.

The Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China in the Mainland (PRC), although opposed on sovereignty issues, have developed highly interdependent economies. Chiang (2011:684) identifies four significant peaks of development in their relations. Firstly, the period of military confrontation (1949 to 1979) was characterized by the inexistence of political, economic and social contacts between people across the Taiwan Strait. Secondly, the emergence of a political contact (1979 to 1993) as a result of the mainland’s message to Taiwan Compatriots. That attitude resulted in an enormous growth of cross-strait economic and social communications. Thirdly, from 1994 to 2007, the proposition of the “special state-to-state relation” followed by the “one country on each side” respectively by the two DPP former Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian contributed to deteriorate the political ties between both sides. The Anti-Secession Law adopted by China in 2005 to prevent a referendum for Taiwan independence was counterproductive to a reunification process between both sides.

Paradoxically, despite the political hostilities of this period, the economic and social interactions were enhanced considerably. Lastly, since May 2008, with the election of President Ma Ying-Jeou, political, economic, and social events occurring in the Taiwan Strait have brought new development in the dynamics of the conflict. The resumption of the negotiations between the ARATS and the SEF on the basis of the “1992 consensus” has been a significant development. In addition, growing socio-economic relations have occurred with the implementation of the three direct links (air, sea, and land), the authorization for mainland’s tourists to travel to Taiwan and the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

As Brown (1996) asserts, identity is constructed and strengthened based on collective experience including economic, sociocultural and political experiences. Therefore, individuals or groups form their identities by interacting with the environment—social and cultural—they belong to. The divergent social and cultural changes experienced by people on both sides have transformed the identities of both social entities, which have created a dichotomy framework of unification versus independence for China and Taiwan. Since then, the people in Taiwan, in order to identify themselves with Taiwan or China, have encountered many ethnic, linguistic, social, and political issues with two major groups being involved: the local Taiwanese and the Mainlanders (Kan and Morrison, 2014:4).

In spite of the resumption of semi-governmental negotiations, the establishment of economic interdependence, and the improvement of interrelations between the people of both sides, a political divergence still exists. Apparently, this ingenious strategy is



not working towards its intended goals. China's resolute position, its Foreign Affairs' inflexible and unbending explanations, the application of the "one China" principle and the consequent rejection of the need for Taiwan's people to be involvement in international organizations prevents China from cultivating and promoting a Chinese identity among the Taiwanese. Consequently, two main trends have been developing simultaneously across the Taiwan Strait, namely the intensification of Taiwan's identity—ethnic, civic, national, political—and the development of economic interdependence and social exchanges between China and Taiwan (Kan and Morrison, 2014:4).

Consequently, many concerns still exist in regard to the future of the relations in the Taiwan Strait. The occurrence of unpredictable and pernicious domestic or international events can affect the achievements attained so far and deadlock the process. For instance, the victory of a DPP candidate during the next presidential election in Taiwan may profoundly transform the current trend in the relations and the rapprochement process. The leaders may refocus on the positions of their predecessors (Presidents Lee and Chen), they may opt to suspend the negotiation process, or they may choose to change the pattern of the collaboration.

Given this potential for deterioration, a systematic conflict transformation approach is essential to prevent the present status quo from degenerating into a worst case scenario that would block the political reunification process. This is consistent with Lederach's argument that both conflict resolution and conflict management are involved in conflict transformation (2003). This context leads to the following question: is multi-track diplomacy adequate to transform the conflict towards a sustainable political reunification

across the Taiwan Strait?

The main purpose of this paper is to explore and analyze the conflict, and suggest an appropriate strategy that can contribute to achieve a sustainable political reunification.

In the second section after this introduction, by applying the curve of conflict, the paper will identify the root causes and the prominent issues underlying the conflict, the actors—primary and secondary—with their respective claims and interests. We investigate the dynamics of the conflict and assess the peacemaking approach—conflict management, conflict resolution, or conflict transformation—that has been used in the Taiwan Strait conflict. We also determine the factors contributing to its intractability as well as the barriers blocking the actors from achieving a sustainable political integration. The third section examines the applicability of the multi-track diplomacy approach as the suitable peacemaking tool to achieve the transformation of the conflict in order to pave the way for the political reunification of the PRC and the ROC. Finally, the concluding section will suggest a new perspective in resolving the political deadlock between China and Taiwan. Before concluding, the paper will suggest perspectives relevant to the political integration. The recommendations in this paper will contribute to identify the origin of political tensions and suggest some possibilities for regional integration.

## **Analysis of the conflict**

### **Causes and interests**

Tracking back in history, the end of Chinese war led to the Taiwan Strait political conflict in 1949. The root cause was the battle between the PRC and the ROC to control the territory and unify the people in both mainland China and the islands of Taiwan. The central location of Taiwan provides sig-

nificant interests for the actors involved in the conflict. Straddling the sea lanes it remains a significant port for several trade routes across Asia, hence providing tremendous economic interests to China, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. The multiple types of soft power and the impeccable infrastructure in Taiwan provide a reliable environment for local, external, and Chinese enterprises with an economic benefit for Japanese, American, and Southeast Asian businesspeople. These considerations explain China's avaricious attitude to reconquer Taiwan with no flexibility on practical options for a future Taiwan Strait relationship.

Secondly, in terms of security, Chinese leaders also perceive the reunification of Taiwan with China as indispensable for the integrity of a Chinese state that is stable and unified. Accepting Taiwan to become independent would provide an opportunity for other rebellious Chinese provinces—Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang—to claim their independence as well. An independent Taiwan could also probably serve as a military base for China's foes. The close collaboration of Taiwan with the United States and Japan may prevent China from gaining a regional and global reputation. In such a relationship, either the United States or Japan may even use Taiwan as a foundation for disruption in a situation of domestic turbulence in China. In this regard, many concerns were expressed among the Chinese leaders when on February 19, 2005 an Americano-Japanese declaration was released in which both countries qualified the Taiwan Strait conflict as a collective security problem. The United States' failure to protect Taiwan from China's military attack would affect its relations with other regional allies leading to its marginalization in the region. Furthermore, it would extend China's military influence toward the East into the Pacific, which will allow China

to supervise the sea routes important to the economic activities of Japan and South Korea.

The last element is that the United States has an enduring interest in promoting and helping the development of democratic nations to confine the communist regimes. By the same token, Japan's interest is to prevent China from becoming a superpower in the region which could create a security threat for Japan. Particularly, China might use its power to seize and block sea routes in the eastern Taiwan which are indispensable for Japan's economic development. China considers Taiwan as the last relic of a hundred years of Chinese humiliation perpetrated by powerful colonizers. In China, both the leaders and the citizens relate Taiwan's status emotionally and nationalistically to the territorial losses incurred during the foreign invasions of China.

Hamrin and Wang (2004) identify six contributing factors to the intractability of the conflict: 1) more than a hundred years of separate administration of both sides; 2) historical memory of the "2-28 incident"; 3) the independence movement engendered by democratization; 4) Taiwan's isolation in international organizations; 5) the rapid economic development; and 6) the demographic change.

### **Actors and their claims**

The main actors involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict are the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China, whereas the United States and Japan represent the secondary actors.

#### People's Republic of China

In the People's Republic of China, the leaders claim that the existence of the Republic

of China ended in 1949 and the islands of Taiwan have always been part of mainland China, apart from being under Japanese administrative control from 1895 to 1945. The ultimate goals are to reunify the islands of Taiwan with mainland China. This position has been expressed in the proposal suggested by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, sustained by Hu Jintao and supported by the current Chinese leader Xi Jinping. They focus on the fact that the resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue needs to be considered as a Chinese internal affair; peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China; affirmation that Taiwan is a natural and indisputable portion of China; the use of force is a last resort; the status of Taiwan cannot be changed by means of referendum; and the United States should be dealing with both China and Taiwan based upon the Three Communiqués declared respectively in 1972, 1979, and 1982. Since Hong Kong and Macao returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively and given the public support by the United States Congress for Taiwanese independence, the recovery of Taiwan has become a sacred mission for China. The ability of Chinese Communist Party leaders to reunify Taiwan with the mainland is perceived as a demonstration of their legitimacy.

#### Republic of China (ROC)

The ROC's nationalistic stand is based on the fact that it sees itself as a state that has its own population dwelling within a delimited territory, constituted as a political entity, governed by a sovereign authority, and able to establish relationships with other states and join international organization. However, in Taiwan, there are two primary actors in the conflict supporting two distinct claims. On the one hand, the political coalition "Pan Blue Camp" encompasses the Kuomintang (KMT) or nationalist party that founded the Republic of China with the People First Party

(PFP) as political ally. This pro-China political group is claiming that the ROC has been an independent state since its creation in 1911; it therefore refuses to recognize the People's Republic of China created in 1949 by the Communist Party of China in Beijing; it aims at conciliating Taiwan with China and therefore adopts a very vigilant attitude that does not offend China (Kan and Morrison, 2014:3-4). The government is seeking to take advantage of the cross-Strait economic relationship and deflect military confrontation with China while avoiding recognition of the concept of "one China" promoted by China (Sutter, 2006:424). On the other hand, the political coalition "Pan Green Camp" regroups the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with their political allies such as the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). This political spectrum is pushing for reforms that enhance Taiwan's position to become an independent country completely separated from China. The coalition considers the ROC as an illegal foreign government; it wants to install a legitimate independent and new regime or a Republic of Taiwan (ROT) to supplant the ROC (Sutter, 2006:424). On the basis of international law, the DPP claims that legally Taiwan is not part of China because the island has never been returned to the PRC under formal legal instruments including the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951. Based on this position, the logical framework for dealing with China should be "One China, one Taiwan".

#### The United States

The United States in adopting the "One China" policy, has always encouraged dialogue between the leaders of both parties, seeking to prevent an armed conflict, and promoting a peaceful settlement. However, the position of the United States remains ambiguous because the United States and the PRC have a different understanding and in-

terpretation of the expression “one China”.

### Japan

Japan has adopted a dual position where it has to maintain a good relationship with the United States without offending China. Refusing to provide assistance to the United States might jeopardize the Americano-Japanese mutual security alliance (Faiola, 2005). At the same time, it is preserving the economic interdependence with China. Providing assistance to the United States to support Taiwan against China may lead to China's vengeance in the form of economic reprisals. Due to the fact that the countries of East and Southeast Asia have unpleasant memories of the Japanese occupation during World War II, Japan wants to retain its relationship with the United States without antagonizing China.

### Dynamic of the conflict

The conflict is in its sixth decade without being fully resolved. Since 1949, military and diplomatic confrontations have occurred between the PRC and ROC as well as between the PRC and the United States, making the Taiwan Strait, an epicenter of hostilities with several climaxes leading to war, crises, and unstable peace (Wu, 2003: 63).

### **First climax (August 11, 1954 – May 1, 1955)**

During the Korean War, the United States restricted the Taiwan Strait by preventing both the PRC and the ROC from attacking each other. On February 1953, the government assisted the KMT's army in its attempt to attack the mainland, and Chiang Kai-shek provocatively moved fifty eight thousand troops to Kinmen and fifteen thousands to Matsu. After Zhou Enlai's declaration on August 11, 1954 to liberate Taiwan, the crisis started on September 3, 1954 when the troops of the People's Liberation Army de-

ployed to Amoy began to bombard the ROC controlled offshore island of Quemoy.

The rationale of the PRC was to inhibit the establishment of collaboration between the United States and the ROC and to prevent them from associating their military and political capabilities, which would violate China's sovereignty and prevent Taiwan's liberation. A second reason was the fear of the PRC that the ROC could integrate the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) that was supposed to be founded in September 1954. Indicatively, the bombardment of Quemoy started the time the parties invited to conclude the convention of the SEATO were gathering in the Philippine capital, Manila. At the same time, the United States was projecting to create in a near future the Northeast Asian Treaty Organization (NEATO), a regional security organization between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. The last reason was that the PRC considered that any future attack by an external enemy, possibly the United States, would be launched from Indochina, the Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan; this idea was framed as “the three-front” concept (*“Sanluxiangxinyu bui”* 三線論).

Due to the persistence of the crisis, the United States designed a strategy with a set of three components: preventing the PRC from attacking the ROC in Taiwan; convincing the ROC to refrain from any reprisals against the PRC in case of an attack; and inhibiting the status quo encompassing the Taiwan Strait. To achieve these goals, the United States initiated and adopted three measures including a diplomatic maneuver in the United Nations known as “Operation oracle”, the finalization of the security treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, and the adoption by the United States Congress of the Formosa Resolution. On March 10, 1955,

the United States publicly announced that it might use of nuclear weapons against China. On May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1955 China stopped its shelling actions on the Kinmen and Matsu, and that led to the end of the crisis.

By preventing one party from attacking the other party, the United States adopted a stratagem of dual deterrence which transformed the line (Taiwan Strait) into the creation of a real “border” between the two territories. Consequently, the border issue transformed “One China” into “Two Chinas”, the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan. It is worth noting that the disagreement between Beijing and Taipei on who should control China left both sides dissatisfied with the status quo of the existence of “Two-Chinas”. The dissatisfaction of both governments prepared the path for the second confrontation in 1958.

#### **Second climax (August 23, 1958 – January 1, 1959)**

From July 31 to August 3, 1958, the People’s Liberation Army began a huge artillery attack of Kinmen and Matsu with a threat to invade them. The United States declared its support to the ROC and deployed a military contingent in the region. When the intensity of the confrontation attained its peak, the United States planned nuclear attacks on some Chinese cities including Guangzhou, Nanjing and Shanghai. In an effort to support the PRC, Khrushchev declared that attacking China would be considered as attacking the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The PRC reduced its bombardment despite the Soviet Union’s support and gradually ceased entirely due to the announcement by the American government that it would not retreat in the front of the armed confrontation. The conflict ended on October 6, 1958, when the People’s Liberation Army stopped

its bombardment.

#### **Third climax (1959-1978)**

Many semi-armed confrontations followed the prolonged armed conflicts. The altercations in the Taiwan Strait continued after the armed conflict of the Quemoy Islands. For instance, many military and secret police attacks were perpetrated by Chiang Kai-Shek against the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhejiang from 1962 to 1965. From 1962 to 1974 the ROC Air force flew frequently over the mainland to monitor the process of the nuclear facility development by the PRC. The PRC successfully shot down five American planes. Between 1960 and 1974, the United States deterred the PRC by deploying nuclear arms in Taiwan. Between October 25, 1958 and December 31, 1978, every odd day the Quemoy islands were shelled by the PRC.

#### **Fourth climax (July 21, 1995-March 23, 1996)**

Following two resolutions adopted by the United States Congress to grant Taiwanese president Lee Teng-Hui a private visiting visa, on May 22, 1995, the American government invited President Lee Teng-Hui to attend a meeting at Cornell University. After his visit, the PRC realized that President Lee Teng-Hui challenged the “One-China” principle by repeatedly using the expression “Republic of China on Taiwan” in the United States. Furthermore, the PRC feared that Lee Teng-Hui was planning more visits in many other significant Western nations. In reaction to the visit, the PRC verbally assaulted President Lee through the media, and proceeded to test six missiles between July 21 and 26, 1995, approximately 95 miles away from the Pengchiayu Island. The PRC continued the military exercises by testing missiles until the



election of Lee as Taiwanese president on March 23, 1996.

The PRC asserted that the rationale behind the missiles testing and military exercises was to cause alarm in order to influence and prevent Taiwanese voters from casting their votes for the pro-independent's presidential candidate Lee. Considering that the Taiwan independence issue is a source of tension, when the Chinese uproar decreased, the American government adjusted its policy toward Taiwan by adopting the "Three Nos" principle while Jiang Zemin was visiting Washington in October 1996.

As explained above, in both climaxes the PRC was very aggressive. The leaders stated their desire to regain Taiwan and bombarded the ROC's offshore islands. But, anytime the United States declared its determination to protect Taiwan, China reversed its stance. While the PRC responded to the provocative action of Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States retorted with military reactions including the threat of nuclear strikes to support the ROC. These missile tests and military exercises were intended to intimidate and thereby influence voters in the Taiwanese presidential election. The government is seeking to take advantage of the cross-strait economic relationship and deflect military confrontation with China while avoiding recognition of the concept of "one China" promoted by China (Sutter, 2006:424).

#### Issues

At the beginning of the conflict in the earlier 1950s, the issue was the power struggle between the CCP and the KMT—two distinct Chinese political entities—and their armies for the territorial sovereignty over Taiwan in which the winner would be the sole legitimate government representing China.

Studies have shown that many changes have

contributed to transform the issues by moving from the sovereignty issue to the Taiwan identity issue—ethnic identity, Chinese national identity, and party identity. According to Wakabayashi, cited by Li (2014), three identity changes have taken place. The first took place with the annexation of Taiwan by Japan in 1895, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war. Before, the Japanese and Taiwanese people were thinking of themselves as a unified country. When Japan annexed Taiwan, the imposition of Japanese culture on the Taiwanese and the potential invasion by new Japanese troops created a strong sense of nationalism among the Taiwanese with a determination to resist the external occupation. An identity centered on the opposition to the Japanese occupation was formed. Both immigrant and native Chinese united based on the goal to resist the Japanese menace. The second transformation happened with the glorious return of Taiwan to China in 1945. The ROC implemented a "Chinese state" and promoted the Chinese culture as the predominant ethnic and cultural identity. When the KMT-led government exiled to Taiwan, many Taiwanese understood they were plainly Chinese again. However, the February 28, 1947 incident that led to the imposition of martial law changed the mindset of the Taiwanese who began to differentiate themselves from the Chinese. The incident brought a second identity transformation in Taiwan with the creation of a strong Taiwanese nationalism. The third change started with the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the beginning of the democratization process in Taiwan. The democratization has been gradually deepening with the presidential election of: Lee Teng-hui—first directly elected ROC president—in 1996; Chen Shui-bian—first opposition leader elected ROC president—in 2000; and Ma Ying-jeo—return of a KMT leader to power after eight years—in 2008 and reelected in

2012. In addition, the government has established elections at both mayoral and county levels. The accountability of the government in terms of policies—domestic and international—to the public is very strong. The processes of de-Sinification and Taiwanization (promoting the Taiwanese identity) have proceeded in many sectors so as to achieve a self-conscious nation building project. Taiwanese writers have provoked a debate over Taiwanese literature. The government has also undertaken name alterations. Examples include the addition of the word “Taiwan” on the case of the Republic of China’s passport; the change of the name “China Post” to “Taiwan Post”; the removal of the word “Province” on license plates; the change of the name “China Petroleum Company” to “Taiwan Petroleum company”. In the education system, local dialects are promoted over Mandarin and the old traditional *pinyin* (phonetic system) is used.

Surveys tracking the ethnic identification of Taiwan residents identify people identifying themselves as Chinese, Taiwanese, or Chinese and Taiwanese, with a strong increase of Taiwanese identity from 17.6% in 1994 to 60.4 % in June 2014. During the same period there has been a slight percentage decrease of the dual identifiers, whereas it dropped dramatically among the Chinese identifiers from 25.5% in 1994 to 3.4% in June 2014 (See figure 1).




Figure 1: Ethnic identity in Taiwan from 1992 to 2014 (Source: Election Study Center)

This considerable growing percentage of the Taiwanese identifiers is strongly consistent with the assertion of President Chen Shui-bian’s capability to construct a new Taiwanese nation historically and culturally rooted in Taiwan. This was demonstrated in 2004 by Chen’s supporters and the political leaders of the Pan-Blue camp (Clark and Tan, 2012)

Niou has pointed out that the preferences of Taiwanese voters towards a political party have created a party identity. In terms of party preferences, Taiwanese citizens with a pro-independence stance and who are embracing the Taiwanese identity always vote pan-green, whereas the pro-unification supporters identify themselves as Chinese and vote blue. In terms of the public opinion towards Taiwan’s political identity (unification versus independence) between 1994 and 2014, the support of the current status quo has fluctuated based upon the variables of maintaining the current status quo either indefinitely, or then moving toward unification or toward independence. The percentage of people supporting independence immediately has remained low from 3.4% to 1.4% (see figure 2).




Figure 2: Position on Taiwan’s Status ( Source: Election Study Center)

## 2.5. Assessment of the peacemaking process

The evaluation of the peacemaking mechanism through the diagram of the multi-track diplomacy can help to thoroughly understand the diplomatic tools that have been implemented to manage or resolve the conflict. The multi-track diplomacy is a set of diplomatic activities involving nine tracks including government officials, professionals of conflict resolution, businesspeople, private citizens, scholars (trainers and students), activists, religionists, fund providers, and communication specialists.

### **Track one diplomacy: Government negotiations**

This track is the traditional interaction between official channels representing governments of sovereign nations. In the cross-strait relations, track one diplomacy has never been applied in a formal way, either through a direct negotiation involving heads of states, or by signing legal documents—protocols, agreements, treaties between governments—by both governments. The only meeting between government officials from both sides since 1949 took place on February 11 and 13, 2014, when Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun met in Nanjing and Shanghai respectively. However, before the trip the Legislative Yuan passed a resolution preventing Wang Yu-chi from approving any document with a direct or incidental reference to China's "One China plan" or its position against Taiwanese independence, as well as from debating "one China" or a "peace agreement". Although these topics are largely debated in track two diplomacy, they are always deflected in debates by President Ma's administration at government-to-government level.

### **Track two diplomacy: Semi-official negotiations**

Track two is the unofficial and non-governmental set of activities conducted independently from the government apparatus in preventing or resolving a conflict. In the Taiwan Strait conflict, the Strait's Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) established respectively by Taiwan on March 9, 1991 and China on December 16, 1991, are two organizations representing an appropriate instrument to discuss the Cross-Strait issues. In order to address the legal tangle, representatives of the SEF and ARATS decided to meet in Hong Kong. During their meeting on October 22-23, 1992 in Hong Kong, under government instruction, the semi-official representatives of both sides discussed the "One China" principle but were unable to reach a general agreement over the real definition. The substance of the unwritten agreement can be portrayed in one sentence as "One China, but with unconventional meanings". In April 1993 in Singapore the leaders of both organizations held a historic public meeting for the first time since 1949. Over twenty consultations were conducted with the signing of four agreements based on economic and commerce relations. The two organizations held twenty rounds of talks between 1993 to 1998, before the suspension of the negotiation in 1999 following the decision of President Lee Teng-hui on the trend of the cross-strait relation and its option for an independent Taiwan. In 2008, following the election of President Ma, the resumption of the negotiation was launched on the basis of the "1992 consensus". Since then, the organizations have held ten round of talks and signed twenty one agreements (Kuo, 2014).

### **Track three diplomacy or “Business Diplomacy”**

Since the beginning of the interactions between both sides in the late 1980s, the business diplomacy has been intense with a significant improvement of economic relations. Trade and investment have been the two fastest growing economic activities between China and Taiwan. An intense business diplomacy involving Taiwanese investors and businesspeople has been conducted between the Communist Party in China and the KMT, as well as the SEF and ARAST. In 1985, commerce was authorized between China and Taiwan with the goods transiting across either Macao or Hong Kong. Following the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, in 1990, the Taiwanese were granted authorization to invest straight with an obligation to register the money in a third nation. Taiwanese investors and businesspeople participated in a forum on the economy and trade in Beijing held by both Chinese parties—CPC and KMT—in April 2006 (Rios, 2102:11).

During President Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (2000-2008), the KMT focused its economic policy on promoting production and exports by supporting tax cuts, the building of infrastructure, and accessibility to China. Most importantly, the policy adopted by Hu Jintao —“counting on the Taiwanese people”—aimed at fortifying economic relationships to strengthen China’s political influence. The second objective also focused of diminishing military menaces and abstaining from offensive diplomacy, in order to reduce the resentment of Taiwanese people toward China (Keng and Schubert, 2010: 295).

In Taiwan, the leaders prioritize the economic aspect over the political issues. In contrast to the position supported in 1997 by the

PRC in giving top priority to the political aspect in the reconciliation process, Chinese leaders have been adjusting to Taipei’s formulation; this, despite the fact that they keep stating that all agreements should have an inherent political nature. These political issues include security issues, military guidelines (rules of conduct, announcement in advance of military exercises, diminution of deployment), identity (national, cultural, and ethnic identities), sovereignty issues, international peace, relations between Taiwan and the United States (i.e. arms sales), and the institutionalization of the Taiwan Strait governance (democracy on the Strait as stated by China).

Additionally, China has been emphasizing the economic sector related to Taiwan’s policies that promote economic growth, more precisely the industry with a complementary economic impact, and it has granted Taiwanese businesspeople “preferential treatment”. The economic ties between Taiwan and China have been substantiated since the election of President Ma in 2008 with the adoption in June 2010 of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The aims of this preferential trade agreement are the reduction of the tariffs and trade barriers and the improvement of economic relations.

The statistical data provided by the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Councils (MAC) show that The proportion of Taiwan’s exports to China has firmly increased from 3.9% in 2001 to 26.8% in 2013. The proportion of Taiwan’s imports has also increased from 5.5% in 2001 to 15.8% in 2013.

### **Track four diplomacy or Private Citizen Diplomacy**

Track four diplomacy, or people-to-people diplomacy (citizen diplomacy) in the case of



the Taiwan Strait has been essentially limited to tourism and can be determined by the number of citizens traveling through the Strait. Citizen diplomacy or people-to-people interaction has abruptly and rapidly increased since Taiwan allowed its citizens to visit China for the first time.

It is worth mentioning that the visits have been asymmetrical, with more Taiwanese visiting China than Chinese visiting Taiwan. This asymmetry is due to some travel restrictions on the Chinese side, such as being part of a tour group and having an annual income of more than  $\text{¥}11,000$  (Zhang, 2013).

In addition to tourism, cultural exchange has been another component of the citizen diplomacy. This has taken many forms, including a sport tournament with the visit of Basketball player Yao Ming in 2007 (Yeh, 2013), a book fair in Xiamen in 2005 (Chen and Hu, 2011), traditional music performances (Wang, 2004), movie promotions, etc.

#### **Track Five: Academic Exchange, Research, Training, and Education**

Since the end of the 1980s, educational exchanges have increased, based on the conviction that such a relationship would help bring together the new generation of both sides (Li, 2014:126). In a thorough study on the academic and educational exchanges between Taiwan and China, Shucher (2009) identifies exchanges at both community and state levels. There have been intense official exchanges between foundations, associations, and universities. The official and unofficial exchanges between colleges include visits by scholars from Taiwan to China. In this regard, the number of students funded by the MAC to pursue graduate studies in China increased from 14 in 1996 to 1,063 in 2009. Studies conducted by Liu (2014:126-127)

show that in 1992, the numbers of co-sponsored cultural activities were 6 and 18 cases for China and Taiwan respectively. These numbers increased to 2,787 and 607 cases in 2009 for China and Taiwan respectively. Since 2008, President Ma has focused in rediplomatizing the academic exchange with the openness of Taiwanese universities to Chinese students and the recognition of Chinese credentials.

#### **Track six or Activisms or Advocacy**

The democratization in Taiwan has led to the democratization of Taiwan's civil society with more freedom to organize protests. On August 30, 2008, the "Taiwan Society"—an organization constituted of outstanding Taiwanese scholars—protested against the worsening of the economic situation since President Ma took office and accused its administration of jeopardizing Taiwan's sovereignty by favoring tight relation with China.

The DPP leaders opposed the signing of the ECFA by expressing concerns that China would influence the ROC. On June 26, an anti-ECFA protest was launched and rallied over 32,000 protesters. Many demonstrators rallied at the headquarters of the Straits Exchange Foundation to protest against the secrecy that characterized a pre-signing by the government of a trade agreement in June, 2013 (Lee and Culpan, 2014; Loa, 2013).

By the same token, on March 2014, a crowd of more than 116,000 people of the "sunflower movement" protested against the ECFA and occupied the Legislative Yuan for more than three days (Tseng et al., 2014). The movement was characterized by a strong organizational structure, a degree of discipline, a charismatic centralized leadership, and a limpid message. The demonstrators protested against the trade agreement be-



tween China and Beijing which they declared as potentially harmful for the Taiwanese economy.

### **Track seven or Religious diplomacy or Faith diplomacy**

Taiwan and China have been practicing faith-based diplomacy by allowing religious cooperation (Deborah and Cheng, 2012). Some Chinese Buddhist leaders have traveled unofficially to Taiwan for indoctrination. The Buddhist Master Wei Chueh supported Lien Chan during Taiwan's presidential election in 2004 and coerced his partisans to refuse the peace referendum that was proposed by Chen Shui-bian's administration. Hsing Yun, a Buddhist master originating from Jiangsu, has been involved in the enhancing of relations for the reunification process because he was engaged with the KMT against Lee Teng-Hui during the presidential election in 1996. Hsin Tao is focused on promoting mutual understanding between all world religions, and peaceful development. Among the four Buddhist organizations in China, three Buddhist Masters have been actively involved in resolving the Taiwan Strait dispute.

In addition, China has been holding many Buddhist relics exhibition events in Taiwan, specifically in 2002 and 2010. Due to its historical population characteristics, the exhibition has attracted more tourists.

Between 1980s and 2000, Taiwan has invested about ten billions New Taiwan Dollars into restoring some one hundred Taoist and Buddhist temples. Most of the money was invested in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, from where thousands of Chinese had departed to migrate to Taiwan. In addition to the economic advantage, the restoration of the temples, leading to many re-

ligionists' visits' would promote the historical ties between the Taiwanese and these provinces, hence transforming the identity of more visitors.

China has used Buddhist-based diplomacy by organizing international Buddhist forums in 2006, 2009, and 2012 respectively in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, with a secondary objective of strengthening the bond between China and Taiwan. China has also organized exhibitions of Buddhist relics in Taiwan. Christians—Catholics and Protestants—do not have much influence on either side (Angelskär, 2013:4).

### **Track eight: Funding**

Funding organizations always provide the financial resources to support the other tracks in their activities. In the Taiwan Strait conflict, three groups of funding organizations have been providing resources to support the activities of the other tracks. First, governmental funding is obtained from public sources such as taxation. In Taiwan, the Chinese Development Funds created by the Mainland Affairs Council plays this role. Second, there are private donations by individuals or corporations. Taiwanese businesspeople have been investing actively in this regard. For instance, Taiwanese billionaire Wang has built a private hospital. Third, there is the humanitarian aid provided during disasters. In this regard, the disaster diplomacy has been reciprocally active between Taiwan and China. Government data reveals that there were more than 40,000 Taiwanese NGOs and over 2,000 among them have carried out cross-strait activities or are partnering with International NGOs.

### **Track nine or communication**

The democratization in Taiwan has led to the democratization of Taiwan's civil society with

more freedom of the press and freedom to protest. Therefore, Taiwan's response to any cross-Strait question is based on the opinions of the general public, the media, the leaders of political entities, and the members of the Legislative Yuan. According to Yang Yi, spokesperson for the Council of Taiwan Affairs Office, journalism/media exchanges have contributed significantly to promote cross-Strait relations. The media exchanges across the Taiwan Strait started in September 1987 with the dispatch of journalists from the "Independent Evening Post" to China, which was also the first travel of Taiwanese journalists to China since 1949. The journalism exchanges were formally instituted in August 1991, when journalists from Xinhua (Fan Liqing) and China News (Guo Weifeng) traveled to Taiwan for a reporting mission. In China, the exchanges have been promoted by the adoption of laws on news reporting easing the procedures of acquiring travel authorization to China for Taiwanese journalists. For instance, since 1987, approximately two thousands Chinese journalists have traveled to Taiwan, whereas over twenty thousand Taiwanese journalists have set foot on Chinese soil. In 2009 Xinhua News Agency's President (Li Congjun) met with the President of the Straits Exchange Foundation and a media group from Taiwan and discussed cooperation with the Taiwan media. In 2013, over seventy Chinese and Taiwanese media agencies met in China and agreed on a six-point plan on the accountability of the media for the peaceful progress in the cross-Strait conflict. Despite this development in media exchanges between China and Taiwan, China continues to block and restrict the publication of news from Taiwanese websites, magazines, and newspapers. Similarly, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan has opposed the media exchanges by rationalizing that such a cooperation could engulf Taiwanese media, promote Chinese influence,

sway Taiwanese culture, and expand Chinese identity in Taiwan. Consequently, Chinese newspapers are prohibited for publication in Taiwan. With the split in the political entity into pan-green and pan-bleu, the DPP always refer to the media cooperation to attack.

The communications have also increased between both sides. Postal letters have been the form of communications frequently used. The number of letters between both sides has been reduced from 17 million in 1995 to eight million in 2010. This decrease might be explained by the growing use of emails, fax, telephone, Skype, and other internet-based communications tools (Liu, 2014:125).

#### Prospect of Political Reunification

As described above in the dynamic of conflicts, conflict management has been significantly based on coercive diplomacy and deterrence diplomacy. In addition, there has been an increased economic and socio-cultural integration in the Taiwan Strait, which has resulted in the economic dependence of Taiwan on China. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the rapid economic integration has been accompanied by increasing political tensions and security menaces as explained earlier in the dynamics of the conflict. The "spirit of commerce", as described by Kant, has been predominant in the relations. However, this spirit has not supplanted the wicked circle of hostilities and distrust with a wholesome circle of trust and reciprocal political integration. This implies that the use of traditional approaches of political integration do not yield efficient results in the case of the Taiwan Strait.

In my opinion, in the Taiwan Strait conflict, many social and political changes have solidified the perceptions of the people on each side to such a degree that transformation in the status quo would be a political earthquake

leading to a political suicide for the political leaders. For instance, China's resolute position, its Foreign Affairs' inflexible and unbending explanation and utilization of the "one China" principle, and the consequent rejection of the need for Taiwan's people to be involved in international organizations, prevents China from cultivating and promoting a Chinese identity among the Taiwanese. China's perpetual denial of the aspirations of the citizens in Taiwan, its refusal to adapt its "one China" principle will sustain the tensions and deepen the identity gap, hence block the political reconciliation and unification. The ROC's participation in international organizations has been one of the important elements of its foreign policy since 1990; according to an opinion poll, 77.3% of Taiwanese support Taiwan's participation in organizations affiliated to the United Nations (Glaser, 2013:1).

The different political patterns followed by the PRC and the ROC have led to a divergent political transformation which has created a gap between them in terms of the major aspects of political development, including statehood, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration (BTI, 2014:5). In light of the above-mentioned facts, a resolution of the conflict leading to a perpetual peace agreement is hard to reach; even if it is achieved, there is no guarantee for a future political reunification. Therefore, the success of political reunification is contingent on the transformation of the conflict. In this regard, the multi-track diplomacy approach, an exhaustive mechanism of conflict transformation, can be used to conduct the five sorts of transformation, including actor transformation, issue transformation, rule transformation, structural transformation, and relationship transformation (Väyrynen, 1991: 163; Auvinen and Kivimäki, 1997: 3).

#### Actor transformation

Since Ma Yingjiu's election as Taiwan president in 2008, the resumption of the dialogue has contributed to the reduction of hostility, with a convergent goal of peaceful development between China, Taiwan, and the United States leading to a closer relationship. Since the source of the conflict has changed from sovereignty to identity, the leaders in China, Taiwan, and the United States need to adopt a new approach in response to the changes in the nature and issues of the conflict for a "triple-win" solution to one of the protracted complex conflict arenas of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Hamrin and Wang, 2004). i) In regard to its strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait and the region as a whole, the United States should adopt an impartial position for peaceful political reconciliation of both sides and the protection of its symbiotic relationship with its allies; ii) For peaceful political reunification, Beijing needs to change its attitudes in the parent-child authority struggle and adopt a new policy compatible with the current reality in the Taiwan Strait issue. China needs to understand that the issues in Taiwan are not similar to the model in Hong Kong and Macao, because of their experience and colonial past.

#### Issue transformation

The transformation of the issue is related to the change in the political agenda of each actor through an alteration of the root cause of the conflict. Taiwan's de-Sinification and democratization processes have created a new collective social understanding and experience. The new experience has transformed the Taiwanese identity. This identity is also protecting the democratization in Taiwan. Therefore, democracy in Taiwan is considered a crucial element that marks significant political and social differences between China and Taiwan. Importantly, both Taiwanese leaders and citizens believe that re-

unification with China under the “One China principle” would destroy their political liberties.

Hence, the way leaders exploit identity transformation has become an important political game. The Han ethnic identity is directly associated with the identity of the Chinese.

The change of identity in China and growing nationalism has also contributed to the current pattern of the Taiwan Strait issue with convergent socioeconomic ties and divergent political relations that are far from comfortable. The current increasing economic and social interactions between both sides symbolize China’s strong desire to integrate Taiwan into the Chinese nation. For Chinese leaders, the integration of Taiwan in China is a matter of China’s civic/national identity. It can be argued that many Chinese would preserve the Chinese unity and cohesion at the expense of their economic interest. Therefore, the economic realm cannot plainly explain China’s attitudes in the Taiwan Strait issue.

Rather, the root cause of the sovereignty issue has both historical and cultural backgrounds. Culturally, the Chinese agree that China is a multiethnic nation. Although the Han remain the ethnic majority, a Confucian hierarchical classification is present everywhere. Based upon this reasoning, Chinese identity is linked to Han ethnicity, and thus the Han Taiwanese should be part of China. China reserves a preferential treatment for the Taiwanese for political and symbolic considerations. The Chinese consider the Taiwanese as members of one family, being socially in-group opposed to an out-group of foreigners, such as American or French business. This Chinese in-group and Han-centered national identity has been reinforced lately because of the strongly growing Chi-

nese nationalism for two main reasons. Firstly, China’s modern history is characterized by many foreign aggressions; therefore it is a history of humiliation. The people refer to nationalism as both a consequence and means to reinforce national identity during times of crisis. In China, the leader who gives up territory is considered a “national renegade” who transfers national humiliation to the nation. For example, Li Honzhang became a traitor for his involvement in the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki during the Qing Dynasty, thus ceding the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores islands to Japan. Secondly, the rapidly growing economic development of China has provoked a growing fear among western nations. The West’s threatening reaction to China’s rise has developed internal unity among Chinese citizens. They consider nationalism as the best way to preserve Chinese unity, for the survival of both the Chinese and the Chinese Communist Party government. Three circumstances have contributed to the growing nationalism in China. The Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade by NATO in 1999, the Anti-Secession law in 2005, and the anti-China protests during the Olympic torch relay in 2008. During the three events, the huge reactions by the Chinese people demonstrate that the growing nationalism is now beyond the government’s scope (Li, 2014:137).

#### Rule transformation

Rule transformation happens when a change in the preoccupations and priorities of the competing actors has a direct influence on the entire structure of the conflict.

From the above analysis of the conflict, we can observe that there is a huge difference in the rule as determined by the claims expressed by the ROC and the PRC vis-à-vis Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty issue. In addition, since 1949, through social and cultural experiences observed by the Taiwanese, there

are has been a shift from the sovereignty issue towards a Taiwan identity issue including ethnic identity and civic identity. This has been impeding reunification since the rules and the positions held by each side are rather inflexible. There is no important positive development relating to rules transformation, yet a slight shift has occurred. For instance, the resumption of the negotiations between SEF and ARATS, three links, and tourism are some living examples.

#### Structural transformation

The Structural transformation which involves changes in the whole structure of inter-party relations, a new power structure, or a change in existing structure. The structure encompasses the social environment of the conflict, the trend of relations between the actors and the encompassing social and political systems and institutions that surround and characterizes the relations. The structural transformation is the area that can impressively change the trend of the Taiwan Strait conflict. The structure between the parties in the cross-Strait relations has been influenced by the confrontations in international relations, mainly the Soviet-US confrontation, the Sino-Soviet-US relations, and the increasing US hegemony in the region. As argued above, actor transformation is not enough to facilitate the resolution because the existing rule is unconducive to a resolution. Throughout history, there have been some structural transformations in the cross-Strait relations. During the Cold War era, the bipolarization in world politics deepened the divergence between the actors.

#### Relationship Transformation

Military buildup, fear, bitterness, lack of mutual trust and hostility have become the norms of interaction, leading both China and Taiwan to remain distrustful and suspicious of each other's actions. The above analysis

demonstrates no significant achievement in any of the levels of transformation in cross-Strait relations. To some degree, there has been progress at actor level in Taiwan but that could not be sustained because of the high degree of political development as compared to China. These dimensions of transformation are mutually interdependent. For instance, the growing interdependence can ameliorate the relations between the parties, which can transform the rule or the actors.

#### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, the analysis above addresses the different questions presented earlier. The shift in the issues underlying the conflict and the inefficiency of the conflict management mechanism that has been explored demonstrate that there is a need to transform the conflict for a successful resolution and political integration. The most important strategy is to apply all the tracts of multitrack diplomacy which could favorably contribute to transform the actors, the issues, the structure and even the rule of the game.



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### About UB

The University of Bridgeport is an international, doctoral-intensive, comprehensive university, offering award-winning academic programs in a variety of innovative undergraduate and graduate degree programs. Our 50-acre, seaside campus overlooks Long Island Sound on Connecticut's corporate Gold Coast, and is within easy driving distance of New York City and Boston.

Our student-faculty ratio is 15:1, and our full- and part-time faculty members include Fulbright Scholars, National Science Foundation Fellows, Ford Fellows, National Endowment for the Humanities Fellows, American Council for Learned Societies Scholars and Phi Beta Kappa Scholars. Some 32 percent of our students are members of minorities and students from more than 80 countries live and learn within our community.





# UB

## Master of Arts in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies

### Concentrations

- Negotiation and Diplomacy
- International Political Economy and Development
- Global Management
- Global Communication

### Program Overview

The Master of Arts in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies is a 12-course, multidisciplinary degree program designed for current and future professionals who require an in-depth understanding of this pivotal engine of the world political economy. The curriculum is intended to equip students with the knowledge, skills and experience necessary to conduct research and interpret developments in the Pacific Rim, as well as develop a foundation in an East Asian language. The program is highlighted by practical hands-on training.

As a capstone experience, students complete an overseas internship.

The program prepares students with the crucial background needed for a successful career in this emerging region, whether in business, government or academia. Students may choose from four area concentrations. Students develop an understanding of the political, economic and social issues of East Asia as well as an understanding of the role that language and culture play in its growing political economy. Students accepted into the program may choose one of four tracks in business, global communication, diplomacy or development.



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# GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY

GAS presents a  
**SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING**

List of Speakers


<b>MALEA ONTRANTO</b> END TRAFFICKING FELLOW U.S. FUND FOR UNICEF	<b>ALICIA KINSMAN</b> MANAGING ATTORNEY PROJECT RESCUE - IBCNN	<b>GUEST SPEAKER</b> INTERNATIONAL ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFICKING NGO
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GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY 


Wed, April 15th  
Carlson 2B3  
@ 6pm

**CAN A PARK STATUE DESTABILIZE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL RELATIONS?**

by Thomas J. Ward  
Dean of the College of  
Public and International Affairs

GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY 


Discovery Pavilion  
Feb 25  
8:40 pm




**WHY A CAREER IN FOREIGN SERVICE?**

sponsored by the College of Public and International Affairs

MARCH 25TH  
CARLSON 153  
8:40 PM



Ana Escrogima  
Diplomat in Residence  
Foreign Service Officer  
State Department

GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY 

Approved for Posting  
Staff Inmate C-4  
Removed by: 3/26/13

GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY 

**ARE WE ALL CHARLIE?**

Special roundtable  
discussion of Paris attacks

Wednesday, Jan 28th  
8.30 to 10pm  
Discovery Pavillion




GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY 

**cuba libre**  
a new chapter in u.s.- cuba relations

WED, FEB 11TH  
8.40 PM  
DISCOVERY PAVILLION



GLOBAL AFFAIRS SOCIETY 

**THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE**

100 YEARS LATER: WHAT NOW?  
with Prof. Robert Riggs

Wed, April 29  
Discovery Pavilion  
@ 8:40 pm

